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EURIBOR BASIS SWAP SPREADS – ESTIMATING DRIVING FORCES 
 
Objective of the study 
 
The objective of the study is to investigate how credit risk, liquidity and news about 
macroeconomic factors affect to Euribor basis swap spreads. Euribor basis swap 
spreads should trade in flat in order to no-arbitrage condition to hold. However, 
during the current financial crisis spreads have increased significantly. I will regard 
euro countries’ and Euribor panel banks’ credit default swap spreads as a credit risk 
component and the actions of the European Central Bank as a factors of liquidity 
component. 
 
Data and methods 
 
The study is empirical and will be based on linear regression and co-integration 
analysis. Data consist of time-series data from July 2008 to December 2011. I will 
first investigate relations between explanatory variables and 3 month versus 12 
month Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities using descriptive 
statistics. After that, I will present proper empirical test results. In first phase, I will 
use unit root tests to see are time-series stationary. After they are stated to be 
stationary in differences and log-differences I will proceed to conduct short-run 
linear regression tests using ordinary least squares estimation. Finally, I will conduct 
Engle-Granger and Johansen co-integration tests in order to find out is there long-
run relationship between the explanatory variables and Euribor basis swap spreads.  
 
Results 
 
Results are in some sense twofold. Ordinary least squares provide rather different 
test results than co-integration tests for the short-run. In the long-run, I found only 
one robust co-integrating relation when applying both co-integration methods. The 
relation was between Euribor basis swap spreads and Eurobond yield. In the short-
run I found five significant factors that could model the movements of Euribor basis 
swap spreads. The coefficients of determination were 30 per cent (2 year) and 25 per 
cent (5 year). Based on OLS results I could accept my initial hypothesis about 
significant components being credit risk, liquidity and news about macroeconomic 
variables. On the other hand based on co-integration tests I could accept liquidity 
component.     
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The effect of turbulence on money and capital markets started in the second half of 
2007 has created a need to explore forces that have caused multiple uncommon 
phenomena in markets, such as the increase of the basis spreads quoted on the 
market between interest rate instruments and swaps particularly (Amentrano & 
Bianchetti, 2009). In the second half of 2007 the deterioration in a relatively limited 
segment of the U.S. subprime mortgage sector started to spread to other markets as 
well. Uncertainty in markets caused banks and other financial institutions to increase 
their liquidity. The markets were uncertain about forthcoming losses which caused 
financial institutions to be reluctant to lend each other in money markets, especially 
in longer maturities. Financial institutions were afraid of counterparty risks. As a 
consequence basis spreads of interbank short-term interest rates, Treasury bill rates 
and swap rates widened. The situation in money and capital markets became more 
severe in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in U.S. 
Reduction in willingness to take on counterparty risk and even more significant 
increase in demand to hold liquidity among financial institutions froze funding 
markets temporarily (Bank for International Settlements, 2010).   
 
In the aftermath of the crisis in June 2011 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
said “the U.S. economy is recovering at a moderate pace from both the worst financial 
crisis and the most severe housing bust since the Great Depression” (MacKenzie C., 
2011). Meanwhile in euro area, markets are still unreliable. The increased costs of 
financial support schemes as well as recession induced falls in tax revenues have 
caused in most advanced economies a dramatic increase in the supply of government 
paper and raised concerns about the impact of fiscal imbalances on long-term debt 
financing costs (Caporale, G.M. & Girardi, A., 2011). Understanding the effects of 
growing levels of public debt on long-term yields is a difficult task. Economic theory 
suggests that deteriorated fiscal position will lead to higher real interest rates with a 
harmful effect on private investment and consumption plans (Buiter, 1976). The 
ongoing debt crisis in Greece and Italy as well as Portugal in spring of 2011, and 
Ireland in 2010 are effective reminders of liquidity crisis in the euro area.  
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Focus of this study is not on government bonds and their spreads. Instead I will 
concentrate on Euribor basis swap spreads, since there is not much evidence on 
which are the driving forces of Euribor basis swap spreads quoted on the market 
between two plain vanilla interest rate instruments. The reason for this is that 
spreads widened not until during the financial crisis. Previous to 2007 basis spreads 
were substantially low reflecting a normal, healthy state of the economy.  
 
There are several studies focusing on pricing and hedging interest rate derivatives in 
pre- and post-crisis framework. As indicated in the paper of Amentrano & Bianchetti 
(2009), they are studying “old traditional style of single curve market practice for 
pricing and hedging interest rate derivatives and the recent market evolution, 
triggered by the credit crunch crisis”, which have imposed the new post-credit crunch 
multi-curve approach for pricing and hedging interest rate derivatives. Among 
several other researchers, Morini (2009) and Amentrano & Bianchetti (2009) have 
studied more consistent pricing formulas of basis swaps. In chapter 3, I will present 
basics of different valuation approaches to basis swaps and the pre- and post crisis 
pricing framework of Euribor basis swaps in order to understand how financial crisis 
has changed the structure of pricing interest rate derivatives. 
 
With regard to this study, the most significant pressure will be on forces driving basis 
swap spreads. Previously studies on the basis swap spreads have largely focused on 
swap counterparty default risk as the main driver of swap spreads. However, due to 
collateralization, the counterparty risk is very low in Euribor basis swaps but Euribor 
rates embed a credit risk component as they are quoted on the interbank market. 
Duffie, D. & Huang, M. (1996), Minton, B. A. (1997) and Cossin, D. & Pirotte, H. 
(1997) have studied only one factor, default risk, to explain the magnitude and 
behavior of swap spreads. Fehle, F. (2002) examined in his paper “The Components 
of Interest Rate Swap Spreads: Theory and International Evidence”, the  two 
additional components being Libor spreads and swap market structure effect, which 
can cause positive swap spreads even in the absence of counterparty default risk 
which is the case with collateralized swaps. Poskitt, R. (2010) in his paper “Do 
liquidity or credit effects explain the behavior of the Libor-OIS spread”, decomposes 
spread into credit risk and liquidity risk components using credit default swaps 
written on Libor panel banks as a proxy for the credit risk component embedded in 
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market rates and bid-ask spreads together with the number of dealers active in the 
market as a proxy for liquidity premium. 
 
There are not any comprehensive studies conducted on how several factors affect the 
basis swap markets, especially in the euro zone. In this sense, there exists a niche to 
empirically investigate what the effects of presumable driving forces on basis spreads 
are and how they effect on these markets. 
 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
 
The existence of wide basis swap spreads between various underlying rate tenors can 
be seen as an indicator of impairment in the financial markets. During the financial 
turmoil basis swap spreads have been significantly different from zero, one of the 
consequences of liquidity crisis. I will give an overall description of basis swaps and 
finally clarify the current market state through example.      
 
A money market basis swap is an exchange of floating rate payments based on one 
rate tenor for floating rate payments based on another rate tenor (Porfirio, P. & 
Tuckman, B., 2003) on over-the counter market. An imaginary basis swap to 
exchange the default-free rate of one term for the default-free rate of another term 
should trade nearly flat as was the case before summer 2007. Intuitively, the 
definition of the term structure of default-free rates is precisely that borrowers and 
lenders are indifferent between, for example 3 month money rolled over a quarter 
and 6 month money. However, observed money market basis swaps trade with a 
built-in credit premium. Credit premium built into a particular rate tenor differs from 
that built into another. Consider again 3 month versus 6 month rate tenors, where 
the credit risk of a 6 month loan is greater than that of rolling over 3 month loan for a 
6 month. A probability of counterparty default is greater the longer is a tenor 
(Porfirio, P. & Tuckman, B., 2003). The famous liquidity preference theory by Hicks 
(1939) predicts that term premium have a positive relationship with time to maturity. 
The expected holding period yield on a long-term rate includes a higher premium 
than that on a medium-term rate, which includes a higher premium than on a short-
term rate (Bailey, 2005). Basis swaps in the market are collateralized so that there is 
zero credit risk in the basis swap. Therefore it is necessary to compensate the party 
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receiving the lower 3 month rate with a premium called basis spread between the 3 
month and the 6 month legs. Since August 2008 to December 2011, the basis swap 
spread to exchange 3 month Euribor with 12 month Euribor over 1 year was averaged 
+45 basis points. 
 
1.2 Objectives and contribution of the study 
 
Despite the nature of basis swap spreads increase since 2007, there have been only a 
few studies focusing on forces driving basis swap spreads. In the economics 
literature, empirical papers have consisted impacts of credit risk on the pricing of 
swaps and most of them deal with only U.S. dollar interest rate swaps. I will now 
discuss shortly the results of central previous studies and then link them to 
contributions of this study. Finally I will present contributing factors and research 
problems together with the hypothesis.  
 
Duffie, D. & Huang, M. (1996) studied that default risk contributions to swap spreads 
can be expected to be more irrelevant than the comparable bond credit spreads 
between the counterparties because the risk in a swap is lower since only net interest 
payments are being changed. Fehle (2002) extended the study of Duffie, D. & Huang, 
M. (1996) to two additional components, Libor spreads and swap market structure 
effect, and performed empirical analysis using a weekly panel dataset of swaps 
denominated in seven various currencies between 1992 and 2000. Evidence of his 
analysis is supportive for all the three swap spread components tested. Default risk, 
Libor spreads, and market structure were found significant across all swap maturities 
and denominating currencies, and the findings were generally robust over time. 
Heider et al. (2008) developed a model that could explain high unsecured rates in 
interbank markets, excessive liquidity needs by banks and the ineffectiveness of 
central banks liquidity injections in restoring interbank activity. They based their 
model on adverse selection problem. When the level and spillover of the credit risk is 
minor, the adverse selection problem is not an issue. Vice versa, when the penalty 
built into the interbank rate rises highly rated borrowers drop out of the market 
causing breakdown of the interbank market. Michaud and Upper (2008) studied 
Libor-OIS spread in several currencies. They found that Libor-OIS spreads moved 
together with measures of credit risk. In addition, they found that of the ten 
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extraordinary liquidity management operations conducted by central bank in U.S., 
Libor-OIS spread declined in seven cases, while credit default swap spread on Libor 
panel banks declined in only five cases. In addition to Michaud and Upper, Frank and 
Hesse (2009) examined U.S. dollar Libor-OIS spread and effects of Federal Reserve’s 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) on spreads. TAF is a monetary policy program used by 
the Federal Reserve to help increase liquidity in the U.S. credit markets during the 
subprime crisis. European Central Bank’s long-term refinancing operations 
(presented in chapter 4) are quite similar than that of Federal Reserve’s TAFs. 
Authors found out that Libor-OIS spread narrowed following the announcement of 
FED’s TAF and the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations and announced cuts in 
federal funds rate and ECB’s discount rate. 
 
Basis swap spreads reflect increased liquidity risk and preferences of financial 
institutions for receiving payments with higher frequency. I will use several variables 
in order to estimate what the driving forces of basis spreads are. Forces such as the 
debt to GDP ratio, euro area government budget deficit to GDP ratio, European 
Central Bank’s actions, Eurobond yields, Eurobond and Euribor panel bank credit 
default swaps (CDS) and euro - U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate will be investigated 
in testing. I will present these factors in more detail in chapter 4. I will base my 
hypothesis partially on the results of previously conducted Libor-OIS studies. Thus, 
my hypothesis are that European Central Bank’s liquidity providing or absorbing 
actions together with its key interest rate policy, Euribor panel CDS or Eurobond CDS 
spreads together with Eurobond yields are the core determinants of Euribor basis 
swap spread movements. In addition, I will consider euro – U.S. dollar foreign 
exchange rate as a factor providing information about current macroeconomic state 
of euro area. I will specify my hypothesis further in chapter 4, where I present 
descriptive statistics and compare each variable with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor 
basis swap spread with 2 year and 5 year maturities. Contributions of various 
regressors will be examined in chapter 6 using linear regression model, and co-
integration tests of Engle-Granger and Johansen. First, I studied whether all datasets 
are stationary or not, using unit root test. Then, I estimated linear regression model 
for log-differentiated data, using OLS estimation. As a second test procedure I 
decided to study both long- and short-run relations between dependent and 
independent variables and conducted co-integration tests of Engle-Granger and 
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Johansen. Finally, I estimated error correction models. The methods applied in the 
study, can be found from chapter 5. 
 
Based on the background information presented, the present study addresses the 
following research questions: Why does the basis spread exist in markets in 
aftermath of financial crisis? What are the main driving forces behind Euribor basis 
swap spreads? Is it solely the liquidity or credit risk that causes such wide basis 
spreads? Does a long-run relation exist between Euribor basis swap spread and any 
explanatory factors? 
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2 CHARACTERISTICS OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET AND EURIBOR 
BASIS SWAPS 
 
This chapter will introduce Euribor basis swap, one of the basic plain vanilla swap 
instruments in over-the-counter (OTC) market. First, will be explained the 
functionality and importance of over-the-counter market regarding hedging purposes 
to banks, other financial institutions and firms. Secondly, the structure of Euribor 
basis swap will be explained in more detail. Finally, the pre- and post-crisis state of 
markets and quotations of Euribor basis swaps will be pointed out. 
 
2.1 Over-the-counter markets 
 
The total trading volume measured on over-the-counter market indicates that over-
the-counter market has become an important alternative to trading in exchanges 
(Hull, 2006. 2 – 3) The Bank for International Settlements has collected data from 
over-the-counter markets since 1998. Reflecting these figures it can be concluded that 
the outstanding over-the-counter market had grown to approximately twelve times 
greater than the world gross product, which was approximately USD 65 trillion in 
first half of 2011. Options on foreign interest rates and foreign exchange are the most 
popular products of over-the-counter markets (Hull, 2006. 199). 
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Figure 2.1 Notional amounts of outstanding derivatives in exchange market and over-the-
counter market 
8 
 
Over-the-counter market is a telephone- and computer-linked network of dealers. 
Trades are done through telephone or computer without meeting counterparties face 
to face. Trades in these markets are usually done between two counterparties, for 
example between financial institutions or financial institution and one of its clients 
such as corporate treasurer or fund manager. Financial institutions usually act as 
market makers in these markets. Thus they should be prepared to quote both bid and 
ask price anytime. (Hull, 2006. 2 – 3)  
 
Trades in over-the-counter market can be much larger than trades in exchange-
traded market. Terms of a contract in over-the-counter market do not have to be 
those specified by exchange market. The instruments are often structured by financial 
institutions to meet the needs of their clients. These may involve choosing exercise 
dates, strikes, barriers or more specific structures than in standard puts and calls.  
(Hull, 2006, 198 – 199) More complex options are sometimes referred to as exotic 
options. 
 
Most significant disadvantage of an over-the-counter market is that counterparty 
may default prior to expiration of the contract and will be not able to make the 
required payments. For example, counterparty B may default prior to expiration 
which exposes counterparty A to default and counterparty risk if A has currently a 
positive net present value (NPV). To cover counterparty risk for example in a basis 
swap contract, counterparties usually have contracted credit support annex (CSA) 
which requires counterparties to post collateral. At every margination date, the two 
counterparties check the value of the portfolio of mutual over-the-counter 
transactions adding to or subtracting from the collateral account the corresponding 
mark to market variation with respect to the preceding margination date (Binchetti & 
Carlicchi, 2011). The posted collateral amount is available to the creditor (positive 
NPV) while the debtor receives an interest on the collateral amount that it has posted. 
Credit support annex is a part of an International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) Master Agreement for transactions in over-the-counter market. ISDA is the 
drafting of confirmations between two representative swap counterparties that 
consist of clauses defining terminology used in swap agreements and what happens 
in the event of default. Actual credit support annex provide many other detailed 
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features that are out of the scope of this study. The recent credit crunch has effected 
increasingly to number of collateral agreements (Binchetti & Carlicchi, 2011).  
 
As mentioned in previous paragraph, counterparty A is exposed to a counterparty risk 
if it has currently a positive market value (NPV(A)>0) in a basis swap contract, then 
counterparty A expects to receive future cash flows from counterparty B. This can be 
considered like counterparty A has a credit with counterparty B. Mutually if 
counterparty B  has negative  market value (NPV(B)<0), then it expects to pay future 
cash flows to counterparty A. This can be considered like counterparty B has debt 
with counterparty A. In this case if the counterparty B defaults then the counterparty 
with positive market value can lose a large proportion of its hedge. Counterparty with 
positive market value might have to replace its hedge at current market conditions 
and prices which are less favorable than in the initial hedge. To reduce the 
counterparty risk associated with the risk of losing positive market value in the basis 
swap contract can be mitigated through a guarantee, called collateral agreement or 
credit support annex (CSA). Counterparty with positive market value can call 
collateral from other counterparty according to credit support annex. (Binchetti & 
Carlicchi, 2011) 
 
2.2 Euribor basis swap 
 
In a basis swap two different floating reference rate cash flows are exchanged (Hull, 
2006. 698). In a case of Euribor basis swap there can be for example cash flow 
exchanges between 3 month Euribor and 12 month Euribor. A basis swap is widely 
used for risk management purposes among market participants (Hull, 2006. 698). 
Basis swap markets are available for financial institutions, banks and their clients 
(firms). Usually these markets are not available for private customers as notional 
principal of these hedges can be millions of euros. The principal itself is not 
exchanged in a single-currency basis swap that is why it is called notional principal 
(Hull, 2006. 151). Basis swaps are generally only by market professionals such as 
financial institutions whose assets and liabilities are dependent on different floating 
rates (Flavell, 2002. 137).  
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In order to understand how Euribor basis swap can be used to hedge underlying cash 
flows, Figure 2.2 illustrates the simplified process and reasoning to enter into Euribor 
basis swap in a case of credit institution, which operates in granting loans to 
municipalities and non-profit making companies and raises funds by issuing bonds.  
First consider the credit institution, which issues in a principal of 10 million euros 
floating rate note (FRN) with five year maturity, which has a variable coupon fixed at 
the beginning of each coupon period, for example quarterly. On a floating rate bond, 
interest is fixed at the beginning of the period to which it will apply and is paid at the 
end of the period (Hull, 2006. 152). In this case the floating rate is 3-month Euribor 
without margin. In a second stage financial institution grants a 10 million euros loan 
for five years to a customer that is willing to take the loan in 12-month Euribor + 70 
basis points (bps) margin where rate is fixed annually at the beginning of the period 
to which it will apply and is paid at the end of the period. Margin is the current 
pricing framework used by financial institution when granting a new credit to a 
customer. What happens at a third stage, is that a financial institution enters into 
Euribor basis swap with five year maturity since it is exposed to a basis risk for the 
next five years.  
 
Customer
(borrower)
EUR 10mil 
5y loan
12 m
EURIBOR 
+ 70bp
Credit 
institution
Bond issue 
Floating rate 
note (FRN)
(to investors)
EUR 10mil 5y
3m 
EURIBOR 
flat
Swap 
counterparty
(bank)
3m Euribor 
flat
Euribor basis swap
12m Euribor
-45 bp
(8.12.2011)
 
 
Basis risk is the exposure to change in basis, which is defined as difference between 
spot and futures prices in the futures market (Saber, 1994. 109). In other words basis 
risk is the risk that yields on assets and costs on liabilities are based on different rates 
Figure 2.2 Cash flows in a 3m Euribor vs. 12m Euribor basis swap contract
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and different rates will move in different directions. In the worst case scenario, the 
credit institution is paying higher funding cost and receiving lower interest yield from 
its lending. To hedge against basis risk, the credit institution decides to net its cash 
flows and enter into Euribor basis swap. Basis swaps can be seen as locking levels for 
forward basis risk (Sadr, 2009. 71).  
 
To go back to the third stage and Figure 2.2, in Euribor basis swap, credit institution 
receives 3 month Euribor without margin from swap counterparty and swap 
counterparty receives 12 month Euribor minus 43 basis points (spread) from a credit 
institution. It is worthwhile to notice that actually in the current pricing framework, 
credit institution is making a profit of +115 basis points as it is receiving 70 basis 
points margin across the market level from lending and paying 45 basis points 
funding cost below the market level. This calculation though is based only on current 
situation, meaning that if underlying rates will shift, then the case is different.  The 
quoted price of basis swap is called spread.  Market quotes of basis swaps are based 
on expected future difference between the two floating rate indexes (Sadr, 2009. 71). 
As quoted price of basis swap or spread may fluctuate in the markets it is also 
reasonable to consider perfect timing to enter into a basis swap. That is why it is 
essential to try to understand factors behind the basis movements.  
 
Usually financial institutions do swaps with several customers like credit institutions 
or non-financial companies and are basically entering into offsetting swap 
transactions with two different customers. Financial institutions such as J.P. Morgan 
and Goldman Sachs have an important role in acting as intermediary since customers 
like a credit institution or non-financial company, do not get in touch directly to 
arrange a swap with each other. Neither it is likely that two different customers 
willing to take offsetting swap transactions are contacting a financial institution at the 
same time. For this reason financial institution also act as market maker which 
means that they are prepared to enter into a swap without having offsetting swap 
with another counterparty. Plain vanilla basis swaps are usually structured so that the 
financial institution earns about 3 or 4 basis points on a pair of offsetting transactions 
(Hull, 2006. 153 – 154). In Euribor basis swaps contracted for example with swap 
counterparty in Figure 2.2 this would mean that credit institution would be paying 
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actually 12 month Euribor minus 43 basis point although it is quoted at 45 basis point 
at markets. 
 
2.3 Markets and quotations for Euribor basis swaps 
 
Basis swaps are quoted on the euro interbank market in terms of the difference 
between two swaps with the same fixed legs, for example 12 month tenor, and 
floating legs paying 3 month Euribor and 6 month Euribor in the case of 3 month 
versus 6 month Euribor basis swap. The frequency of the floating legs is the tenor of 
the corresponding Euribor rates. The Euribor rate is the reference rate for over-the-
counter transactions in the euro area and is defined as the rate at which euro 
interbank Deposits are being offered within the European Monetary Union zone by 
one prime bank belonging to the panel to another bank belonging to the panel at 
11:00 a.m. Brussels time. The Panel is composed currently of 42 banks selected 
among the European Union banks with the highest volume of business in the euro 
zone money markets. In addition, there are some large international banks from 
countries that are not members of the European Union with important euro zone 
operations. Thus Euribor rates are reflecting the average cost of funding of banks in 
the interbank market. During the crisis, the solvency and solidity of the banking 
sector was questioned and the credit and liquidity risk and premiums associated with 
interbank counterparties sharply increased. The Euribor rates immediately reflected 
these dynamics and raise to their highest values on October 2008. (Binchetti & 
Carlicchi, 2011) 
 
As we can see from Figure 2.3, the basis swap spreads were actually even not quoted 
before the crisis. However, they suddenly increased in August 2007 as the first signs 
of the turmoil to follow appeared in US. mortgage loan markets. This was just a start 
and basis spreads peaked after 15th September 2008 when Lehman Brothers 
defaulted. According to Figure 2.3, there is a structural change in markets after 
Lehman Brothers crashed. Uncertainty started to reach the market already after U.S. 
the mortgage loan crisis. The basis swap involves a sequence of spot and forward 
rates carrying the credit and liquidity risk. Differences between different rate tenors 
and their forward rate agreements are primarily based on market’s forecast of future 
credit spreads fixed by supply and demand dynamics (Sadr, 2009. 71). In times of 
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good financial health basis spreads run around zero but in times of financial turmoil 
those can easily explode (Sadr, 2009. 71). Thus the basis spread explosion can be 
interpreted in terms of the different credit and liquidity risk carried by the different 
underlying Euribor/Libor rate tenors. From Figure 2.3 it can be seen that after the 
crisis burst market players have had a preference for receiving floating rate payments 
with higher frequency, for example quarterly indexed to Euribor 3 month, with 
respect to floating payments with lower frequency, for example annually indexed to 
Euribor 12 month and pay a premium for the difference (Binchetti & Carlicchi, 2011). 
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Figure 2.3 Daily observations of Euribor basis swaps with two and five year maturities of different rate 
tenors from 28th July 2003 to 8th December 2011 
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In Figure 2.4 is a snapshot of the market quotations as of 8th December, 2011 for the 
four Euribor basis swap term structures corresponding to the four Euribor tenors 1 
month, 3 month, 6 month and 12 month. As one can see, in time interval of 1 year to 
30 year the basis spreads are monotonically decreasing from 95 to around 8 basis 
points. 
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High basis spreads reflect the higher liquidity risk encountered by financial 
institutions and the corresponding preference for receiving payments with higher 
frequency for example, quarterly instead of annually. Monotonically decreasing 
feature of Euribor basis swap spreads indicate that in a longer time interval, for 
example after 20 years basis spreads are approximately between 10 and 20 basis 
points according to current expectations. Thus in a long-run spreads are expected to 
narrow. 
 
Figure 2.4 Euribor basis swap spreads for different rate tenors and maturities from 1 year to 30 years 
for value 8th December 2011 
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3 PRICING AND VALUATION FRAMEWORK OF EURIBOR BASIS SWAPS 
 
In this chapter I will first concentrate on two different basis swap valuation methods 
used commonly in finance and economics course literature. Then I shortly present 
the pre-crisis single-curve and post-crisis multi-curve adaptation for pricing and 
valuation basis swaps. 
 
It might seem strange that basis swaps exist because an imaginary basis swap to 
exchange the default-free rate of one term for the default-free rate of another term 
should basically trade flat. This is the case because the compounded shorter-term 
rate must equal the longer-term rate and the arbitrage-free difference (spread) 
between these two should be zero.  (Sadr, 2009. 73)  
 
According to no-arbitrage condition the definition of the term structure of default-
free rates is precisely that borrowers and lenders should be indifferent between 3 
month money rolled over one year and 12 month money, otherwise there is arbitrage. 
Observed money market basis swaps exchange rates with a built-in credit premium, 
which is called basis spread. More precisely the credit premium built into one rate 
index differs from that built into another. For example, the credit risk of a 12 month 
loan is greater than that of rolling over 3 month loans for a year. The credit exposure 
is very important in a basis swap in which for example 3 month Euribor is exchanged 
to 12 month Euribor, namely the swap counterparty (bank) will make four quorterly 
payments before it gets its annual receipt. However with collateralization the two legs 
have both zero counterparty risk. A positive spread must be added to the 3 month leg 
to reach equilibrium in this context. For example in the Euribor basis swap without 
any counterparty default risk, 3 month Euribor plus a spread is fair against 12 month 
Euribor or other way around 3 month Euribor against 12 month Euribor minus a 
spread. In a basis swap, counterparties do not bear any credit risk built into the rates. 
They are only investigating the values of cash flows and comparing those of one 
certain rate against the value of another rate. (Tuckman & Porfirio, 2003)  
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In addition basis spreads are representing the relative supply and demand in the two 
cash markets, namely their liquidities and the inherent credit exposure   (Flavell, 
2002. 137). Liquidity risk may appear in at least three circumstances:  
 
1. Lack of liquidity to cover short term debt obligations thus running short 
euros. 
2. Lack of ability to liquidate assets thus run trading in a illiquid market with 
excessive bid-offer spreads. 
3. Lack of possibilities to borrow funds on the market due to excessive funding 
cost in the illquid market. (Acerbi & Scandolo, 2007) 
 
These three elements cause serious problems if they appear together simultaneosly. 
This is because a bank facing, for example, problem 1 and 2 will be still able to finance 
itself by borrowing funds on the market but if all three occurs simultaneosly then a 
bank is not able to finance itself anymore. In the beginning of the recent crisis these 
three scenarios occurred jointly at the same time generating a systemic lack of 
liquidity  (Michaud & Upper, 2008). 
 
When first initiated, an interest rate swap is worth zero or close to zero. After it has 
initiated and it has existed for some time its value might have become positive or 
negative depending on how underlying interest rates have evolved. There are two 
common valuation approaches to interest rate swaps. The first valuation is based on 
differences between two bonds and the second is based on portfolio of forward rate 
agreements (FRAs).  (Hull, 2006. 161) There does not necessarily exist forward rates 
in the markets for all different tenors. However any partcular forward curve can be 
constructed from each of the basis swap curves, using the Euribor/Libor forward 
curve, Euribor/Libor discount factors and swap rates (Flavell, 2002. 137). Forward 
rates indicate future expectations of the current expected development paths of short-
term interest rates. For example, forward rate of 3x6 indicates what is the current 
expectation of the level of 3 month rate fixed after 3 month for the next 3 month 
period. 
 
Figure 3.1 presents 3 month Euribor forward curve and 6 month Euribor discount 
curve. 12 month Euribor forward curve can be derived from 3 month forward curve 
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and 3 month vs. 12 month Euribor basis swap spreads by adding these two together. 
Markets generate 12 month Euribor forward curve along with this manner. 
Respectively, 3 month vs. 12 month Euribor basis swap spread could be derived using 
6 month discount curve plus 6 month vs. 12 month Euribor basis swap spread minus 
3 month forward rate. Yield curves are structured using cash rates, spot forward rate 
agreements (or alternatively futures) and swap rates. 
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the curve structures of 3 month forward curve and 6 month 
discount curve.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Forward and discount curves used in valuation and pricing for 1 year maturity to 30 
year maturity. Curves were generated using 30th March 2012 quotations. 
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For example in upper figure, curve from t0 to 3 month is constructed from Euribor 
rates, curve from 3 month to 2 year using futures or forward rate agreements and 2 
year onwards using swap rates. 6 month discount curve is constructed applying 
similar methods. 
 
3.1 Valuation in terms of bond prices 
 
From the point of view of the 3 month floating rate payer, a swap can be regarded as a 
long position in a 12 month floating rate note and a short position in a 3 month 
floating rate bond and of course vice versa from the point of view of the 12  month 
rate payer. Thus for 3 month payer 
 
     BBV mmSWAP 312 −=      (3.1) 
 
Now V SWAP is the value of the swap and B3m is the value of payments made in 3 
month floating rate leg and B12m correspondingly the value of payments received 12 
month floating rate leg. Floating rate bonds are worth the notional principal 
Figure 3.3 Structure of forward and discount curves for 50 years. Curves were generated using 
30th March 2012 quotations. 
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immediately after interest payment date that is Bfl = L. On the other hand 
immediately before the interest payment date B3m or B12m is equal to notional 
principal, L, plus floating payment, k. Thus discounting these gives us the value of 
both floating rate notes separately: 
)( *** trkL −+      (3.2) 
 
in which r* is the Euribor or swap zero rate for maturity of t*.  (Hull, 2006. 161 – 162) 
 
3.2 Valuation in terms of forward rate agreements (FRAs) 
 
Alternatively swap valuation can be and is generally done by using portfolios of 
forward rate agreements (FRAs). Consider the 3 month versus 12 month Euribor 
basis swap between a credit institution and a swap counterparty (bank) with five year 
maturity. The first exchanges of cash flows are known at the time the swap is 
negotiated but in the case of 3 month leg forthcoming nineteen exchanges and in the 
case of 12 month leg four exchanges can be regarded as forward rate agreements. 
Thus a plain vanilla interest rate swap can be regarded as a portfolio of forward rate 
agreements, by assuming that forward interest rates are realized and are used as 
discount factors for the cash flows.  (Hull, 2006. 163)  
 
At the outset of the swap the sum of values of the forward rate agreements underlying 
the swap should be zero (Hull, 2006. 164). Let us assume that there are risk-free 
interest rates rtenor(t) quoted by default-free banks for 3 month and 12 month at 
r3m(0) and r12m(0). Now the question is what should be the forward rates to be used 
for 3x6, 6x9 and 9x12 if it is assumed that banks are default-free. Then we can buy 
3x6, 6x9 and 9x12 forward rate agreements with the corresponding prices of X3x6, 
X6x9 and X9x12, borrow at r3m(0) for the first three months and roll it over quarterly, 
pay the principal and interest ((1 + r3m(0)/4)) in every 3 month with the principal and 
interest financed by a new loan at the current 3 month rate, r3m(3m) and invest the 
amount for next 12 months. In 12 months cash flows can be expressed in forms of the 
following equations: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )4/914/614/314/01 3333 mmm rrrr mmmm +×+×+×+ , (3.3) 
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which express cash flows we need to pay from successive loans. Equation 3.4 express 
reinvested payoff of the forward rate agreements one receives and equation 3.5 
express received cash flows from investment as the 12 month investment matures. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 4/963 1299663333 XXXrrr xxxmmm mmm −−−++  (3.4) 
r m121 +      (3.5) 
 
Finally as it cost nothing to enter these transactions, in this theoretical illustration 
under efficient markets, the no-arbitrage condition requires that final amounts be the 
same in 12-month and X3x6, X6x9 and X9x12 must satisfy:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) rXXXr mxxxm 1212996633 14/14/14/14/01 +=+×+×+×+   (3.6) 
 
In normal state of the economy and under competitive markets with free-entry, above 
relationship should hold. However, basis swaps are bilateral agreements and thus 
there is a limited access to this market, which may explain why the spread is not 
traded away. In addition, if we are dealing with default-free or vice versa risky 
counterparties of the same credit worthiness, the riskiest transaction is the longest 
maturity loan as it has the longest possible time and greatest probability to default. 
Although basis swaps are collateralized, Libor (Euribor) rates embed built-in credit 
premia because Libor (Euribor) rates are quoted in interbank markets.  Therefore in 
order to illustrate the existence of spread in above relationship, counterparty that is 
lending a 12 month, will require a rate higher than what is implied by shorter-term 
rates that are 3 month rate, 3x6, 6x9 and 9x12 forward rate agreements. In addition 
the credit spread is also adjusted further for liquidity of one rate tenor versus another 
tenor which can make the spreads trade negative (Sadr, 2009. 74). This is the reason 
why four successive 3 month forward rate agreements do not appear to equate to a 12 
month forward rate agreement and the error term, which I call spread has to be 
added. Notice that spread term can be added either on left hand side or right hand 
side, but its sign is opposite. This can be formulated as: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )spreadrXXXr mxxxm ++=+×+×+×+ 1212996633 14/14/14/14/01   (3.7) 
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Currently in markets, the spread is negative in above relationship. Thus counterparty 
that is receiving 3 month tenor in a swap will get 3 month rate plus spread or vice 
versa pay 12 month tenor minus spread as noted in above relationship.  Finally both 
cash flows are discounted using the Euribor/swap zero curve and the swap value will 
be obtained by subtracting. 
 
3.3 Pricing from single-curve approach towards multi-curve approach 
 
To evaluate Euribor basis swaps correctly counterparties have to decide what funding 
index or yield curve is to be used. Is the index Euribor 3 month, Euribor 6 month or 
Eonia, for instance. Most plain vanilla swaps have been previously indexed to 
unsecured interbank, Libor or in the case of euro, Euribor, rates with  6 month 
tenors.  With the recent financial crisis the reliability of Euribor/Libor as a 
benchmark rate has been challenged. More focus has been put towards overnight 
indexed swaps –rate and in the case of euro, euro overnight indexed average (Eonia) 
rate as these rates are keyed to actual traded policy rates. (Sadr, 2009. 74–76) The 
diffusion of collateral agreements among interbank counterparties during the recent 
crisis has invoked the use of Eonia as a discounting rate. By no-arbitrage condition, 
the credit support annex (CSA) margination rate and the discounting rate of future 
cash flows must match. However in the case of absence of credit support annex, a 
bank should discount future cash flows using its own funding cost term structure 
(Binchetti & Carlicchi, 2011). This implies an important problem of mismatch  as 
counterparties assigns a different present value to the same future cash flow. 
 
In addition to response to the recent crisis the classical pricing framework based on a 
single yield curve used to calculate forward rates and discount factors has been 
abandoned. There are several papers from Amentrano, Bianchetti, Carlicchi and 
Morini to name but a few, focusing on pricing and hedging interest rate derivatives in 
pre- and post-crisis framework. As discussed in the paper of Amentrano & Bianchetti 
(2009) they are studying both old traditional style of single-curve market practice for 
pricing and hedging interest rate derivatives and the recent market practice, known 
as multi-curve market practice, triggered by the credit crunch crisis.  
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Single-curve pricing framework does not take into account neither the market 
information carried by the basis swap spreads that are no longer negligible nor the 
interest rate market that is segmented to corresponding instruments with different 
underlying rate tenors characterized by different dynamics. Thus, pricing and 
hedging an interest rate derivative on a single yield curve can make prices and hedge 
ratios less stable and more difficult to interpret. (Bianchetti, 2009) 
 
Multi-curve pricing takes into account the market segmentation as empirical 
evidence and incorporates the new interest rate dynamics into a multiple curve 
framework. Discounting curves are the yield curves used to discount futures cash 
flows that must be constructed and selected such that to reflect the cost of funding of 
the counterparty, in connection with the actual nature of the specific contract that 
generates the cash flows. In proportion forwarding curves are the yield curves used to 
compute forward rates that must be constructed and selected according to the tenor 
of the rate underlying the actual contract to be priced. (Binchetti & Carlicchi, 2011)  
 
In the single-curve approach a unique yield curve is built and used to price and hedge 
any interest rate derivative on a given currency. This is equivalent to assume that 
there exists a unique fundamental underlying short rate process that is able to model 
and explain the whole term structure of interest rates of all tenors. Single-curve 
approach is not guaranteed to be an arbitrage free model because discount factors 
and forward rates obtained from a given yield curve through interpolation method 
are not necessarily consistent with those obtained by a no-arbitrage model. In 
practice bid-ask spreads, transaction costs and limited access hide any arbitrage 
possibilities. (Bianchetti, 2009) 
 
Multi-curve framework is consistent with the present market situation. However it is 
a much more complicated model. First, the discounting curve must be built with 
particular care as there is no general principle for the discounting curve construction 
at the moment. The forwarding curves construction is driven by the underlying rate 
homogeneity principle. (Bianchetti, 2009) Basically in the discounting curve 
construction counterparties are currently using OIS discounting or are in a 
transitional phase towards adaptation of it. In spite of the difference when applying 
either OIS or Libor is very minor, it might cause significant valuation differences 
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when notional principals are hundreds of millions. Second, building multiple curves 
requires multiple quotations and thus many more bootstrapping instruments must be 
considered (Bianchetti, 2009). Third, appropriate interpolation algorithms are 
crucial to produce smooth forward curves (Bianchetti, 2009). Fourth, multiple 
bootstrapping instruments implies multiple sensitivities which set challenges to 
hedging as it becomes more complicated (Bianchetti, 2009). 
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4 DATA 
 
This chapter will describe datasets that I selected implicitly to model Euribor basis 
swap spreads. I will explain effects of the multiple variables under investigation and 
the reasoning behind the selected variables. Ongoing financial crisis has proven the 
complexity of economy and the functionality against the theories of economics. 
Datasets in the study consist of Eurobond yields, Eurobond credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads, euro zone budget deficit to GDP, euro zone government debt to GDP, the 
actions of European Central Bank, the CDS spreads of Euribor panel banks and euro 
– U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate. Datasets consist of daily observations gathered 
from Bloomberg and European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse. I will set 
my hypotheses one by one in the end of each specific subchapter. Hypotheses are 
based on conclusions made from the descriptive statistics and figures. 
 
I gathered the data on 8th December 2011 and the sample period is between 10th July, 
2008 and 8th December, 2011 as the earliest observation was available from 10th July, 
2008 for all variables used in the study. The sample period represents the period just 
before and from the beginning of the actual crisis to the current state of the market 
and consist of 879 observations. The nature of the crisis has changed during the 
sample period. In the very beginning, everything initiated from U.S. mortgage sector 
in 2007, and just one year later, the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused illiquidity 
and uncertainty in markets all over the world. Later the crisis has located especially to 
banks in euro area and to some members of European Monetary Union that have not 
been able to fulfil the requirements of Maastricht Treaty during their EMU 
membership. These countries are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (PIIGS-
countries). 
 
4.1 Euribor basis swap spread 
 
Fiqure 4.1 presents motions of Euribor basis swap spreads over the sample period. As 
we can see, spreads explode when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. 
Later on, range has been smaller and basis swap spreads have fluctuated between 
zero and forty basis points. In July 2011, there was again a peak in spreads, especially 
in 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity. There can be many 
25 
 
explanations for sudden change, for example European Central Bank’s decision in 7th 
July to increase the rate of the main refinancing operations by 25 basis points. I will 
present the operations of European Central Bank in more detail in subchapter 4.1.5. 
Altogether, spreads have been progressing mostly with positive upward trend since 
beginning of the 2009. 
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Table 4.1 reports summary of descriptive statistics of Euribor basis swap spreads over 
the sample period. Means of Euribor basis swap spreads between different rate tenors 
and maturities ranges from 11,10 (6M vs. 12M 5y) to 34,17 (3M vs. 12M 2y) basis 
points and between a maximum of 77,30 (3M vs. 12M 2y) and a minimum of 0,10 
(6M vs. 12M 2y) basis points over the sample period.  Median ranges from 10,30 (6M 
vs. 12 M 5y) to 29,70 (3M vs. 12M 2y) basis points.  Table 4.1 points a significant fact 
that means of basis spreads are lower in 5 year maturities. This may indicate that 
markets expect spreads to narrow more in a five year period than for example in a 
two year period. In addition, Table 3.2 supports the inverted slope of Euribor basis 
swap spread over multiple maturities. Standard deviation ranges from 3,31 (1M vs. 
3M 5y) to 14,66 (3M vs. 12M 2y) basis points. 
 
Figure 4.1 Euribor basis swap spreads from sample period (10/7/2008 – 8/12/2011) 
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bs3vs6y2 bs3vs6y5 bs1vs3y2 bs1vs3y5 bs3vs12y2 bs3vs12y5 bs6vs12y2 bs6vs12y5
Mean 16,64 12,26 21,00 16,31 34,17 23,36 17,53 11,10
Median 16,50 13,10 20,90 16,40 29,70 23,90 14,70 10,30
Standard Deviation 4,20 3,86 4,40 3,31 14,66 8,97 12,14 6,82
Kurtosis 0,47 -0,79 0,06 -0,60 0,52 -0,34 0,26 -0,44
Skewness -0,13 -0,42 0,29 -0,09 1,27 0,56 1,04 0,64
Jarque-Bera 10,31 49,19 12,09 14,18 244,24 49,91 159,72 67,98
Minimum 4,40 3,10 11,10 7,70 13,90 8,80 0,10 0,60
Maximum 26,50 18,50 34,50 23,10 77,30 44,70 53,20 26,40
Count 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
 
 
Skewness is a measure of how symmetric or asymmetric the distribution is with 
respect to its mean. A value greater than zero is the degree to which the distribution is 
skewed in the positive direction and likewise, a value less than zero is the degree to 
which the distribution is skewed in the negative direction with respect to normal 
distribution. Kurtosis is similarly a descriptor of the shape of a probability 
distribution and it measures peakness of the distribution with respect to mode. A 
positive value, greater than +3, of kurtosis implies relatively peaked shape and flat 
tails of the distribution with respect to normal distribution. In proportion, 
distribution with kurtosis smaller than +3, implies a relatively flat distribution. Using 
the skewness and kurtosis of the least squares residuals the Jarque-Bera test for 
normality can be computed. If the data is normally distributed, chi-squared 
distribution with two degrees of freedom, the Jarque-Bera statistic can be used to test 
the hypothesis that the data is from a normal distribution. With the 5 % level of 
significance this means that test result have to be compared against the critical value 
of 5,99. Null hypothesis is that the distribution is normally distributed, which means 
that if test result is below critical value then null hypothesis is accepted, otherwise 
rejected.  (Hill at al, 2001) 
 
From Table 4.1 we can see that five of eight basis swap spreads are positively skewed 
to the right and the rest are negatively skewed to the left. The values of kurtosis 
implicate flat distributions different from the assumption of normal distribution. 
Neither skewness nor kurtosis supports the null hypothesis that data is normally 
distributed. The values of the Jarque-bera test are reported as well and they confirm 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of Euribor basis swap spreads 
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the rejection of null hypothesis. Thus, Euribor basis swap spreads are not normally 
distributed. 
 
4.2 Eurobond yield 
 
In the first hand, I will regard Eurobond yield as a factor of credit risk component. 
However, interpretation is twofold as it may also indicate relationship with liquidity 
component. That is because for example every time when European central bank will 
buy government bonds from secondary markets in order to pull down government 
bond yields, it inevitably increases liquidity in markets.  
 
I constructed Eurobond yields from market quotations of 2 year, 5 year and 10 year 
generic government bond indices of eleven different EMU-countries, later expressed 
just “country panel”. This is because there are no Eurobonds issued currently in the 
markets. Ongoing debt crisis in the euro area has invoked a severe discussion of 
Eurobonds in European Commission. There are at least three different suggestions 
how to implement Eurobonds, but the detailed presentation of those, are beyond the 
limited scope of this study. However, the basic idea in Eurobonds is according to 
Delpla & von Weizsäcker (2011) that they are covered by joint and several guarantee. 
Thus each country, each year, guarantees all the Eurobond of all other participating 
countries to be issued the following year. The joint and several guarantees will ensure 
that Eurobond would be considered even safer investment than the current 
benchmark bond which is the German Bund. This would mean that for example 
Greece would be able to borrow money with the same funding cost as for example 
Germany. 
 
In order to construct Eurobond for the estimation purposes of the study, I will 
assume that countries belonging to country panel jointly represent the current 
financial state of the whole euro area economy. Thus, the weight and the current state 
of each member in country panel will affect to the Eurobond yield. Of course, if 
Eurobonds will be issued in future, the panel will cover all European Monetary Union 
members. Generic government bond yield reflect the current market yield quoted in 
markets for given government bond with given maturity. Each country belonging to 
the country panel has its own weight, which I derived as GDPcountry panel 
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member/GDPEurozone. For example each daily observation of generic government bond of 
Finland has been weighted using 2,06 % weight. Table 4.2 presents derived weights 
that are based on the average of quarterly gross domestic products of given panel 
member from 2002 to 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 presents Eurobond yields with 2, 5 and 10 year maturities with respect to 
3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities. In the 
uppermost is the 10 year Eurobond curve, in the middle 5 year Eurobond curve and 
in the bottom is 2 year Eurobond curve (take a look e.g. 10th March 2010). After 
Lehman Brothers collapsed, bond yields with shorter maturities first decreased and 
then remained quite steady towards the end of 2010. During the sample period, bond 
yields have reflected normal, upward-sloping yield curve as bond yields with longer 
maturities have offered higher returns due to the risks associated with time. The 
liquidity theory by Hicks is one of the theories that have been presented, for what 
determines the term structure of interest rates. Hicks hypothesized that investors are 
typically risk averse and thus to induce them to hold bonds with longer maturities 
they must be compensated with higher rate than the average of expected future rates 
by risk premium that increases when maturity increases, meaning upward-sloping 
term structure of interest rates (Fabozzi, 1993). However, several studies have 
rejected the theory presented by Hicks. From the beginning of 2011, bond yields have 
been increasing especially in shorter maturities and as we can see from Figure 4.2 
that the trend has been currently towards the inverted shape of the yield curve at 
least in maturities from 2 to 10 years. Inverted yield curve is rare and is often seen as 
a forecast of the turning points of the business cycle as well as lower interest rates in 
the future (Adrian et al. 2009).  
Table 4.2 Members of country panel and average of quarterly gross domestic products from 2002 to 
2010. 
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Weight 3,36 % 4,43 % 2,06 % 21,30 % 29,35 % 2,29 % 2,24 % 16,80 % 6,18 % 2,16 % 10,11 %
29 
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When comparing Eurobond yields to Euribor basis swap spreads, it is noteworthy 
that since the breakdown of Lehman Brothers, they have moved more or less in a 
similar fashion, especially 2 year Eurobond yield and Euribor basis swap spread with 
2 year maturity. Thus, I expect Eurobond yields and Euribor basis swap spreads to be 
significantly correlated. Correlation matrix presented in Appendix 1, supports the 
hypothesis. Two year Eurobond yield and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads are 
positively correlated in level stage with correlation coefficients of 0,50 (5 year) and 
0,54 (2 year).         
 
Table 4.3 reports summary of descriptive statistics of Eurobond yields over the 
sample period. Means of Eurobond between different maturities ranges from 2,27 
percentage (Eurobond 2y) to 3,93 percentage (Eurobond 5y) and between a 
maximum of 5,88 percentage (Eurobond 2y) and a minimum of 1,10 percentage 
(Eurobond 2y) over the sample period.  Median ranges from 1,81 percentage 
(Eurobond 2y) to 3,86 percentage (Eurobond 10y). Standard deviation ranges from 
0,39 percentage (Eurobond 10y) to 1,06 percentage (Eurobond 2y) reflecting the fact 
that short-term rates are more volatile. 
 
Figure 4.2 Eurobond yields (right axis) with 2 year, 5 year and 10 year maturities with respect to 3M 
vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads (left axis) with 2 and 5 year maturities. I 
constructed Eurobond yields from eleven different generic government bond yields that 
were chosen to country panel 
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Eurobond2y Eurobond5y Eurobond10y
Mean 2,27 3,10 3,93
Median 1,81 2,95 3,86
Standard Deviation 1,06 0,63 0,39
Kurtosis 0,41 -0,41 -0,64
Skewness 1,12 0,67 0,26
Jarque-Bera 188,10 71,71 24,61
Minimum 1,10 2,11 3,10
Maximum 5,88 4,94 5,05
Count 879 879 879
 
 
From Table 4.3 we can see that each Eurobond is positively skewed to the right end. 
The values of kurtosis below three implicate flat distributions different from the 
assumption of normal distribution. Neither skewness nor kurtosis supports the null 
hypothesis that data is normally distributed. The values of the Jarque-bera test as 
well, confirm the rejection of null hypothesis. Thus, Eurobond yields are not normally 
distributed. 
 
4.3 Eurobond credit default swap (CDS) spread 
 
I will regard Eurobond credit default swap as a factor of credit risk component. 
Previously conducted studies on Libor-OIS spread by Frank and Hesse (2009), 
Michaud and Upper (2008) and Heider et al. (2008) supports this assumption. 
 
I constructed Eurobond CDS spreads from market quotations of 5 year and 10 year 
mid-market credit default swap spreads similarly from eleven different EMU-
countries CDS spreads as Eurobond yields were constructed in previous subchapter. 
Neither Eurobond yields nor Eurobond credit default swaps are available currently in 
the markets. Credit default swaps with 2 year maturity were available only for 
Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia and for that reason 2 year Eurobond CDS was not 
constructed. In order to construct Eurobond CDS for the estimation purposes of the 
study, I assumed that countries belonging to country panel jointly represent the 
current credit default risk of the euro area economy. Thus, the weight and the current 
state of each member in country panel will affect to the Eurobond CDS spread 
similarly as was the case with Eurobond yields.  
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of Eurobond yields
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A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of a 
default by underlying entity such as a company, bank or government. Thus, a CDS 
can be used to hedge a position in a government bond, for instance. However, this 
requires that there is credit default swaps issued in the markets for the particular 
government bonds. The buyer of a credit default swap has right to sell bonds issued 
by the underlying entity for their face value (notional principal) if the financial entity 
defaults that is credit event occurs. The buyer of the credit default swap makes 
periodic payments, for example 360 basis points annually of notional principal to the 
seller until the end of maturity of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. In case of 
default by underlying entity, the buyer has either right to sell bonds issued by 
defaulted underlying entity with a face value or if the contract requires cash 
settlement, an independent calculation agent will poll dealers to determine mid-
market value of the cheapest deliverable bond. The percent of the notional principal 
that is paid per year is known as the CDS spread. Market makers are quoting credit 
default swaps as bid and offer on CDS spreads, for example a new 5 year credit 
default swap on euro area government bond might bid currently 357 basis points and 
offer 367 basis points according to Figure 4.3. The n-year CDS spread should be 
approximately equal to the excess of the par yield on an n-year risky bond, for 
example government bonds of Greece, over the par yield on an n-year risk-free bond, 
that is for example German government bond. If the spread between risky and risk-
free government bond yields are significantly higher than CDS spread, an investor 
can earn more than the risk-free rate by buying the risky bond and buying a 
protection. Conversely, if CDS spread is significantly higher than spread between 
risky and risk-free bond yields, an investor can borrow at less than the risk-free rate 
by shorting the risky bond and selling CDS protection. (Hull, 2006, 507 – 509) 
 
Figure 4.3 presents the graph of the constructed Eurobond CDS spreads over the 
sample period. It is noteworthy that 5 year and 10 year Eurobond CDS spreads both, 
move along approximately similar paths and there are no significant difference 
between the two spreads. In addition, compared to Eurobond yields (Figure 4.2) the 
Eurobond CDS spreads have increased relatively more than Eurobond yields. The 
movements of CDS spreads indicate that the “term structure” of CDS spreads have 
been almost flat as the difference between 10 year and 5 year CDS spread has been on 
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average 2,79 bps. However, from the beginning of September to mid September 2011 
the difference was temporarily negative, although recovering later back into positive. 
Negative differences between spreads indicate inverted “term structure” accompanied 
by higher risks on the short-end. Causes for the movement are difficult to analyze but 
to name a one potential factor, there was announcement of European Commission, 
European Central Bank and IMF joint team that had been discussing recent economic 
developments and reviewing policy implementation in the context of the fifth review 
of Greece's economic program (ECB, 2011). The economic program of Greece consists 
of financial support provided by the euro area Member States and the IMF to Greece 
in the context of a sharp deterioration of its financing conditions (European 
Commission, 2011). 
 
The Eurobond CDS spreads started to rise after Lehman Brothers crashed and 
problems started in the banking sector when the confidence suddenly disappeared. 
However, the ongoing debt crisis, the core of the euro area crisis, initiated from 
Ireland. The state of Ireland had guaranteed the six main Irish-based banks that had 
financed a real estate bubble in Ireland (Wikipedia, 2012). Irish banks had lost an 
estimated EUR 100 billion related to defaulted housing loans in the midst of the 
property bubble, which burst 2007  (Wikipedia, 2012). In the second quarter of 2009, 
Eurobond CDS spreads started to slightly decrease and remained somewhat steady 
until the sudden increase again in April 2010. In April 2010, Standard & Poor’s 
downgraded Greek’s debt ratings below investment grade to junk bond status, 
Portuguese debt two notches and issued negative outlook, which is a warning that 
further downgrades are likely, and finally downgraded ratings of Spanish bonds from 
AA to AA- (Wikipedia, 2012). In May 2010, concerns about the ability of the euro 
zone to deal with a spreading crisis effectively caused a severe market reaction and 
volatility continued to accelerate with a major widening in for example U.S. dollar - 
Euro currency spread.  
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When comparing Eurobond CDS spreads to Euribor basis swap spreads, it is 
noteworthy that the breakdown of Lehman Brothers had somewhat lagged effect on 
Eurobond CDS spreads. According to Figure 4.3, after the first quarter of 2009, they 
have moved significantly in a similar fashion, especially with Euribor basis swap 
spread with 2 year maturity. Thus, I expect Eurobond CDS spreads and Euribor basis 
swap spreads to be significantly correlated and will consider this factor as a credit 
risk component in my empirical test. Correlation matrix presented in Appendix 1, 
supports the hypothesis. Both Eurobond CDS spreads and 3m vs. 12m Euribor basis 
swap spreads are positively correlated with correlation coefficients of 0,84 (5 year) 
and 0,60 (2 year).         
 
Table 4.4 reports summary of descriptive statistics on Eurobond credit default swap 
spreads over the sample period. Means of Eurobond CDS spread between 2 year and 
5 year maturities ranges from 120,64 bps (Eurobond CDS 5y) to 123,42 bps 
(Eurobond CDS 10y) and between a maximum of 405,67 bps (Eurobond CDS 10y) 
and a minimum of 18,26 bps (Eurobond CDS 5y) over the sample period.  Median 
ranges less from 104,01 bps (Eurobond CDS 5y) to 104,78 (Eurobond CDS 10y). 
Standard deviation ranges from 83,36 bps (Eurobond CDS 5y) to 85,02 bps 
Figure 4.3 Eurobond credit default swap (CDS) spreads (right axis) with 5 year and 10 year 
maturities constructed from eleven different sovereign CDS spreads that I selected to 
country panel with respect to Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities 
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(Eurobond CDS 10y). Results support the theory that credit default risk is higher with 
longer maturities, reflecting higher CDS spread in 10 year maturity. In addition, 10 
year CDS was more volatile than 5 year CDS, which supports the basic market 
observation that the price and yield of existing long maturity bonds are influenced far 
more by the effect of changes in interest rates and inflation expectations, which make 
them more volatile.   
EurobondCDS5y EurobondCDS10y
Mean 120,64 123,43
Median 104,01 104,78
Standard Deviation 83,86 85,02
Kurtosis 1,42 2,02
Skewness 1,34 1,50
Jarque-Bera 336,36 474,95
Minimum 18,26 23,74
Maximum 388,56 405,67
Count 879 879
 
 
From Table 4.4 we can see that each Eurobond CDS spread is positively skewed to the 
right end. The values of kurtosis below three implicate flat distributions different 
from the assumption of normal distribution. Neither skewness nor kurtosis supports 
the null hypothesis that data is normally distributed. The values of the Jarque-Bera 
test, confirm the rejection of null hypothesis. Thus, Eurobond CDS spreads are not 
normally distributed. 
 
4.4 Euro zone budget deficit and debt to GDP ratio 
 
I will regard euro area debt and deficit to GDP ratios as a factor of credit risk 
component. Increased indebtedness and running into government budget deficit 
inevitably leads to worsening of financial condition of the particular entity and 
increases the default risk. 
 
I gathered quarterly observations of euro zone budget deficit and debt to GDP ratio 
from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The data comprise of euro area 17 countries’ 
government debt and deficit to GDP ratios as a percentage points. As all Euribor basis 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of Eurobond credit default swap (CDS) spreads
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swap data and other variables used in the study were daily observations, I generated 
daily observations from quarterly debt and deficit to GDP data. I assumed budget 
deficit and debt to GDP ratios for simplicity to grow linearly between each of the two 
quarterly observations. Thus, the government debt and budget deficit will accumulate 
between t and t+1 according to Figure 4.4.  
 
According to the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European 
Commission (Maastricht) Treaty and more precisely defined in the European System 
of Integrated Economic Accounts, government deficit means the net borrowing of the 
whole general government sector including central government, state government, 
local government and social security funds. Government deficit is calculated 
according to national accounts concepts known as European System of Accounts, 
ESA95. (Eurostat, 2011) Maastricht Treaty states that the ratio of the planned or 
actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market must not exceed three 
percent at the end of the preceding fiscal year (European Union, 2004). 
 
Government debt is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as the total gross debt at 
nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and 
within the sectors of general government, which I defined in the previous section. The 
government debt to GDP ratio must not exceed sixty percent at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year.  (European Union, 2004) 
 
We can see from Figure 4.4 that euro zone government debt, in the left hand axis, 
exceeded the threshold amount defined in Maastricht Treaty by almost twenty 
percent in the end of the third quarter 2011. Additionally euro zone budget deficit 
exceeded the limit of the three percent of gross domestic product by one percent. In 
debt to GDP ratio, the trend has been positively sloped over the sample period. At the 
same time euro zone government deficit has been fluctuating more and is currently 
approaching more optimistically the three percent threshold level defined in 
Maastricht Treaty. We should notice that the scale in the right hand axis consist of 
positive values and is referred to absolute values on government deficit. Throughout 
the sample period, euro zone government budget has been in deficit and that is why it 
does not matter whether deficit or surplus is considered as absolute values or 
opposite of absolute values.  
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When comparing euro zone government budget deficit and debt to GDP ratios to 
Euribor basis swap spreads, it is harder to make conclusions about the dependencies, 
as the data is linearly increasing or decreasing within every quarter. Even though, I 
conclude that euro zone government debt has been growing in a similar long-run 
trend as the Euribor basis swap spreads over the sample period. Correlation matrix 
presented in Appendix 1, indicates twofold correlations. Correlation coefficients are, 
despite the relationship between debt to GDP ratio and 5 year basis swap spread, 
negative.  Based on descriptive statistics, I will not consider the debt or deficit to GDP 
as a significant credit risk component affecting to Euribor basis swap spreads. 
 
Table 4.5 reports the summary of descriptive statistics on euro area government 
deficit and debt to gross domestic product ratios over the sample period. Mean of 
euro area government deficit relative to gross domestic product was 5,23 percent, 
maximum being 8,26 percent and a minimum 0,90 percent over the sample period. 
Meanwhile euro area government debt was on average 79,39 percent of GDP, 
maximum being 87,16 percent and a minimum 67,61 percent, confirming the 
conclusion made from Figure 4.4 that debt to GDP ratio has been over the boundary 
level of 60 percent throughout the sample period.  Median for deficit was 5,62 
Figure 4.4 Euro zone government budget deficit (right axis) and debt (left axis) to GDP ratio in 
percentages over the sample period with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis 
swap spread with 2 year and 5 year maturities 
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percent and for debt 80,77 percent. Standard deviation of euro area deficit was 1,72 
percent, while for debt the value in question was 6,28 percent.  
  
deficitzone debtzone
Mean 5,23 79,39
Median 5,62 80,77
Standard Deviation 1,72 6,28
Kurtosis -0,40 -0,89
Skewness -0,68 -0,58
Jarque-Bera 69,61 74,31
Minimum 0,90 67,62
Maximum 8,26 87,16
Count 830 830
 
 
From Table 4.5 we can see that both euro area deficit and debt to GDP ratios are 
negatively skewed to the left end. The values of kurtosis below three implicate flat 
distributions different from the assumption of normal distribution. Neither skewness 
nor kurtosis supports the null hypothesis that data is normally distributed. The 
values of the Jarque-Bera test confirm the rejection of null hypothesis. Thus, neither 
the euro area deficit nor the debt with respect to gross domestic product is normally 
distributed. 
 
4.5 The monetary policy and actions of European Central Bank (ECB) 
 
The monetary policy strategy adopted by the ECB embodies the general principles in 
order to meet the challenges facing the central bank. The strategy aims to provide a 
comprehensive framework within which decisions on the appropriate policies can be 
explained to the public. I will regard European Central Bank actions in its entirety as 
a factor of liquidity component. 
 
The challenges that the ECB faces can be roughly divided into five categories. First, 
proper functioning of markets is central to the transmission of the ECB’s policy rates. 
The transmission of the ECB's policy decisions to money market rates depends on 
banks' willingness to promote smooth exchanges of liquidity in the interbank market. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of euro area government deficit and debt to GDP ratios
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Recent financial turmoil has demonstrated that the transmission of monetary policy 
can be disturbed.  In order to promote functional markets and maintenance price 
stability (one of the core policy target of the ECB), the ECB may need to introduce 
occasionally non-standard policy measures, like liquidity interventions aimed at 
facilitating the transmission of the interest rate policy and enhancing the flows of 
credit to the broad economy. Second, changes in monetary policy today will only have 
lagged effect on the price level after a number of quarters or years. Central banks 
need to confirm what policy stance is needed today in order to maintain price 
stability in the future. In this sense, monetary policy must be forward-looking and 
pre-emptive. Third, in the short-run, there is always a large element of uncertainty 
surrounding the effects of monetary policy. For these reasons, monetary policy 
should have a medium-term orientation in order to avoid excessive activism and 
unnecessary volatility into the real economy. Fourth, monetary policy will be 
considerably more effective if it firmly anchors inflation expectations. In this sense, 
the central bank should specify its goal, systematic method for conducting monetary 
policy and communicate clearly and openly. Well-anchored inflation expectations act 
as automatic stabilisers during heightened macroeconomic uncertainty and increase 
the impact of monetary policy. Finally, a successful monetary policy has to be broadly 
based, taking into account all relevant information in order to understand the factors 
driving economic developments. (ECB, 2011) 
 
Taking into account all relevant market information, one of the most significant 
changes ECB has adopted in its monetary policy during the crisis, have been the 
switching of main refinancing operations from variable rate tenders to fixed rate 
tenders. In addition to previous, maturities of MROs have increased. Unusual is also 
that key interest rates are again near at their lowest levels recorded. Considering the 
ECB’s role in securing financial stability in Euromarket, it is reasonable to distinguish 
interest rate and liquidity providing or absorbing operations from each other. This is 
commonly known as a separation principle based on a clear separation between the 
determination of the monetary policy stance and its implementation using liquidity 
operations. The monetary policy stance is determined to serve the maintenance of 
price stability (ECB, 2011).  Liquidity operations as implementation vehicle aim at 
steering very short-term money market rates close to the ECB’s key policy rate, which 
is the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations (ECB, 
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2011).  The purpose of the liquidity operations is to smooth impacts of financial 
shocks in interbank money markets and to secure that monetary policy decisions are 
transmitted into euro area economy.   
 
After Lehman Brothers defaulted in September 2008, monetary atmosphere 
experienced a dramatic change. Suddenly interbank market became illiquid because 
banks that had excess liquidity refused to lend each other. The main reason was that 
it was hard to recognize the risks embedded in banks asking additional liquidity. 
Simultaneously the impacts of the ECB’s monetary policy were endangered.  Across 
the developed economies, the markets overheated and crisis deepened. The 
separation principle was abandoned and actions to gain ECB’s monetary policy 
targets were combined. The European Central Bank decided to increase maturities of 
its main refinancing operations as the demand for longer maturities boosted in 
illiquid interbank markets. The interbank refinancing rates increased, which caused 
banks to ask intensively central bank money. 
 
By setting the rates on the deposit and lending facilities, the Governing Council 
determines the corridor within which the overnight money market rate (EONIA) can 
fluctuate. In addition, European Central Bank’s steering rate that is the rate applied 
in MROs should lie in the centre of the corridor. In normal circumstances, the EONIA 
has remained close to the rate of the MROs as it should be. This will demonstrate the 
importance of these operations as the main monetary policy instrument of the 
Eurosystem. The differences between the deposit and lending facility interest rates 
and the rate on the MROs were kept unchanged until October 2008 at ±1 percentage 
point. From Figure 4.5 we can see, in October 2008, the width of the corridor was 
narrowed to ±0.5 percentage point, and again widened to ±0.75 percentage point in 
May 2009, when the ECB decided to set the rate for the MROs at 1 percentage. The 
ECB reduced its key interest rates to historically low levels as other major central 
banks did, and took measures on a series of non-standard policies, with a view to 
preserving price stability, stabilising the financial situation and aiming to limit 
infection of the real economy. (ECB, 2011) 
 
Appendix 2 reports the summary of descriptive statistics on European Central Bank’s 
actions over the sample period. Rate means of deposit facility, marginal lending 
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facility and MROs were 0,77 percent, 2,31 percent and 1,54 percent. Maximums were 
3,25 percent, 5,25 percent and 4,25 percent while minimums were 0,25 percent, 1,75 
percent and 1,00 percent over the sample period. Medians of these were 0,25 percent, 
1,75 percent and 1,00 percent. Standard deviations of key interest rates of ECB were 
0,96 percent, 1,00 percent and 0,98 percent. From Appendix 2 we can see that key 
interest rates of euro area are positively skewed to the right end. The values of 
kurtosis below three, in case of deposit facility rate and MROs rate, implicate flat 
distributions different from the assumption of normal distribution. The value of 
kurtosis of marginal lending facility rate supports the assumption of normal 
distribution. However, both skewness and kurtosis do not support the null hypothesis 
that data is normally distributed regarding key interest rates. The values of the 
Jarque-Bera test confirm the rejection of null hypothesis. 
 
When comparing the key interest rates of the ECB with the most commonly used 3 
month vs. 12 month Euribor basis swap spread over two and five year maturities 
(Figure 4.5) it is noteworthy that there has been quite a similar kind of trends in basis 
swap spreads and the key interest rates of the ECB along the sample period. This will 
give proof to hypothesis that key interest rates may have impacts on basis swap 
spreads as they are one of the key monetary policy instruments of the ECB. However, 
it is hard to say about the sign of the correlation, as the key interest rates do not 
fluctuate daily as the Euribor basis swap spreads do. According to the correlation 
matrix in Appendix 1, correlations are twofold. Key interest rates are correlated 
positively with 2 year and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread. I will not consider 
these factors as significant component affecting to Eurbor basis swap spreads because 
they does not fluctuate daily and are probably stationary in levels. 
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During exceptional times, the actions of ECB are reasonable, but as soon as the euro 
area and the world economy revert to normal circumstances, central banks also revert 
to normal monetary policy and will start to increase key interest rates and absorb 
excess liquidity from markets. On its way to normal monetary policy stance, the ECB 
will cease to conduct MROs with longer maturities. In addition, it will finish its 
covered bond purchase programme, sell bonds purchased from secondary markets 
and tighten the requirements of collateral posted by banks. 
 
In the following subsections, I present actions of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
more detail consisting of open market operations, recourse to the marginal lending 
facility, use of the deposit facility, autonomous liquidity factors, current account 
holdings and reserve requirements. In addition, I will use data on interest rate levels 
on the deposit facility, on the marginal lending facility and on the reverse open 
market operations that is the main refinancing operations as well. Finally I regard, 
ECB’s monetary policy decisions that is, monthly meetings of the Governing Council 
of the ECB as dummy variable, with value one if meeting occurred and zero 
otherwise. 
Figure 4.5 Rates (%) of ECB’s main refinancing operations, deposit facility and marginal lending 
facility (right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 
5 year maturities (left axis) 
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4.5.1 Open market operations excluding Securities Markets Programme 
 
Open market operations play significant role in the European Central Bank monetary 
policy. The Securities Markets Programme, initiated in May 2010, was introduced in 
response to turbulence in the euro area sovereign bond markets. Under the securities 
market programme, Eurosystem interventions can be carried out in the secondary 
euro area public and private debt securities markets to ensure functionality and 
liquidity in dysfunctional markets. To ensure that liquidity conditions are not 
affected, all SMP purchases are fully neutralised through liquidity-absorbing 
operations conducted through open market operations.  Open market operations do 
not include Securities Markets Programme itself but liquidity operations to neutralize 
the effect of the SMPs.  (ECB, 2011) 
 
Open market operations have central role in steering interest rates and managing the 
liquidity in the European market. Open market operations that are carried by ECB, 
signal the current and future state of the monetary policy in euro area. Euro area 
open market operations can be divided into four categories. What comes to the 
instruments used in operations, reverse transactions are the main open market 
instrument of the ECB and can be employed in all four categories of operations. In 
addition, debt certificates of ECB may be used for structural absorption operations 
that can on the other hand be conducted by means of outright transactions. Finally, 
the ECB can use foreign exchange swaps and the collection of fixed-term deposits for 
conducting its fine-tuning operations. (ECB, 2011) In the following sections, I will 
present specific features of the different types of open market operations and 
instruments used by the ECB in more detail. 
 
First, I will present the most important policy instrument; that being the main 
refinancing operations that normally provide the bulk of liquidity to the banking 
system and are executed in a decentralised manner by the national central banks on a 
weekly basis. Main refinancing operations are executed through standard tenders 
where, in principle, all credit institutions located in the euro area are potential and 
eligible participating counterparties. Tenders may be executed in the form of fixed 
rate or variable rate tenders. In fixed rate tenders, the interest rate is specified at the 
fixed interest rate by ECB and participating counterparties bid the amount of money 
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they wish to transact. In variable rate tenders, counterparties bid both the amount of 
money and the interest rate. Since 8th October 2008, weekly main refinancing 
operations have been carried out through a fixed-rate tender procedure. ECB 
intended to mitigate the adverse effects that money market turbulence were having 
on the liquidity situation of solvent banks in the euro area and to support the flow of 
credit to firms and households.  (ECB, 2011) 
 
Second, longer-term refinancing operations are regular, monthly operations with a 
three-month maturity and/or additionally with even longer maturities, for example 
lately there have been operations conducted with three year maturity. These 
operations are aimed at providing longer-term liquidity to the banking system. This is 
regarded as a useful tool in order to prevent all the liquidity in the money market 
from having to be rolled over each week or every three-months and to give 
counterparties access to longer-term refinancing. Longer-term operations are 
conducted in a similar fashion than standard main refinancing operations. Longer-
term operations are normally executed in the form of pure variable rate tenders as in 
these operations, the ECB does not intend to send signals to the market and therefore 
normally acts as a rate taker. However, under exceptional circumstances, the ECB 
may also execute longer-term operations through fixed rate tenders and may decide 
to accommodate all bids in the operations.  (ECB, 2011) 
 
Third, fine-tuning operations are open market operations that can be carried on an 
ad hoc basis. These operations are known as fine-tuning operations that can absorb 
or provide liquidity. Frequency and maturity of such operations are not standardised. 
Fine-tuning operations are conducted for managing the liquidity situation in the 
money market and steering interest rates, in particular in order to smooth the effects 
on interest rates of unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market. Fine-tuning 
operations are in first hand executed as reverse transactions, but may also take the 
form of foreign exchange swaps or the collection of fixed-term deposits. Reverse 
transactions are operations where the ECB buys or sells eligible assets under 
repurchase agreements or conducts credit operations against eligible assets as 
collateral. Normally fine-tuning operations are executed through quick tenders that 
take one hour from their announcement to the communication of the allotment 
results. Rapid unexpected market developments make these operations desirable for 
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the ECB to retain a high degree of flexibility. However, for operational reasons, only a 
limited number of selected counterparties may participate in fine-tuning operations. 
During the financial crisis, the list of counterparties eligible for these operations was 
increased from around 140 to around 2000 eligible counterparties to secure demand 
for liquidity in markets. (ECB, 2011) 
 
Fourth, structural operations can provide or absorb liquidity and their frequency can 
be regular or non-regular. Structural operations in the form of reverse transactions 
and the issuance of debt instruments are normally carried out through standard 
tenders. Structural operations may be possible also in the form of outright 
transactions that refer to operations where the ECB buys or sells eligible assets 
outright on the market.  Outright transactions are normally executed through 
bilateral procedures.  (ECB, 2011) 
 
We can see from Figure 4.6 that open market operations excluding Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) have been the central liquidity-providing and liquidity-absorbing 
factors as the liquidity provided through the open market operations were at the most 
900 billion euros, reflecting the key role played by this monetary policy instrument. 
After third quarter of 2010, there has been a downward trend in providing or 
absorbing liquidity through open market operations. Downward spikes stem from the 
timings of reserve maintenance periods. Reserve maintenance period is the period 
over which credit institutions’ compliance with reserve requirements is calculated.  
The Governing Council decided in March 2004 that maintenance periods would start 
on the settlement day of the first MRO following the Governing Council meeting at 
which the monthly assessment of the monetary policy stance was pre-scheduled 
(ECB, 2011). Reserve maintenance period would end on the day preceding the 
corresponding settlement day in the following month in order to prevent  rate change 
speculation during a maintenance period from affecting very short-term money 
market conditions (ECB, 2011).  
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When comparing open market operations to most commonly used 3 month vs. 12 
month Euribor basis swap spread over two and five maturities it is noteworthy that 
there has been similar kind of movements in basis swap spread paths and the 
amounts of open market operations along the sample period. This will give proof to 
hypothesis that open market operations have impacts and are correlated signficantly 
with basis swap spreads. I will consider open market operations as a significant 
liquidity component affecting Euribor basis swap spreads. 
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics of open market operations. Mean of open 
market operations was EUR 610,6 billion. Maximum was EUR 910,5 billion, while 
minimum was EUR 180,4 billion over the sample period. Median of operations was 
EUR 618,3 billion. Standard deviation was EUR 150,0 billion. According to value of 
skewness, operations pursue the normal distribution. The value of kurtosis below 
three, on the other hand, will implicate a flat distribution. Altogether, the values of 
skewness and kurtosis together with Jarque-Bera test results, will result in rejection 
of normally distributed values. 
 
Figure 4.6 Open market operations (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) of ECB with respect to 3M vs. 
12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities (in left axis) 
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4.5.2 Recourse to standing facilities 
 
The European Central Bank implements monetary policy also by setting the interest 
rates on its standing facilities. There are two standing facilities available to eligible 
counterparties. These are known as the marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility. Standing facilities provide or absorb liquidity with an overnight maturity on 
the initiative of counterparties. Generally, there is a little incentive for banks to use 
standing facilities, as the interest rates applied to them are in normal circumstances 
much more less when compared with market rates. The use of the standing facilities 
increased significantly during the financial crisis as banks preferred to keep more 
central bank reserves than required and to deposit the additional reserves in the 
deposit facility instead of lending them out to other banks. The reasons for this were 
obvious as banks perceived increasing uncertainty and counterparty risk.  As the 
overall amounts requested by banks during the crisis have been higher than the 
liquidity needs of the banking system during this period, the excess liquidity has been 
deposited in the deposit facility (see Figure 4.7). (ECB, 2011) 
 
Counterparties can use the deposit facility to make overnight deposits with National 
Central Banks (NCBs).  The interest rate of deposits is fixed at a pre-specified level 
and in general, it is a floor for the overnight market interest rate (see Figure 4.5). The 
ECB may change the interest rate at any time effective at the earliest from the 
following business day. Access to the deposit facility is granted only on days when 
TARGET2 is open. TARGET2 is the real-time gross settlement system owned and 
operated by the Eurosystem and it has to be used for all payments involving the 
Eurosystem. There is no limit to the amount counterparty may deposit under the 
facility. 
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics on deposit facility. Mean of deposit 
facility was EUR 110,7 billion. Maximum was EUR 384,3 billion, while minimum was 
EUR 40 million over the sample period. Median of deposit facility was EUR 85,9 
billion. Standard deviation was EUR 90,7 billion. The value of kurtosis below three, 
implicate flat distribution while skewness different from zero indicates positively 
skewed distribution. The value of the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the distribution of deposit facility is normally distributed. 
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Figure 4.7 illustrates the relationship between deposit facility (in EUR 100 millions) 
and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. Deposits 
with national central banks peaked soon after the Lehman Brothers collapsed, 
reflecting the unwillingness to lend each other in interbank markets when the banks 
in euro area preferred to deposit excess liquidity in central bank. Based on Figure 4.7 
I draw a conclusion that deposit facility and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis are expected to 
be positively correlated. Fluctuations in deposit facility seem to be more volatile than 
in Euribor basis swap spreads. However, overall picture gives support to hypothesis 
that deposit facility and Euribor basis swap spreads have elaborated quite much in 
similar fashion in the long-run. Correlation matrix (in Appendix 1) gives support to 
hypothesis that deposit facility mat be a significant liquidity component affecting 
Euribor basis swap spreads. 
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In similar manner as above, counterparty may use the marginal lending facility to 
obtain overnight liquidity from NCBs. The interest rate is fixed at a pre-specified level 
against eligible assets.  The ECB may change the interest rate at any time, effective, at 
the earliest, from the following business day. The marginal lending facility is intended 
Figure 4.7 Deposit facility (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis 
swap spreads (left axis) 
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to satisfy counterparties’ temporary liquidity needs (see Figure 4.8).  Generally, the 
interest rate on the facility provides a cap for the overnight market interest rate (see 
Figure 4.5).  The NCBs may provide liquidity under the marginal lending facility 
either in the form of overnight repurchase agreements or as overnight collateralised 
loans with overnight maturity.  Access to the marginal lending facility is granted only 
on days when TARGET2 is open. There is no limit to the amount of funds that can be 
advanced under the marginal lending facility. 
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics of marginal lending facility. Mean of 
marginal lending facility was EUR 1,5 billion. Maximum was EUR 28,7 billion, while 
minimum was EUR 0 over the sample period. Median of marginal lending facility was 
EUR 0,23 billion. Standard deviation was EUR 3,4 billion. The value of kurtosis 
above three, implicate peaked distribution while skewness indicates positively 
skewed distribution. The value of the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis that 
the distribution of marginal lending facility is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the relationship between marginal lending facility (in EUR 100 
millions) and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. 
Marginal lending facility from NCBs peaked similarly as deposit facility soon after the 
Lehman Brothers collapsed, reflecting the banks’ willingness to obtain liquidity from 
the central bank. However, based on Figure 4.8 I draw a conclusion that marginal 
lending facility and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis are not correlated as significantly as 
was the case with deposit facility. Actually, it seems that marginal lending facility has 
fluctuated mostly between zero and 5 billion euros following quite smooth trend.  
Overall picture gives support to hypothesis that marginal lending facility and Euribor 
basis swap spreads have not elaborated in similar fashion in the long-run. Correlation 
matrix (in Appendix 1) gives support to hypothesis and the correlation is rather lower 
compared to other independent variables. 
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4.5.3 Autonomous liquidity factors and Securities Markets Programme 
 
The liquidity provision coming from the Securities Markets Programme (presented in 
4.5.1) is displayed together with the autonomous factors. Autonomous factors are the 
sum of banknotes in circulation plus government deposits minus net foreign assets 
plus other factors. These factors all together affect on the liquidity of the banking 
system, and are labelled autonomous, because they are not the result of the use of 
monetary policy instruments as for example banknotes in circulation and 
government deposits are not under the control of the monetary authorities.  
Banknotes in circulation and government deposits with the ECB generate the 
liquidity absorbing effect of autonomous factors because notes are obtained from the 
central bank, and credit institutions borrow funds from the central bank. Other 
factors instead, such as net foreign assets, can be controlled by the monetary 
authorities. Even though, transactions in these assets are not related to monetary 
policy operations. Purchases of foreign assets by the ECB provide liquidity into the 
banking system and reduce the need for liquidity providing monetary policy 
operations. The net foreign asset position of a country is the value of the sum of 
Figure 4.8 Marginal lending facility (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spreads (left axis) 
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foreign assets held by monetary authorities and commercial banks, less their foreign 
liabilities.  
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics of autonomous liquidity factors and 
SMP. Mean of autonomous liquidity factors and SMP was EUR 286,1 billion. 
Maximum was EUR 417,2 billion, while minimum was EUR 1,8 billion over the 
sample period. Median of autonomous liquidity factors and SMP was EUR 312,8 
billion. Standard deviation was EUR 98,7 billion. The value of kurtosis below three, 
implicate flat distribution while skewness indicates negatively skewed distribution. 
The value of the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
autonomous liquidity factors and SMP is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the relationship between autonomous liquidity factors and 
Securities Markets Programme (in EUR 100 millions) with respect to 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. In a similar fashion than 
ECB’s actions presented so far, autonomous liquidity factors (including Securities 
Markets Programme) peaked in the fourth quarter of 2008. Based on Figure 4.9 I 
draw a conclusion that autonomous liquidity factors (including Securities Markets 
Programme) and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis are significantly correlated. Correlation 
matrix presented in Appendix 1 supports the hypothesis. I will consider autonomous 
liquidity factors including SMP as a significant liquidity component affecting Euribor 
basis swap spreads. 
  
Over the sample period, basis swap spreads have increased, while the autonomous 
liquidity factors have decreased. According to the ECB the sum of banknotes in 
circulation have increased smoothly during the past ten years, while the government 
deposits aggregated at the euro area level, have continuously been the most volatile 
autonomous factor, causing a large part of the errors in the forecast of liquidity needs 
underlying the allotment decisions for the open market operations of the ECB (ECB, 
2011). Increase in net foreign assets should decrease the autonomous liquidity 
factors, which would support the evidence in favour of current account surplus over 
the sample period. According to ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, there has been 
current account deficit in euro area over the sample period. Increase in net foreign 
assets is due to current account surplus. Respectively, if the country has current 
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account deficit, like over the sample period, it has to be financed through borrowing 
from foreign countries, which will in turn decrease net foreign assets and increase 
autonomous liquidity factors. This in turn will indicate that for example banknotes in 
circulation, government deposits and other factors have decreased over the sample 
period. 
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4.5.4 Current account holdings 
 
In order to meet its reserve requirements and settlement obligations from interbank 
transactions, a credit institution has to hold balances on its current accounts with the 
National Central Bank. Current account holding is not fixed and it may fluctuate 
around its reserve requirement. On average, though, the current account holding 
must be at least equal to the reserve requirement over the maintenance period. The 
interaction between the Eurosystem and the banking system's current account 
holdings could be illustrated more precisely with the help of the consolidated balance 
sheet of the Eurosystem, but is beyond the scope of this study. However, to give an 
Figure 4.9 Autonomous liquidity factors and Securities Markets Programme (in EUR 100 millions in 
right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year 
maturities (left axis) 
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overall insight of current account holdings of credit institutions, it consists of factors 
like deposit facility, banknotes in circulation, government deposits and other factors 
on the liabilities side. (ECB, 2011) 
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics on current account holdings. Mean of 
current account holdings was EUR 215,2 billion. Maximum was EUR 384,9 billion, 
while minimum was EUR 79,4 billion over the sample period. Median of current 
account holdings was EUR 215,8 billion. Standard deviation was EUR 44,5 billion. 
The value of kurtosis below three, implicate flat distribution while skewness indicates 
negatively skewed distribution. The value of the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of current account holdings is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 4.10 illustrates the relationship between current account holdings (in EUR 100 
millions) and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. 
Current account holdings with NCBs have been fluctuating heavily over the sample 
period. This reflects the nature of current account holdings, that is, those are not 
fixed and may fluctuate around its reserve requirement over the maintenance period. 
According to Figure 4.10 I expect current account holdings to be stationary in levels. 
Based on Figure 4.10 I cannot draw a clear conclusion about the correlation between 
current account holdings and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis. Altogether, overall picture 
indicates that current account holdings and Euribor basis swap spreads have not 
elaborated in a similar fashion in the long-run. Correlation matrix (Appendix 1) 
supports the hypothesis, that is, no significant correlation. I will not consider current 
account holdings as a significant liquidity component affecting Euribor basis swap 
spreads. 
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4.5.5 Reserve requirements 
 
In order to determine the reserve requirement of a credit institution, the reserve base 
is multiplied by a reserve ratio. The ECB applies a uniform positive reserve ratio to 
most of the balance sheet items included in the reserve base. This reserve ratio has 
currently been set at two percent. Reserve base is the sum of the eligible balance 
sheet items, in particular most of the liabilities that constitute the basis for 
calculating the reserve requirement of a credit institution. (ECB, 2011) 
 
The difference between credit institutions’ holdings on current accounts with the ECB 
and reserve requirements makes up the excess reserves. Before 2004 reserve 
requirements accounted for more than half of the total liquidity needs of the banking 
system but since 2004 onwards, the total liquidity-absorbing effect of autonomous 
factors have exceeded the effect from reserve requirements. For clarification, 
required reserves have a liquidity absorbing effect, which have relatively similar size 
power to the effect of all the autonomous factors together.  (ECB, 2011) 
 
Figure 4.10 Current account holdings (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities (left axis) 
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Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics of reserve requirements. Mean of reserve 
requirements was EUR 212,7 billion. Maximum was EUR 221,1 billion, while 
minimum was EUR 206,1 billion over the sample period. Median of reserve 
requirements was EUR 211,9 billion. Standard deviation was EUR 4,0 billion. The 
value of kurtosis below three, implicate flat distribution while skewness indicates 
positively skewed distribution. The value of the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of reserve requirements is normally distributed. 
 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the relationship between reserve requirements (in EUR 100 
millions) and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. 
Reserve requirements peaked soon after the Lehman Brothers collapsed, reflecting 
increase in  reserve base, that is, the sum of the most liabilities on the balance sheet 
that constitute the basis for calculating the reserve requirement of a credit institution. 
Based on Figure 4.11 I conclude that reserve requirements and 3M vs. 12M Euribor 
basis were somewhat correlated until the beginning of 2011. Correlation matrix 
indicates a negative relationship between reserve requirements and 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spreads. Since second quarter of 2011 reserve requirements and 
Euribor basis swap spreads have moved to opposite directions. This will make it more 
difficult to assess the overall effects of reserve requirements on Euribor basis swap 
spreads over the sample period. Fluctuations in Euribor basis swap spreads seem to 
be more volatile than in reserve requirements. I will not consider reserve 
requirements as a significant liquidity component affecting Euribor basis swap 
spreads. 
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4.5.6 Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP) 
 
The Covered bond purchase programme of ECB, that was initiated on 9th July 2009. 
The European Central Bank has purchased covered bonds issued in the euro area at 
total value of €60 billion so far. The reason why ECB decided to start purchasing 
covered bonds was mainly due to illiquid covered bond markets. The aim of the 
covered bond purchase programme was naturally to revive the covered bond market. 
The covered bond market is a very important financial market in euro area and it is a 
primary source of financing for financial institutions. As a result of covered bond 
purchase programme, the relationship between the main refinancing rate and money 
market rates temporarily changed. In normal circumstances, the EONIA (Euro 
Overnight Index Average) is an effective overnight interest rate that closely follows 
movements in the main refinancing rate. According to ECB the high demand from 
banks for central bank liquidity in refinancing operations during the crisis has 
resulted in the deposit facility rate playing a greater role in steering the EONIA.  
(ECB, 2011) 
 
Figure 4.3 Reserve requirements (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities (left axis) 
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Covered bonds are issued by financial institutions and created from public sector or 
mortgage loans where the covered bond is backed by a separate group of loans called 
cover or collateral pool. In the euro area, covered bonds are further defined by the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which limits the range of accepted collateral. 
The dual nature of protection offered by covered bonds distinguishes covered bonds 
for example from asset-backed securities. The fact that they are secured by a 
collateral in addition to the issuer’s creditworthiness results in a higher credit rating 
than bank bonds. Assets pledged as collateral for a covered bond issue remain on the 
balance sheet of the issuer giving an incentive to keep only high quality assets.  (ECB, 
2011a)  
 
The financial crisis caused the lack of confidence between financial institutions, 
which raised concerns about the liquidity risk of a large number of banks, thereby 
threatening the whole banking system. To hinder this from happening, the European 
Central Bank decided to provide support to the covered bond market in the euro area 
through outright purchases of covered bonds under the Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (CBPP). The objectives of European Central bank purchases under the 
CBPP were clear: promoting the ongoing decline in money market term rates, easing 
funding conditions for financial institutions, encouraging financial institutions to 
maintain and expand their lending to clients, improving market liquidity in 
important segments of the private debt securities market. Following the 
announcement of the CBPP led markets to a sharp tightening. In secondary market, 
covered bond yield spreads narrowed in the euro area and the primary market started 
to recover. (ECB, 2011a) 
 
Appendix 2 reports the descriptive statistics on covered bond purchase programme. 
Mean of covered bond purchase programme was EUR 48,3 billion. Maximum was 
EUR 61,1 billion, while minimum was EUR 66 million over the sample period. 
Median of covered bond purchase programme was EUR 59,7 billion. Standard 
deviation was EUR 18,4 billion. The value of kurtosis below three, implicate flat 
distribution while skewness indicates negatively skewed distribution. The value of the 
Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of covered bond 
purchase programme is normally distributed. 
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Figure 4.12 demonstrates the relationship between covered bond purchase 
programme (in EUR 100 millions) and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 
and 5 year maturities. Between July 2009 and August 2010, one can spot slight 
upward trend in basis swap spreads, giving justification to liquidity factors to be 
taken into account in a comprehensive model. Even though there is a similar kind of 
trend in basis swap spreads and CBPP soon after initiation of CBPP, dependencies 
remain unclear. After July 2010, the CBPP has started to decline smoothly, but one 
cannot see the similar kind of fashion in Euribor basis swap spreads. Based on Figure 
4.12 I draw a conclusion that covered bond purchase programme and 3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis are correlated. Correlation matrix (Appendix 1) indicates quite 
significant positive correlation between CBPP and 3M vs. 12M basis swap spread, 
namely  0,54 (2y) and 0,76 (5y). However, fluctuations in Euribor basis swap spreads 
are more volatile than in covered bond purchase programme and the data starts from 
the initiation of CBPP in July 2007. These will lead me to omit this variable from 
empirical testing and I will not consider covered bond purchase programme as a 
significant liquidity component affecting Euribor basis swap spreads.   
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Figure 4.4 Covered bond purchase programme (in EUR 100 millions in right axis) with respect to 3M 
vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year maturities (left axis) 
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4.5.7 Meetings of the Governing Council of the ECB 
 
The Governing Council of the ECB is the main decision-making voice of the monetary 
union.  It consists of the six members of the Executive Board and the governors of the 
national central banks of the 17 euro area countries. Main responsibilities of the 
Governing Council are to adopt the guidelines and make the decisions necessary to 
ensure the performance of the Eurosystem and to formulate monetary policy 
decisions. In assessing risks to price stability in the euro area, the Governing Council 
has relied on its monetary policy strategy, implying a comprehensive analysis of both 
economic and monetary developments in the euro area. Central monetary policy 
decisions concerning euro area are related to key interest rates, the supply of reserves 
in the Eurosystem, and the establishment of guidelines for the implementation of 
these decisions. (ECB, 2011) 
 
The Governing Council usually meets twice a month. At first meeting of each month, 
the Governing Council assesses economic and monetary developments and according 
to current stance in euro area takes its monthly monetary policy decision. At the 
second meeting, the Council discusses mainly issues related to other tasks and 
responsibilities of the ECB and the Eurosystem. The monetary policy decision is 
explained in detail at a press conference held right after the first meeting of each 
month. (ECB, 2011) I will impose for dummy variable value one when first meeting of 
the month occurred. I will not take stand whether the desicions of each meeting was 
positive or negative and that is why I use only value one (instead of one and minus 
one). 
 
According to Figure 4.13 Euribor basis swap spreads increased in the following of the 
announcement of Governing Council’s monthly monetary policy decision in 19 out of 
41 cases over the sample period. Respectively, in 22 out of 41 cases spreads 
decreased. Thus, I can not unambiguosly conclude the sign of the correlation, which 
gives support to omit this factor when aiming to build a comprehensive model to 
estimate direction of driving forces of Euribor basis swap spreads. Additionally, 
correlation matrix presented in Appendix 1, supports to omit the variable. I will 
consider meetings of the governing council as a significant component affecting 
Euribor basis swap spreads. 
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4.6 Credit default swap (CDS) spreads of Euribor panel banks 
 
I will regard Euribor panel bank credit default swap spreads as a factor of credit risk 
component similarly as was the case with Eurobond CDS spread. I constructed credit 
default swap spreads of Euribor panel banks from market quotations of 2 year and 5 
year mid-market credit default swap spreads of 34 Euribor panel banks with equal 
weights in the case of 2 year maturity Euribor panel CDS. Respectively, Euribor panel 
CDS with 5 year maturity consist of 36 Euribor panel banks and their CDS market 
quotations. Euribor panel bank credit default swaps are not available in the markets 
by themselves and thus had to be constructed using CDS quotations of each Euribor 
panel banks. The comprehensive list of banks that had credit default swap quotations 
in Bloomberg platform is available in Appendix 3. In order to construct Euribor panel 
CDS for the estimation purposes of the study, I assume that countries belonging to 
Euribor panel jointly represent the current credit default risk of the representative 
euro area credit institutions and credit risk component in Euribor rates. The similar 
weights and the current state of each panel member will affect to the Euribor panel 
CDS spread.  
 
Figure 4.5 Monthly monetary policy decisions in meetings of Governing Council of the ECB (dot, 
cross, plus and minus signs) with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads 
with 2 and 5 year maturities   
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Figure 4.14 there presents graphs of the constructed Euribor panel CDS spreads over 
the sample period. It is noteworthy that 2 year and 5 year Euribor panel CDS spreads 
both move along quite similar paths. The difference between 5 year and 2 year CDS 
spreads have been fluctuating within the range of -38,19 to 48,48 bps. The 
movements of Euribor panel CDS spreads indicate that the “term structure” of CDS 
spreads have been fluctuating from upward sloping to inverted across the sample 
period. The average difference between the 5 year and 2 year CDS spreads has been 
14,70 bps. Inverted “term structure” of CDS spreads, that is, negative difference 
between 5 year and 2 year spreads, indicate that investors are expecting the 
underlying entity to be defaulted in the short-run more likely than in the long-run.    
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The Euribor CDS panel spreads started to rise already before Lehman Brothers 
crashed and problems started in banking sector. I see that rise in Euribor panel CDS 
spreads started after the U.S. subprime crisis in 2007 and peaked in the end of the 
first quarter in 2009. Since the fourth quarter of 2009, Euribor panel CDS spreads 
started again to rise slightly, and finally culminated by the heavy increase in spring 
2011. The heavy increase in CDS spreads in second quarter of 2011, might arose from 
uncertainty regarding the future of the joint currency of the euro zone. If Greece or 
any other member country of EMU defaulted, it would mean also a series of defaults 
Figure 4.14 Euribor panel credit default swap (CDS) spreads with 2 year and 5 year maturities (right 
axis) constructed from 34 and 36 different Euribor panel bank member CDS spread 
quotations that were available with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread 
with 2 year and 5 year maturities (left axis). 
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what comes to euro area banks and sovereigns. This is an essential factor that affects 
to increase in Euribor panel CDS spreads as well as Eurobond CDS spreads.  
 
When comparing Euribor panel CDS spreads to Euribor basis swap spreads, it is 
noteworthy that the breakdown of Lehman Brothers had a lagged effect on Euribor 
panel CDS spreads similarly as was the case with Eurobond CDS spreads. According 
to Figure 4.14, after the third quarter of 2009, they have moved significantly in a 
similar fashion, especially with Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity. Thus, 
I expect Euribor panel CDS spreads and Euribor basis swap spreads to be positively 
correlated. Correlation matrix presented in Appendix 1, supports the hypothesis. 
Both Euribor panel CDS spreads and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads are 
positively correlated. I will consider Euribor panel CDS spread as a significant credit 
risk component affecting Euribor basis swap spreads. 
 
Table 4.6 reports summary of descriptive statistics of Euribor panel credit default 
swap spreads over the sample period. Means of Euribor panel CDS spread between 2 
year and 5 year maturities ranges from 171,64 bp (Euribor panel CDS 2y) to 186,34 bp 
(Euribor panel CDS 5y) and between a maximum of 490,27 bp (Euribor panel CDS 
5y) and a minimum of 63,17 bp (Euribor panel CDS 2y) over the sample period.  
Median ranges from 148,29 bp (Euribor panel CDS 2y) to 159,02 (Euribor panel CDS 
5y). Standard deviation ranges from 89,42 bp, (Euribor panel CDS 5y) to 92,83 bp 
(Euribor panel CDS 2y). Results support the theory that credit default risk is higher 
with longer maturities, reflecting higher CDS spread in 5 year maturity. However, 2 
year CDS was more volatile than 5 year CDS, which do not support the basic market 
observation that the price and yield of existing long maturity bonds are influenced far 
more by the effect of changes in interest rates and inflation expectations, which 
should make them more volatile and thus have greater CDS spread also.   
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CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS CDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS
Mean 171,64 186,34
Median 148,29 159,02
Standard Deviation 92,83 89,42
Kurtosis 1,05 1,75
Skewness 1,30 1,52
Jarque-Bera 286,66 448,36
Minimum 63,17 87,84
Maximum 472,82 490,27
Count 879 879
 
 
From Table 4.6 we can see that each Euribor panel CDS spreads are positively skewed 
to the right end. The values of kurtosis below three implicate flat distributions 
different from the assumption of normal distribution. Neither skewness nor kurtosis 
supports the null hypothesis that data is normally distributed. The values of the 
Jarque-Bera test confirm the rejection of null hypothesis. 
 
4.7 Euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate 
 
I wanted to take into account euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate as well. 
Reasoning behind this is that currencies are traded on an open market, and the 
demand for them fluctuates based on what is happening in the country or area that 
uses the currency. In addition, the responses to news about macroeconomic variables 
will be reflected rapidly in exchange rates, although the relative importance of 
individual macroeconomic variables shifts over time (Chinn, 2003). However, 
according to Chinn (2003) economic fundamentals appear to be more important at 
longer horizons. Correspondingly, short-run deviations of exchange rates from their 
fundamentals refer more to speculation and institutional customer or hedge fund 
manipulation. Thus, I take this factor as a component providing information of 
responses to news about macroeconomic variables. 
 
I gathered bilateral exchange rate data from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
Bilateral exchange rate between euro and the U.S. dollar is the price of dollars in 
terms of euros. The European Central Bank has no explicit exchange rate objective. 
The euro floats freely in world foreign exchange markets against other currencies 
Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics of Euribor panel credit default swap (CDS) spreads
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such as the U.S. dollar. However, ECB may prevent fluctuations in the euro exchange 
rate by purchasing or selling euro against other currencies, when needed.  
 
The ECB have supplementary instruments needed to effectively implement exchange 
rate policy. Effective exchange rate policy requires four main ingredients: First, 
monitor and assess exchange rate markets and developments. Second, discuss about 
market developments with the other major partners. Third, make public statements. 
Fourth, intervene in the foreign exchange markets. International exchange rate policy 
is targeted to the specific circumstances such as to prevent the negative effect of the 
current crisis. This, in turn should help to restore confidence in the financial markets. 
(ECB, The Euro Area's Exchange Rate Policy and the Experience with International 
Monetary Coordination during the Crisis, 2009) 
 
During the financial turmoil, foreign exchange markets swings in euro – U.S. dollar 
bilateral rates have been quite smooth according to Figure 4.15. Until the June 2008, 
the U.S. dollar weakened against the euro (out of the data scope of this study). This 
reflected the market perception that the turbulence originated in the United States. 
However, later on and especially after the Lehman Brothers collapsed, the euro has 
weakened against the U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar benefited from increased risk 
aversion worldwide as well as widespread shortage of dollar liquidity in financial 
markets. Recently, the foreign exchange rate has been fluctuating around 1,3 and 1,4.  
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Figure 4.15 Euro – U.S. dollar exchange rate (right axis) with respect to 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap 
spreads with 2 year and 5 year maturities (left axis) 
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Figure 4.15 demonstrates the relationship between euro – U.S. dollar exchange rate 
and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 and 5 year maturities. Based on 
Figure 4.15 I am not able to draw a clear conclusion whether foreign exchange rate 
and 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis have been significantly correlated or not. According to 
correlation matrix I presented in Appendix 1, the correlation is negative.  In overall, 
fluctuations in Euribor basis swap spreads are more volatile than in foreign exchange 
rate. This will lead me to consider euro – U.S. foreign exchange rate as a significant 
macroeconomic component affecting Euribor basis swap spreads. 
 
Table 4.7 reports summary of descriptive statistics on euro – U.S. dollar exchange 
rate over the sample period. Mean and median of euro – U.S. dollar exchange rate is 
1,38. Maximum is 1,60 and a minimum 1,19 over the sample period. Standard 
deviation is 0,08. Euro – U.S. dollar exchange rate is slightly positively skewed to the 
right end but the distribution is very close to normal distribution. On the other hand, 
the values of kurtosis below three implicate flat distributions different from the 
assumption of normal distribution. Skewness supports properties of the normal 
distribution but kurtosis is against the null hypothesis that data is normally 
distributed. The value of the Jarque-Bera test confirm the acceptance of null 
hypothesis. 
 
EUR/USD
Mean 1,38
Median 1,38
Standard Deviation 0,08
Kurtosis -0,21
Skewness 0,10
Jarque-Bera 3,08
Minimum 1,19
Maximum 1,60
Count 879
 
Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics of euro – U.S. dollar exchange rate
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5 METHODS 
 
The empirical part of the study is based on historical values of Euribor basis swap 
spreads and explanatory variables. Aim of the study is to build a comprehensive 
model that could explain Euribor basis swap spreads.  Another aim of the study is to 
understand short-run and long-run relations between explanatory variables.  In the 
empirical part, I will first use regression analysis. In the second part, I will run co-
integration analysis in order to determine whether the model has any short-run or 
long-run relations. Similar kind of regression methods have been used by Baglioni 
(2009), Frank et al. (2009) and Taylor et al. (2009) in investigation of Libor-OIS 
spreads. Co-integration techniques used in the study, are developed by Johansen 
(1988) and Engle & Granger (1987). 
 
5.1 Linear regression model 
 
I will estimate linear regression models in this study using the regression analysis 
with straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) method. I tested the empirical data 
and obtained result with the Gretl. The multiple variable linear regression model is of 
the form: 
εβββα tikkiii XXXY +++++= .......2211  , (5.1) 
 
where Yi is the ith observation on the dependent variable Y, Xik is the ith observation 
on the independent variable Xk. α is the intercept and β1, β2,…, βk are the slope 
coefficients and εi is the error term (residual). The model is linear because increasing 
the value of the ith regressor by one unit increases the value of the dependent by βi 
units. 
 
Underlying assumptions of the linear regression analysis are: 
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Assumption Interpretation 
1. E(εi|Xi) = 0  The errors have zero mean 
2. Var(εi|Xi) = σ2 The variance of the errors is constant and 
finite over all values of Xi 
3. cov(εi, εj| Xi, Xj) = 0 The errors are linearly independent of 
another 
4. cov(εi, Xik) = 0 There is no relationship between the 
error and corresponding X variant 
5. εi ~ N(o, σ2) Errors are normally distributed 
6. No perfect multicollinearity 
There should be no relationship between 
the explanatory variables 
 
If the data to be analyzed by linear regression violate one or more of the linear 
regression assumptions, the results of the analysis may be incorrect or misleading. In 
this study, I will assume that log-differentiated variables (1st degree) closely qualify 
the assumptions of the linear regression analysis. This is because the level variables 
of the study are non-stationary (test results are available further in chapter 6) and 
thus cannot provide realistic results. Instead, the estimation results indicate spurious 
regressions, when linear regression is used with non-stationary data. If the 
assumption of independence is violated, linear regression is not appropriate. This I 
will avoid by omitting variables that are significantly correlated (correlation 
coefficient ≥0,8) with each other and taken into account the variable alone that is 
more correlated dependent variable. The impact of an assumption violation on the 
linear regression result usually depends on the extent of the violation. However, some 
small violations may have little practical effect on the analysis and results. 
 
5.2 Towards the co-integration analysis (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 
 
Co-integration is a special case of non-stationary variables and restores the feasibility 
of linear regression models in this sense. In this special case, non-stationary variables 
are co-integrated, if they are independently integrated with the same degree. Many 
Table 5.1 OLS assumptions (Brooks, 2008. 44) 
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time series are non-stationary, but tend to be moving together over time. In general, 
researchers may make a conclusion that there exist some influences, for example 
market forces on the series, which imply that the two series are tied by some 
relationship in the long-run. A co-integrating relationship may also be seen as a long-
term or equilibrium phenomenon, since it is possible that co-integrating variables 
may deviate from their relationship in the short run, but would return on track in the 
long-run. (Brooks, 2008. 336) On the other hand, if there were no co-integration, 
there would be no long-run relationship binding the series together. Such a 
relationship would arise since all linear combinations of the series would be non-
stationary. If the dependent variable and explanatory variable(s) are co-integrated, 
they are expected to be variables of the same process at different points in time, and 
hence will be affected in very similar ways by given pieces of information.  
 
In order to test whether the data is stationary or not, I will apply the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test for auto-correlated time-series (ADF). Stationary process has the 
same parameters between different time and position. In this study, for example 
time-series of euro area debt to GDP is not stationary, because they exhibit time 
trends. Most of the non-stationary time-series can be converted to stationary 
processes through differentiating as many times as it is needed to get a stationary 
time-series. A case when the first difference of the process is stationary is difference 
stationary process. Stationarity of the data closely implicates the properties of 
estimation methods used in the study, like linear regression model and the co-
integration analysis.  If the variable is not stationary, it must be transformed to 
stationary before OLS-regressions can be calculated as mentioned in previous 
subchapter. The first order integration of the data is crucial for the co-integration 
analysis. If, the data series follows an autoregressive process where, the error term in 
the standard Dickey-Fuller test will be auto-correlated, will invalidate the use of the 
Dickey-Fuller test. Thus, I must apply the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, which 
includes additional lagged difference terms to account the autocorrelation problem. 
The test of a unit root existence is based on one of the following regression equations 
according to Dickey and Fuller (Enders, 2004. 181 – 183): 
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where ∆ represents first differences of Yt. a0 and a2t are deterministic elements, γ and 
β are coefficients to be estimated, p is the number of lagged terms, t is the trend, a2 is 
the estimated coefficient for the trend, and the error term εt is white noise process. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is γ=0. If the null hypothesis is rejected then the 
series is stationary and γ<0. (Enders, 2004. 181 – 183)  
 
The equation 5.2 is a pure random walk model without a constant and time trend, the 
second model includes constant without time trend, and third includes both constant 
and time trend. 
 
In order to test the significance of the estimated γ coefficients, I will calculate the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test using the τ-statistic for each estimated 
coefficient, in the same way as with the student’s t-statistic. However, the estimated τ 
values do not follow the same distribution as student’s t-test. I assess the statistical 
significance of the estimated τ values by comparing them with critical values derived 
for the τ distribution presented by Dickey and Fuller (1981). If the estimated τ value is 
less than the critical value in absolute terms, then the null hypothesis of the existence 
of unit root cannot be rejected. Critical values depend on the sample size, as is the 
case with most type of hypothesis tests in statistics. For any given level of significance 
the critical values of the t-statistic decrease as sample size increases. (Enders 2004, 
182 - 183) MacKinnon (1991) estimates the calculation of Dickey-Fuller critical values 
for any sample size. In this study I will use MacKinnon (2010) critical values for 
comparison of ADF tests results with critical values. 
 
In addition, I have to investigate the degree of integration of each variable in order to 
proceed to co-integration tests. Variable Yt is said to be integrated of degree zero I(0), 
if it is stationary. Conversely, if the variable Yt is integrated of degree one I(1), it is 
non-stationary, but the first difference of a variable, ∆Yt is stationary. In general case, 
variable has to be differentiated d times in order to get stationary variable. According 
69 
 
to common market evidence, economic time-series are usually integrated of degree 
zero or one. 
 
In order to attain error term that is white noise process, lagged differences (∆Yt-1+1) 
have to be added into the equation under estimation. The selection of lag length can 
be done, for example by using Akaike information criteria.  From multiple alternative 
lag lengths, the lag-length with smallest information criteria value should be chosen. 
Another way to select the appropriate lag-length is to start with relatively long lag 
length and pare down the model by the usual t-test until lag is significantly different 
from zero (Enders, 2004. 192). Including too few lags will not remove all of the 
autocorrelation and will cause biased results, while using too many will increase the 
coefficient standard errors. 
 
5.3 Engle-Granger method 
 
First, I make sure that all of the individual variables are integrated of degree one. 
Then the co-integrating regression is estimated using ordinary least squares -method 
(OLS).  
 
εγβ ttt xy ++= 0    (5.5) 
 
It is not possible to perform any conclusion or relations on the coefficient estimates 
in this OLS regression. All that can be done is to estimate the parameter values. I 
conduct the OLS estimation, save the residuals εt of the co-integrating regression and 
see whether residuals are integrated of degree zero. In this case the modified critical 
values are required in augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test as the test is now 
operating on the residuals of an estimated model rather than on raw data (Brooks, 
2008. 339). Engle and Granger (1987) have tabulated a new set of critical values for 
this purpose and hence the test is known as the Engle-Granger (EG) test. However, 
the critical values of MacKinnon (2010) will be applied in this study, as they fit for 
any sample size. 
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If residuals are integrated of degree one, a model needs to be re-estimated using only 
first differences. After I have tested and found residuals to be integrated of degree 
zero, residuals are used as one variable in the error correction model. When the 
concept of non-stationary variables was first considered in the 1970s, a usual practise 
was to take the first differences of each of the I(1) variables and then to use these first 
differences in any subsequent modelling process. However, when the relationship 
between variables is important, such a procedure is not the recommended approach. 
This is mainly because the pure first difference models have no long-run solution. For 
example, consider two series, yt and xt, that are both I(1) processes. The kind of 
model has no long-run solution and it therefore has nothing to say about whether x 
and y have an equilibrium relationship. Fortunately, several models can handle this 
issue by using combinations of first differenced and lagged levels of co-integrated 
variables.  An error correction model is one of these models. (Brooks, 2008. 337 – 
338). If there exists a dynamic linear model with stationary disturbances and the yt 
and xt datasets are I(1), then the variables must be co-integrated of order CI(1,1). The 
model can be expressed in general form as follows (Enders, 2004. 335 – 338). 
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in which the term  (yt−1 − γxt−1) is known as the error correction term or co-
integrating vector form. It is possible to use saved residuals έt-1 obtained in equation 
5.5 as an instrument for the expression of error correction term. Additionally, an 
error correction model can be estimated for more than two variables. Provided that yt 
and xt are co-integrated, the parameters of co-integrating vector are expressed in γ. 
Then (yt−1 − γxt−1) will be I(0) even though the ordinary variables are I(1). It is thus 
valid to use OLS and standard procedures. Error correction model can be interpreted 
as follows. y is expected to change between t−1 and t as a result of changes in the 
values of the explanatory variable(s), x, between t−1 and t, and also in part to correct 
for any possible disequilibrium existed during the previous period. γ defines the long-
run relationship between x and y. β1, β11(i), β12(i), β2, β21(i) and β22(i) are parameters, 
which describe the short-run relationship between changes in x and changes in y. The 
speed of adjustment coefficicient βy and βx are of particular interest and describes the 
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speed of adjustment back to equilibrium. The higher the coefficient the more 
significant the reaction to deviation from previous period. Strict definition of βy and 
βx is that it measures the proportion of last period’s equilibrium error that is 
corrected for.  (Brooks, 2008. 338 – 339). In general, both variables of co-integrated 
process should react to deviations from equilibrium. For example, coefficient βy 
should be negative and βx positive, in order to process adjust back to long-run 
equilibrium. However, it is possible that one of the speeds of adjustment (e.g. βy) 
coefficients is zero. This would implicate that variable yt is not reacting to deviation 
from long-run equilibrium and variable xt is responsible for adjustment. In this case 
yt is said to be weakly exogenous.  
 
The Engle-Granger approach is easy to use, but one of its major drawbacks is that it 
can estimate only up to one co-integrating relationship between the multiple 
variables. This lacks the reliability of the method. In addition, there could be a 
simultaneous equations bias if the causality between variables y and x runs in both 
directions but Engle-Granger approach requires one variable to be normalized (i.e. 
one variable to be specified as the dependent variable and the others as independent 
variables). (Brooks, 2008. 342) This is why the co-integrating relation must be tested 
in both directions. 
 
5.4 Johansen’s method 
 
Johansen's method provides an improvement to problems that arose in Engle-
Granger method. It allows to test a hypothesis for one or more coefficients in the co-
integrating relationship. This is conducted by viewing the hypothesis as a restriction 
on the Π matrix. If there exist r co-integrating vectors then only these linear 
combinations of the co-integrating vectors, will be stationary (Brooks, 2008. 354). 
Johansen's method is based on maximum likelihood approach for testing co-
integration in multivariate autoregressive models. The method is relying on the 
relationship between the rank of a matrix and its characteristic roots. It provides two 
tests to determine the number of co-integrating vectors. These are known as trace 
and maximum characteristic roots (also known as eigenvalues) tests. 
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In a starting point to Johansen’s methodology, I consider simple n-variables vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model 
 
ε ttt xAx += −11 .   (5.8) 
Then xt-1 is subtracted in the above equation so that 
 
ε tttt xxAx +−= −−∆ 111  
ε ttt xIAx +−= −∆ 11 )(             (5.9) 
ε ttt xx += −Π∆ 1 , 
in which xt and εt are (n x 1) vectors, A1 is an (n x n) matrix of parameters, I is an (n x 
n) identity matrix and Π is defined to be (A1 – I). (Enders, 2004. 348) 
 
Equation 5.9 can be generalized in a multiple different ways. For example, a drift can 
be added into equation, when a process generating the observations involve 
according to a linear trend. On the other hand, lagged differences can be added if 
higher-order autoregressive AR(p) processes are approved. (Enders, 2004. 349 – 
352) I used Akaike information criteria to select the appropriate number of lags to 
eliminate autocorrelation from the co-integration relation.  
 
The number of co-integration vectors may be solved by investigating statistical 
significance of the characteristic roots of Π matrix. The key feature is rank, r, of the Π 
matrix as it is equal to the number of independent co-integrating vectors. If the rank 
of the matrix is zero, none of the characteristics roots differs statistically significantly 
from zero and variables are not co-integrated. On the other hand if matrix is of rank 
n, the vector process is stationary.  Between these extreme cases, in which the rank of 
the matrix is 1< r < n, there exist r co-integrating vectors. (Enders, 2004. 352) 
 
In practice, only estimates can be obtained of Π and its characteristic roots. To 
estimate the number of characteristic roots that are different from zero can be 
conducted using the following two statistics 
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in which T  is the number of usable observations and 
^
λ i  are the estimated values of 
the characteristic roots (eigenvalues) obtained from the estimated  Π matrix. (Enders, 
2004. 352 – 353) 
 
The equation 5.10 tests the null hypothesis that the number of distinct co-integrating 
vecrtors is less than or equal to r against the alternative hypothesis that the number 
of co-integrating vectors is greater than r. The alternative result of the λtrace statistics 
is rather general and the exact number of co-integrating vectors cannot be cocluded 
from the test results. Conversely, the exact number of co-integrating vectors can be 
estimated by the  λmax statistics. The  λmax test is usually preferred for trying to 
estimate the number of co-integrating vectors.  The null hypothesis is now that the 
number of co-integrating vectors is r against the alternative r+1 co-integrating 
vectors. In both cases, the null hypothesis is rejected, if the value from test statistics is 
greater than the critical value. Critical values of the  λtrace and the λmax statistics are 
obtained from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). (Enders, 2004. 353) 
 
Finally, when the co-integration rank is established, I will form a vector error 
correction model quite similarly as was the case with Engle-Granger method in order 
to investigate short- and long-run co-integrating relations together. A vector error 
correction model (VECM) is a restricted VAR constructed for use with non-stationary 
series that are known to be co-integrated. I will use Gretl VAR lag-length selection 
and VECM functionalities to conduct Johansen’s tests. 
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6 EMPIRICAL TEST RESULTS 
 
In this chapter I will first introduce unit root test results of augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests. After that I have obtained the unit root test results, I will analyse and present 
OLS regression results. This is the first part of the empirical testing of the study. In 
the second part, I will conduct co-integration tests to variables that are integrated 
with the same degree. I use two alternative methods that were described in chapter 5. 
As a first method, I run two-stage Engle-Granger co-integration test and estimate the 
error correction model (ECM). As a second method, I use Johansen’s co-integration 
test methodology, which provides two test statistics λtrace and the λmax. After I have 
obtained the test results, I will shortly analyse causes and effects of each result 
separately in the end of each subchapter. I make my final comments and conclusions 
in the chapter 7.   
 
Initially, I will use each test method using variables based on my hypothesis about 
significant factors in chapter four. In summary, those were open market operations, 
deposit facility, reserve requirements, euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate, 
Eurobond CDS spread with 10 year maturity and Eurobond yields of the same 
maturities than dependent variable. If I find that my variables of my hypothesis do 
not provide significant results when conducting these tests, I will try to estimate a 
model that could provide significant results. Thus in each subchapter results are in 
some sense different. However, I found out one significant relationship between 
Euribor basis swap spreads and one independent factor in each of the three tests. 
 
6.1 Unit root tests 
 
I used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test the null hypothesis of a unit root for 
each datasets without a constant and time trend, with a constant and with a constant 
and a time trend. I select the appropriate lag length using general to specific rule, 
where I start with a relatively large value of lags (p*), test the significance of the last 
coefficient and reduce p iteratively until the process is significantly different from 
zero. In this study, the initial p value I have used is twenty lags. In the case of a daily 
data, it is quite impossible to conclude anything reasonable about the lag length 
selection. As a rule of thumb, monthly data should contain twelve lags, conversely in 
a quarterly data, lag length of four would be appropriate.   
75 
 
 
The results from the ADF tests are available in Appendix 4. The null hypothesis I 
tested is γ=0. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the series is stationary and 
contains unit root. I compare the results to MacKinnon (2010) critical values for any 
sample size. The level data of 3M vs. 6M 1 year, 3M vs. 6M 2 year, 1M vs. 3M 2 year 
and 1M vs. 3M 5 year Euribor basis swap spreads was found to be stationary if 
constant term is included in the regression in 5 percentage significance level (in each 
case). In addition 1M vs. 3M 2 year and 5 year Euribor basis swap spreads are 
stationary respectively in 1 percentage and 10 percentage significance level if constant 
and trend are included. However, these are not at particular interest of the study and 
in addition, every other basis swap spreads are non-stationary. Explanatory variables 
on my way to estimating a comprehensive model are mostly non-stationary in level 
stage. Only marginal lending facility, current account holdings and key interest rates 
of the ECB are stationary. Key interest rates are stationary in two of the first cases, 
which I could already expect beforehand based on the Figure 4.5. in chapter 4. They 
do not contain a deterministic or stochastic trend. In chapter 4, I assumed marginal 
lending facility and current account holdings to be correlated insignificantly with 
Euribor basis swap spreads, which do not support the use of those variables in the 
model construction. Marginal lending facility is stationary in each of three cases. 
Current account holdings are stationary in two of the last cases. In addition, I will 
omit euro area debt to GDP ratio from model estimation because it is stationary in 
level stage with 10 percentage significance level. However, I will include euro – U.S. 
dollar exchange rate and euro area deficit to GDP ratio, as they both are stationary in 
the differences level, but non-stationary in the level stage (neither constant nor trend 
case). My logic behind omitting stationary variables (in level stage) in this point, 
comes from the fact that when running a co-integration test, testable variables must 
be integrated of the same degree, that is I(1) in order them to be co-integrated CI(1,1). 
Variables that were stationary in level stage are I(0), and thus cannot co-integrate 
with the first degree integrated variables as they are of the different degree. 
 
I found the ADF test results of the first differences of raw data to support the 
evidence that different datasets could be co-integrated. Variables that were non-
stationary in level stage were found to be stationary when differentiated with the first 
degree. As we can see from Appendix 4, the null hypothesis is rejected in every case, 
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except in the case of covered bond purchase programme and euro area debt to GDP 
ratio. Thus, I will not take into account the covered bond purchase programme when 
conducting co-integration tests. The next step will be the test of co-integration using 
Engle-Granger methodology as well as Johansen’s methodology in order to provide 
proof for the possible co-integration. The test results are presented in subchapters 6.3 
and 6.4. 
 
The third column of table on Appendix 4, provides unit root test results for relative 
factor changes. Except the debt and deficit to GDP ratios, all datasets are stationary 
in relative changes level and in each of the three cases. These results give support to 
use relative factor changes in linear regression model as explanatory variables in 
order to aim to build a comprehensive model. In the following subchapter I will 
present the OLS test results.  
 
6.2 Linear regression model 
 
Relating to the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests I presented in the previous subchapter, 
I will use the relative changes in factors as a dependent and explanatory variables in 
OLS regression. I see that use of relative changes is supported in this case, as the 
variables are in several different units, that is, basis point, percentage and EUR 100 
millions. In general, the use of relative changes is adopted as a general method in 
time-series analysis and modelling. The interest of the study is particularly in 3M vs. 
12M Euribor basis swap spread movements, as they are probably the most commonly 
used by financial institutions. Especially, this is the case for credit institutions that 
have their funding in 3 month tenor but lending in 12 month tenor. Thus, movements 
in spreads are quite significant factor in order to plan timing of hedging. In addition, 
basis spreads may cause difficulties with respect to valuation in IFRS-accounting. In 
the limited scope of the study, I will conduct tests only for 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis 
swaps with 2 year and 5 year maturities, but parts of the other test results are 
reported in appendices.    
 
Descriptive statistics of relative changes in factors can be found from Appendix 5. 
One clear conclusion that arises from the test results is that datasets of relative factor 
changes do not support all of the OLS assumptions as they are skewed (in most of the 
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cases to the right) and peaked, reflecting high skewness and kurtosis values. Jarque-
Bera test results support the rejection of null hypothesis that datasets are normally 
distributed. In spite of the fact that datasets do not fully fulfil the requirements of 
OLS assumptions, I decided to carry the linear regression model in order to estimate 
a comprehensive model and find out what are the differences of the results between 
different methods applied in the study. Initially, I conducted OLS estimations and co-
integration analysis using same independent variables that were open market 
operations, deposit facility, reserve requirements, euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange 
rate, Eurobond CDS spread with 10 year maturity and Eurobond yields of the same 
maturities than dependent variable. I decided to omit autonomous liquidity factors 
including SMP at this point, because at level stage it is correlated significantly with 
Eurobond CDS spreads. However, Eurobond CDS spreads were correlated more 
significantly with Euribor basis swap spreads.  Appendix 6 presents test results. 
Results indicate that relative changes in open market operation, deposit facility or 
reserve requirements do not explain significantly changes in 3M vs. 12M Euribor 
basis swap spreads.  
 
 As the variables based on my initial hypothesis could not provide a comprehensive 
model, in which each explanatory variable would have been significantly different 
from zero, I decided to proceed my way to estimate a model which could handle this 
problem. First, I used correlation matrix in Appendix 7 and the table of correlation 
between 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 year and 5 year maturities 
including one to five leads and lags of explanatory variables in (Appendix 8) in order 
to see what factors are correlating with relative changes in basis swap spreads. In 
order to circumvent multicollinearity between explanatory variables, construction of 
a pair-wise correlation matrix will yield indications of the likelihood that any given 
pair of explanatory variables have multicollinearity. Correlation values between 0,6 
and 0,8 can indicate a problem of multicollinierity (Chennamaneni et al. 2008). 
Sometimes variables may be correlated as high as 0,8 without causing problems. In 
this study, I use values higher than 0,8 as a limit value in order to omit the less 
correlated value with Euribor basis swap spreads. Before moving deeper into the 
multicollinearity topic, I will point some interesting observations from table 
regarding correlation between 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 year 
and 5 year maturities including one to five leads and lags of explanatory variables 
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(Appendix 8). Altogether, I conclude from the table that correlations are minor. The 
explanatory variables and their leads and lags that were greater or equal than for 
value 0,1 correlated with spreads are highlighted in green colour. The relative 
changes in deposit facility, euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate, Eurobond yields, 
Eurobond CDS spreads and Euribor panel banks CDS spreads were correlated with 
values more than 0,1. Based on these correlations, I conducted multicollinearity 
check according to previously presented procedure for each significant variable by 
investigating the values over 0,8 (highlighted in red) in correlation matrix presented 
in Appendix 7. As a result, I estimated models in equations 6.1 and 6.2 for 2 year and 
5 year maturities of 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads, respectively. For 2 year 
maturity the model is: 
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The estimation results for 3M vs. 12M 2 year Euribor basis swap spread are in Table 
6.1. 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/02 (T = 873) 
Dependent variable: bs3vs12y2 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
EUR_USD -0,55721 0,222804 -2,5009 0,01257 ** 
EurobondCDS10y_1lag 0,102794 0,046928 2,1905 0,02876 ** 
Deposit_facility_4lead 0,00178118 0,00077272 2,3051 0,02140 ** 
CDS_5y_EBR_Panel 0,305584 0,0613001 4,9850 <0,00001 *** 
Eurobond2y -1,14111 0,0620061 -18,4031 <0,00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0,003292  S.D. dependent var  0,060111 
Sum squared resid  2,200789  S.E. of regression  0,050353 
R-squared  0,303600  Adjusted R-squared  0,300391 
F(5, 868)  75,68204  P-value(F)  7,28e-66 
Log-likelihood  1372,898  Akaike criterion -2735,797 
Schwarz criterion -2711,937  Hannan-Quinn -2726,669 
rho -0,071700  Durbin-Watson  2,135501 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient of determination R2, as well as adjusted coefficient of determination is 
approximately 0,30. Thus, model explains 30 percent of the movements in 3M vs. 
12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity. In order to estimate the model, 
Table 6.1 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results for 3M vs. 12M 2 year Euribor basis swap 
spread. 
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I conducted several estimations to find a definitive combination in both cases. The 
coefficient of determination cannot provide alone trustworthy results in way to 
estimate the most comprehensive model. As a supplementary method, I used the 
Akaike information criterion, which is a measure of the relative goodness of fit of a 
statistical model. The model is based on the fact that there will almost always be 
information loss due to using one of the candidate models to represent the true 
model. Thus from among several models, the model that minimizes the information 
loss will be selected. Constant and trend terms were not included in the models. The 
constant term was not significantly different from zero in either of the two cases. In 
addition, it is best to avoid the use of trend as an explanatory variable unless there is 
some good reason to include that in the estimation (Enders, 2004. 352).  
 
Durbin-Watson test results can be also found from the table. They test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals from a regression analysis. A value of near two means 
that there is no autocorrelation in the sample dataset while values approaching to 
zero indicate positive autocorrelation and values towards four indicate negative 
autocorrelation. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are quite acceptable as 
well standard error of the regression. They measure respectively the amount of 
sampling error in a regression coefficient and the scatter of the actual observations 
outside the regression line. P-value of F-statistic tests the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero. However, when errors are not normal this statistic 
becomes invalid. According to t-ratios each variable is significantly different from 
zero in 5 percentage significance level. A general assumption regarding student’s t 
distribution is that if the error terms of the regression approximately follow a normal 
distribution, then t-statistics follow a student-t distribution. However, because the 
errors εt do not follow a normal distribution in this case, the interpretation of the 
results becomes more complicated. Finally, the interpretation of coefficients of least 
squares estimates (Table 6.1) indicate that: 1 percentage increase in euro – U.S. dollar 
foreign exchange rate is associated with an decrease of 0,56 percentage in 2 year 
Euribor basis swap spread, 1 percentage increase in second lag of 10 year Eurobond 
CDS spread is associated with an increase of 0,10 percentage in 2 year Euribor basis 
swap spread, 1 percentage increase in fourth lead of deposit facility is associated with 
an increase of approximately 0,002 percentage in 2 year Euribor basis swap spread, 1 
percentage increase in 5 year Euribor panel bank CDS spread is associated with an 
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increase of 0,31 percentage in 2 year Euribor basis swap spread, 1 percentage increase 
in 2 year Eurobond yield is associated with an decrease of 1,14 percentage in 2 year 
Euribor basis swap spread. 
 
The model equation for the 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 5 year 
maturity is: 
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Model 2: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/02 (T = 873) 
Dependent variable: bs3vs12y5 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
EUR-USD -0,55634 0,159554 -3,4869 0,00051 *** 
EurobondCDS10y_1lag 0,0569563 0,033673 1,6915 0,09111 * 
Deposit_facility_4lead 0,00126459 0,000553041 2,2866 0,02246 ** 
CDS_5y_EBR_Panel 0,104584 0,0440905 2,3720 0,01791 ** 
Eurobond5y -1,16142 0,0725691 -16,0044 <0,00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0,002411  S.D. dependent var  0,041667 
Sum squared resid  1,127320  S.E. of regression  0,036038 
R-squared  0,257833  Adjusted R-squared  0,254413 
F(5, 868)  60,30970  P-value(F)  5,67e-54 
Log-likelihood  1664,905  Akaike criterion -3319,810 
Schwarz criterion -3295,950  Hannan-Quinn -3310,682 
rho -0,025537  Durbin-Watson  2,050646 
 
 
 
Coefficient of determination R2, as well as adjusted coefficient of determination is 
approximately 0,25. Thus, model explains 25 percent of the movements in 3M vs. 
12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity. Test statistics of Durbin-Watson 
is supportive to no autocorrelation. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are 
quite acceptable as well standard error of the regression. According to t-ratios each 
variable is significantly different from zero in 5 percent significance level (except 10 
year Eurobond CDS spread in 10 percent significance level). The coefficients of least 
squares estimates of parameters (Table 6.2) indicate that: 1 percentage increase in 
euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate is associated with an decrease of 0,56 
percentage in 5 year Euribor basis swap spread, 1 percentage increase in second lag of 
10 year Eurobond CDS spread is associated with an increase of 0,06 percentage in 5 
Table 6.2 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results for 3M vs. 12M 5 year Euribor basis swap 
spread. 
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year Euribor basis swap spread, 1 percentage increase in fourth lead of deposit facility 
is associated with an increase of approximately 0,001 percentage in 5 year Euribor 
basis swap spread, 1 percentage increase in 5 year Euribor panel bank CDS spread is 
associated with an increase of 0,10 percentage in 5 year Euribor basis swap spread, 1 
percentage increase in 5 year Eurobond yield is associated with an decrease of 1,16 
percentage in 5 year Euribor basis swap spread. 
 
In addition, I estimated both models using the Newey-West procedure that produces 
HAC (Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent) standard errors that 
correct for both possible autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity that may be present. 
The results of estimations (variables significantly different from zero) did not change 
as the result of applying Newey-West procedure. 
 
6.3 Engle-Granger co-integration test 
 
The co-integration analysis focuses on the short- and long-term relationship between 
the variables whereas linear regression model with log-differences focuses exclusively 
on the short-run relationship. In this sense co-integration analysis provides more 
comprehensive results on relations between dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
In step 1, I conducted co-integrating regression using OLS with level variables. The 
explanatory variables in regression were open market operations, deposit facility, 
reserve requirements, 2 year Eurobond yield, 10 year Eurobond CDS spread and euro 
– U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate. In order to avoid multicollinearity, I used pair-
wise examination and omitted variables that were correlated more insignificantly 
with Euribor basis swap spread. Appendix 1 presents correlation matrix of level 
variables. In step 2, I saved the residuals from OLS estimation, took lags and 
conducted unit root test with MacKinnon critical values. Table 6.3 present the results 
and critical values for unit root tests.   
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level of
signifcance test result
resid_bs3vs12y2_t-1 -3,6646
resid_bs3vs12y5_t-1 -2,7043
Critical values (constant) 1 % -4,9825
T=6 N=879 5 % -4,7261
10 % -4,4400
resid_bs3vs12y2_t-1 -3,7939 or -4,0919
resid_bs3vs12y5_t-1 -3,3029 or -3,6353
Critical values (constant) 1 % -5,2750
T=7 N=879 5 % -5,0008
10 % -4,7154
T= number of variables
N=number of observations  
 
Initially, I ran the unit root tests for residuals from regression with constant and six 
variables, one dependent and six independent. Results indicate that null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected in any of the three significance levels. Thus, there is no co-
integration according to Engle-Granger method when all reasonable variables are 
taken into account. However, I wanted to investigate further whether the omitting of 
euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate or more variables, will modify the test 
results. I rationalize the ignorance of euro - U.S. dollar exchange rate relying on the 
fact that it was stationary with 5 percentage significance level in level stage if constant 
term was included. Generally, Engle-Granger method is rather fragile to errors made 
in step 1. This gives reason to test different combinations. As we can see from Table 
6.3, neither unit root tests with six nor seven variables in regression cannot reject the 
null hypothesis. Finally, I took into account all variables presented in chapter four 
similarly as was the case with linear regression model in latter part of the previous 
subchapter. I conducted pair-wise OLS-estimation for levels and saved the residuals 
to see are they stationary or not.  We can find the results were unit-root was found 
from Table 6.4.  3 month vs. 12 month 2 year Euribor basis swap spread and 
Eurobond 2 year, rejects the null hypothesis in 5 percentage significance level. In 
addition, combination of 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity 
and euro area deficit to GDP ratio rejects the null in 5 percentage significance level 
whereas 3M vs. 12M 5 year Euribor basis swap spread and autonomous liquidity 
factors including SMP rejects the null in 10 percentage significance level. The latter 
result is quite interesting because if we have a quick glance back on Figure 4.9 that is 
Table 6.3 Unit root test results for residuals from six, seven and eight variable regression models. 
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in subchapter 4.5.3, autonomous liquidity factor including SMP is converging to zero, 
while Euribor basis swap spread is currently increasing. Altogether, the result 
indicate that Euribor basis swap spread with 5 year maturity and liquidity factors are 
converging in the long-run towards the same path. 
level of
signifcance test result
resid_bs3vs12y2_t-1 -3,6475
resid_bs3vs12y5_t-1 -3,1279
Critical values (constant) 1 % -3,9089
T=2 N=879 5 % -3,345
10 % -3,0493
resid_bs3vs12y2_t-1 -3,4686
Critical values (constant) 1 % -3,9096
T=2 N=830 5 % -3,3431
10 % -3,0496
T= number of variables
N=number of observations  
 
The rejection of null hypothesis gives reason to estimate the error correction model. 
Although I ran unit root tests for residuals including several lagged (maximum was 
20) values, in order to preserve degrees of freedom, only one lag was included for 
simplicity in error correction model estimation. The error correction model is in 
general form: 
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in which, bs3vs12yy is 2 year or 5 year maturity Euribor basis swap spread, the 
regressor corresponds to explanatory variable that had co-integrating relation with 
Euribor basis swap spread.  Table 6.5 presents estimation results of error correction 
models for each pair-wise co-integrating relation. Constant term is included in 
regression equations although it proved to be insignificant. 
Table 6.4 Unit root test results for residual of three pair-wise regression model combinations where 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
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Model 2: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/08 (T = 877) 
Dependent variable: d_bs3vs12y2 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,0642507 0,064069 1,0028 0,31622  
d_Eurobond2_1 -2,15104 1,05693 -2,0352 0,04213 ** 
resi1_1 -0,0168729 0,00521823 -3,2335 0,00127 *** 
d_bs3vs12y2_1 -0,0602783 0,0370528 -1,6268 0,10414  
 
 
Model 8: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/10/11 (T = 835) 
Dependent variable: d_bs3vs12y2 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,0583918 0,0667797 0,8744 0,38216  
d_deficitzo_1 -0,596207 1,80784 -0,3298 0,74164  
resi_1 -0,0141298 0,00580983 -2,4320 0,01522 ** 
d_bs3vs12y2_1 -0,025852 0,0346592 -0,7459 0,45594  
 
 
Model 7: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/08 (T = 877) 
Dependent variable: d_bs3vs12y5 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,0379437 0,0281704 1,3469 0,17835  
d_Liquidity_1 0,000385908 0,000381645 1,0112 0,31222  
resi3_1 -0,0145472 0,00495649 -2,9350 0,00342 ***
d_bs3vs12y5_1 0,0197938 0,0337749 0,5861 0,55799   
 
I consider first the signs and significances of the coefficients in the uppermost model. 
Two-sided co-integration tests are needed in order to prove the mutual co-integrating 
relation. β12 is negative and significant in the equation 6.3, indicating that the 
Eurobond yield does lead the Euribor basis swap spread market, since lagged changes 
in Eurobond yields lead to an opposite change of 2,15 basis points in the subsequent 
period in 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread with 2 year maturity. In addition, 
this means that the change in Eurobond yield alone is responsible for the adaptation 
in the short-run. The coefficient β11 of lagged basis spread is not significant. T-ratio of 
β3vs12yy rejects the null hypothesis in 1 percentage significance level, meaning that 
error correction model is significant. It indicates that if there is a positive difference 
between 3M vs. 12M 2 year Euribor basis swap and 2 year Eurobond yield, then 
Euribor basis swap spread will fall during the next period to restore equilibrium and 
vice versa.  
 
Conversely, β21 is positive and significant in the equation 6.4, indicating that the 
Euribor basis swap spread does also lead the Eurobond yield, since lagged changes in 
Euribor basis swap spreads lead to change of 0,0035 percentage in Eurobond yield in 
the subsequent period. The coefficient of lagged Eurobond yield is also significant, 
since lagged changes in Eurobond yields lead to a change of 0,25 percentage in 
Eurobond yield in the subsequent period. T-ratio of βregressor rejects the null 
hypothesis (in equation 6.4) in 1 percentage significance level, meaning that error 
Table 6.5 Estimation results of error correction model for each co-integrating relations according to 
pair-wise Engle-Granger methodology. 
Model 3: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/08 (T = 877) 
Dependent variable: d_Eurobond2y 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,000748418 0,00221499 0,3379 0,73553  
resi1_1 0,000365785 0,000180404 2,0276 0,04291 ** 
d_bs3vs12y2_1 0,00348098 0,00128098 2,7174 0,00671 *** 
d_Eurobond2_1 0,250632 0,0365401 6,8591 <0,00001 *** 
Model 5: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/09/30 (T = 828) 
Dependent variable: d_deficitzone 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 8,25791e-05 0,000295234 0,2797 0,77977  
d_bs3vs12y2_1 5,93041e-05 0,000153538 0,3863 0,69941  
resi2_1 -3,88776e-05 2,6219e-05 -1,4828 0,13851  
d_deficitzo_1 0,972249 0,00796708 122,0332 <0,00001 *** 
Model 7: OLS, using observations 2008/07/14-2011/12/08 (T = 877) 
Dependent variable: d_Liquidity_a 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const -2,59564 2,49753 -1,0393 0,29896  
d_bs3vs12y5_1 0,936055 2,99441 0,3126 0,75466  
resi3_1 -0,559511 0,439432 -1,2733 0,20326  
d_Liquidity_1 -0,0693885 0,0338358 -2,0507 0,04059 ** 
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correction model is significant. It indicates that if there is a positive difference 
between 3M vs. 12M 2 year Euribor basis swap and 2 year Eurobond yield, then both 
Euribor basis swap spread and Eurobond yield will increase during the next period 
which is not reasonable compared to the estimation result other way round.  
 
The estimation results of second and third model I presented in Table 6.5 are 
interesting because when I estimated ECM for model 6.3, results indicated that there 
is significant relationship between the variables only in the long-run. The coefficient 
of adaptation was 0,014 basis points in both cases (2 year and 5 year maturity), if 
there was a deviation from long-run equilibrium in the previous period. When 
estimations were done other way round, the regressors being dependent variable, 
results did not support either long-run co-movement among variables or short-run 
relations between regressor and Euribor basis swap spreads. Noteworthy though, 
ECM coefficients are negative in both cases as it should be according to nature of 
long-run convergence to exist among variables. 
 
6.4 Johansen’s co-integration test 
 
After that I proved variables to be stationary in first differences, I will proceed to 
obtain appropriate lag length for the VAR. The results of the Johansen’s test can be 
quite sensitive to the lag length. Appendix 9 presents results of the VAR lag length 
selection. The preferred model is that with the lowest Akaike information criteria 
value. According to Appendix 9, the optimal number of lags included in the VAR is 
three.  
 
I took into account constant, dependent 3M vs. 12M 2 year (5 year) Euribor basis 
swap spread and six independent variables being open market operations, deposit 
facility, reserve requirements, euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate, Eurobond 2 
year (5 year) yield and 10 year Eurobond CDS spread.  The results for Johansen’s co-
integration test with three lags can be found from Table 6.6.    
 
In addition, Engle-Granger test results lead me to estimate a model in which euro 
area deficit to GDP and autonomous liquidity factors were taken into account. 
Incorporation of euro area deficit to the model did not change the number of co-
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integrating relations but autonomous liquidity factors did. However, when I 
estimated the error correction model including autonomous liquidity factors, test 
results indicated insignificant correlation in the short- and long-run. Results of the 
previous were not reported in this scope. 
 
I used two test statistics, trace and maximum eigenvalue, to investigate the co-
integration among dependent and explanatory variables. The values of the trace test 
statistic can be found from column three of the Table 6.6 with 5 percentage critical 
values in column four. Correspondingly, the maximum eigenvalue test statistics are 
shown in column five together with their critical values in column six. Critical values 
are values obtained from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
 
Johansen test bs3vs12y2: 
Number of equations = 7 
Lag order = 3 
Estimation period: 2008/07/15 - 2011/12/08 (T = 876) 
Case 3: Unrestricted constant 
 
Log-likelihood = -12633,8 (including constant term: -15119,8) 
 
Rank Eigenvalue       λtrace       CV 5 %        λmax   CV 5 % 
   0    0,11916     228,88 131,70        111,14 46,65 
   1   0,046743     117,74 102,14        41,934 40,30 
   2   0,029924     75,805 76,07         26,614 34,30 
   3   0,021825     49,191 53,12         19,330 28,14 
   4   0,017733     29,861 34,91         15,673 22,00 
   5   0,015753     14,188 19,96         13,910 15,67 
   6 0,00031755     0,2782 9,24          0,27822 9,24 
 
Johansen test bs3vs12y5: 
Number of equations = 7 
Lag order = 3 
Estimation period: 2008/07/15 - 2011/12/08 (T = 876) 
Case 3: Unrestricted constant 
 
Log-likelihood = -11814,4 (including constant term: -14300,4) 
 
Rank Eigenvalue       λtrace       CV 5 %        λmax   CV 5 % 
   0    0,11525     203,44 131,70        107,27 46,65 
   1   0,042022     96,178 102,14        37,607 40,30 
   2   0,022383     58,570 76,07         19,831 34,30 
   3   0,017185     38,740 53,12         15,185 28,14 
   4   0,015308     23,555 34,91         13,513 22,00 
   5   0,011201     10,042 19,96         9,8674 15,67 
   6 0,00019920     0,1745 9,24          0,17452 9,24  
 
The trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics reveals that there are two co-integrating 
relationship among the variables that are compared with 2 year maturity Euribor 
basis swap spread. In other words, the trace and maximum statistics results are 
significant at the 5 percent significance level. Correspondingly, the trace and 
maximum eigenvalue statistics reveals that there is one co-integrating relationship at 
the 5 percent significance level among the variables that are compared with 5 year 
maturity Euribor basis swap spread. 
 
Table 6.6 Johansen’s co-integration test results, trace and maximum eigenvalue tests 
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These results together with the pair-wise Engle-Granger test results indicate that 
there is a long-run co-movement among variables under interest. Therefore, the 
movement of as particular explanatory variable is related to the movement in Euribor 
basis swap spread. These results will lead to estimate the vector error correction 
model (VECM) for the co-integrating variables. Table 6.7 presents the results of the 
VECM estimation: 
 
d_bs3vs12y2 d_Operations d_Depo d_EurobondCDS d_Reserves d_EUR_USD d_Eurobond2y
d_bs3vs12y2_1 -0,084** 10,596 5,233 0,165 0,028 -0,000** 0,000
d_bs3vs12y2_2 0,052 25,285*** 13,912** -0,136 -0,015 0,000 -0,000
d_Operations_1 0,000 -0,482*** -0,086** -0,000 0,000 -0,000 0,000
d_Operations_2 0,000 -0,061 0,020 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000
d_Depo_1 0,000 -0,595*** -0,171*** 0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000
d_Depo_2 0,000 -0,457*** -0,100** -0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000**
d_EurobondCDS_1 0,014 -2,572 0,788 0,276*** -0,031 0,000*** 0,003***
d_EurobondCDS_2 -0,005 0,961 -2,579 -0,093** -0,022 0,000 -0,000
d_Reserves_1 -0,004 2,002 1,370 -0,047 -0,002 0,000* 0,000
d_Reserves_2 0,001 2,437 2,546 -0,062 -0,002 0,000 0,000
d_EUR_USD_1 -2,179 -2611,81* -1367,21 -0,928 -5,637 -0,046 0,121
d_EUR_USD_2 -3,921 1107,78 528,591 -5,430 -19,202* -0,003 0,030
d_Eurobond2y_1 -3,113** 51,342 12,640 -3,284 0,907 0,007 0,141***
d_Eurobond2y_2 0,231 161,445 72,716 -1,351 3,637* 0,005 -0,035
EC1 -0,009** 2,539*** 1,908*** 0,000 0,010 -0,000 -0,000***
EC2 0,000 0,216*** 0,217*** -0,000 0,000** 0,000 -0,000*
Short-run
 
d_bs3vs12y5 d_Operations d_Depo d_EurobondCDS d_Reserves d_EUR_USD d_Eurobond5y
d_bs3vs12y5_1 -0,022 10,585 -12,248 0,500** -0,045 -0,001** 0,002
d_bs3vs12y5_2 0,096** 28,607 16,108 -0,012 0,015 0,000* -0,001
d_Operations_1 -0,000 -0,477979*** -0,084** -0,000 0,000* -0,000 0,000
d_Operations_2 -0,000 -0,0565832 0,023 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
d_Depo_1 0,000 -0,607*** -0,185*** 0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000
d_Depo_2 -0,000 -0,466*** -0,114** -0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
d_EurobondCDS_1 0,002 -2,478 1,434 0,265*** -0,028 -0,000*** 0,001***
d_EurobondCDS_2 -0,000 2,149 -1,523 -0,120*** -0,018 0,000 0,000
d_Reserves_1 -0,004 2,119 1,443 -0,051 -0,002 0,000* 0,000
d_Reserves_2 -0,001 2,567 2,414 -0,063 -0,003 0,000 0,000
d_EUR_USD_1 -1,486 -3055,22** -1772,25* -0,990 -7,744 -0,000 0,116
d_EUR_USD_2 -0,318 763,427 281,043 -4,846 -19,346* 0,001 0,165
d_Eurobond5y_1 -1,068* 197,956 -154,350 -0,805 0,783 0,009 0,126***
d_Eurobond5y_2 0,989* -182,223 -97,064 3,8369 5,811** 0,016** -0,029
EC1 -0,000 9,554*** 9,764*** -0,001 0,014 0,000 -0,000*
***1 % significance
**5 % significance
*10 % significance
Short-run
 
 
As we can see from Table 6.7 Johansen’s co-integration test partially supports the 
results of significant factors obtained from Engle-Granger test. The second column, 
regarding co-integrating relation between 3M vs. 12M 2 year basis swap spread and 
explanatory variables, presents coefficients for model 6.3. Johansen’s test indicates 
significance in 5 percentage level. Coefficients of lagged differences in 3M vs. 12M 2 
year Euribor basis swap spread and 2 year Eurobond yield are higher although error 
correction model has lower coefficient compared to Engle-Granger test results. In 
Table 6.7 VECM estimation results. Upper table represents VECM for co-integrating relation between 
3M vs. 12M 2 year basis swap spread and explanatory variables. Correspondingly, lower 
table presents relation between 3M vs. 12M 5 year Euribor basis swap spread and 
explanatory variables. 
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addition, comparing the co-integrating relationship the other way round, lagged 
differences do not explain changes in 2 year Eurobond yield. Instead, second lag of 
deposit facility, first lags of 1o year Eurobond CDS spread and 2 year Eurobond yield 
itself explain movements in 2 year Eurobond yield. In this case, both error correction 
terms are significant in 1 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.  
 
Latter part of the Table 6.7 presents estimation results from vector error correction 
for co-integrating relations between 3M vs. 12M 5 year Euribor basis swap spread and 
regressors. Now results are different obtained from Engle-Granger method. Engle-
Granger proved only autonomous liquidity factors to be co-integrated with 5 year 
Euribor basis swap spread.  According to Table 6.7 lagged differences of 5 year 
Eurobond yield is in 10 percentage significance level correlated with Euribor basis 
swap spread with 5 year maturity. Vice versa, the correlation of lagged Euribor basis 
swap spread with 5 year maturity is not significantly correlated with differences of 5 
year Eurobond yield. In addition, error correction term is not significantly correlated, 
when 5 year Euribor basis swap spread is regarded as dependent variable. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigated effects of different factors affecting on Euribor basis swap 
spreads, 3 month versus 12 month Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 and 5 year 
maturities especially. Currently, the large spread between for example,  3M vs. 12M 
Euribor basis swap spread is in my sense consequence of markets expectations of 
higher 12 month than 3 month Euribor rate also in future but also the limited access 
to basis swap markets.  
 
Hypotheses were generally based on previous studies regarding factors driving Libor-
OIS spreads. In those studies, credit risk component together with liquidity 
component have found out to be significantly correlated with Libor-OIS spreads. The 
aim of the study was to provide understanding of Euribor basis swap spread 
movements, particularly factors that correlate significantly with basis swap spreads. 
Currently, there are no previous research done on this particular topic. Credit default 
swap spreads represent the credit risk component of the study and European Central 
Bank's actions the liquidity component. In addition, the euro – U.S. dollar foreign 
exchange rate presents variable reflecting view of market participants on 
macroeconomics conditions and news. 
 
In empirical part of the study, I applied linear regression model, Engle-Granger and 
Johansen co-integration tests. Linear regression model is suitable for short-run 
relationship examination between variables. However, linear regression models 
remove information of long-run relations between variables. Thus, Engle-Granger 
and Johansen tests together with vector error correction model are able to provide 
both the short-run and the long-run determinants. Engle-Granger and Johansen co-
integration analyses are also suitable for non-stationary time series used in this 
study. 
 
I laid out seven hypotheses in chapter four what comes to significant factors affecting 
on Euribor basis swap spreads. These hypotheses about significant factors were: 
Eurobond yields, Eurobond CDS spreads, Euribor panel CDS spreads, open market 
operations, deposit facility, autonomous liquidity factors including SMP and euro – 
U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate are significantly correlated with Euribor basis swap 
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spreads. Although these were my hypotheses about significant factors, I conducted 
analysis including also variables that I assumed to be insignificant. 
 
I considered Eurobond CDS spreads and Euribor panel bank CDS spreads as a part of 
credit risk component. I considered open market operations, deposit facility and 
autonomous liquidity factors as building blocks of the liquidity component. Eurobond 
yield had twofold relationship as I predicted in chapter four and thus it was not clear 
whether it is more kind of credit risk or liquidity component. In the following 
subchapters, I will provide my conclusions about the results. 
 
Unit root test results proved the general market observation that most of the financial 
time-series data are integrated of degree zero or one. Although coefficients of 
determination as well as adjusted coefficients of determination remained quite low 
(30 and 25 percentage) in OLS estimations, linear regression model provided 
promising results about significance liquidity and credit risk component. Noteworthy 
was also that euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate, variable that has not been 
taken into account in previous Libor-OIS spread studies, was significant in OLS 
estimation.  
 
I conclude that based on my hypothesis made in chapter 5, deposit facility together 
with twofold interpretation on Eurobond yield represent liquidity components and 
Eurobond CDS spread together with Euribor panel CDS spread represent credit risk 
components and finally, euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate presents additional 
“macroeconomic” component in my OLS model. It is worth mentioning that there 
were neither multicollinearity between log-differences of Eurobond CDS spread and 
Euribor panel CDS spread or Eurobond yields and CDS spreads. In both OLS 
estimations (2 year and 5 year Euribor basis swap spread), 10 year Eurobond CDS 
spread and 5 year Euribor panel CDS spread were more significant and provided 
lower values of Akaike information criteria as well higher coefficient of determination 
than credit default swap spreads with shorter maturities. I deduce that long-run 
credit risk is more significant what comes to markets expectations about forthcoming 
risks and effects on Euribor basis swap spreads.  
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Unit root test result indicated also that after differentiating the level data once, data 
became stationary. This gave reason to analyse whether there is long-run co-
movement between explanatory variables and dependent variables or not. Engle-
Granger and Johansen tests provided consistent results about the number of co-
integrating relations although in Engle-Granger method in order to find any 
relations, I had to conduct pair-wise estimations. Johansen test provided promising 
results when all six independent factors were taken into account. Based on both co-
integration estimations, I found out that there are two co-integrating relations with 
respect to 2 year Euribor basis swap spread and one relation between 5 year Euribor 
basis swap spread. 
 
Pair-wise Engle-Granger co-integration test results with respect to 2 year Euribor 
basis swap spread provided two different co-integrating relations that were with 2 
year Eurobond yield and euro area deficit to GDP. However, I conclude that the result 
of euro zone deficit to GDP should be considered in cautious, because deficit was 
stationary already in levels when constant was included. Thus, they are integrated of 
different degrees. Respectively, 5 year Euribor basis swap spread had co-integrating 
relation with autonomous liquidity factors including securities markets programme. 
Johansen test provided same amount of relations in both maturities. When I 
conducted Johansen tests taking into account deficit to GDP ratio and autonomous 
liquidity factors, they were not found out to be co-integrating with Euribor basis swap 
spreads. 
 
Finally, I estimated error correction models for Engle-Granger and Johansen co-
integrating relations. Error correction model for Engle-Granger test provided results 
from two-sided ECM estimations that there is significant short-run and long-run 
relationship only between 2 year Euribor basis swap spread and 2 year Eurobond 
yield. In spite of the promising results, it found out that ECM term was positive in 
latter estimation. This would implicate that if for example there was a positive 
difference in previous period between Eurobond yield and Euribor basis swap, both 
are increasing also in the current period and the difference is not narrowing. Thus, 
results indicate twofold relations because on the other hand the difference between 
spread and bond yield indicates convergence but then again on the other hand 
difference is increasing. In this sense Johansen method and VECM provided more 
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realistic results as it indicated there to be negative ECM coefficient in both of the two-
sided estimations.  Correlation coefficients of the short-run parameters in absolute 
terms are a bit higher in VECM for Johansen than for Engle-Granger estimations. 
Respectively, long-run coefficients are in absolute terms a bit lower in VECM for 
Johansen estimations.  
 
Error correction estimation results for pair-wise Engle-Granger test between 2 year 
3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread and euro area deficit to GDP ratio as well as 5 
year 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spread and autonomous liquidity factors 
including SMP were insignificant for both short- and long-run relations when results 
of two-sided test were interpreted. In the short-run it found out that lags of euro area 
deficit to GDP explains the future values of deficit to GDP in euro area. This is the 
case naturally because euro area deficit data was based on linearly increasing or 
decreasing data constructed from quarterly data.  Lags of liquidity factors including 
SMP indicated similar behaviour than euro area deficit to GDP ratio and explained 
future values of autonomous liquidity factors. In spite of the error correction term 
was significant in first estimation (Euribor basis swap spread as independent 
variable), it found out to be insignificant in second estimation (regressor as 
independent variable). VECM for Johansen estimations did not find any co-
integrating relations either between Euribor basis swap speads and euro area deficit 
to GDP ratio or autonomous liquidity factors including SMP. VECM for Johansen 
provided the result that Euribor basis swap spread as a dependent variable and yield 
of Eurobond 5 year as an independent are co-integrated in 10 % significance level but 
the inversion could not confirm the co-integrating relation.  
 
My overall conclusions of the study are that in spite of the figures and descriptive 
statistics in chapter four indicated several significant correlations between dependent 
and independent variables, it found out that because the main part of the variables 
were non-stationary in levels, the correlations were consequence of time trend in 
variables. After each data was differentiated in order to conduct reasonable 
estimations, it found out that I could use co-integration estimations for level data or 
linear regression models for differences or log-differences in this case. Finally, the 
linear regression model could provide most realistic results what comes to my initial 
hypothesis.  Co-integration estimations also provided significant results, but the 
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explanatory power of two-sided relations altogether were not that significant in spite 
of the relation between 2 year Eurobond yield and 2 year Euribor basis swap spread. 
 
According to OLS results decrease of euro – U.S. dollar foreign exchange rate will 
lead to increase in basis spreads, which sounds reasonable. Generally, markets react 
to negative macroeconomic news that stem from euro area in a way that it will 
depreciate euro with respect to U.S. dollar, which will in turn increase uncertainty, 
and increase basis swap spreads.  Expected increase in deposit facility will lead to 
increase in Euribor basis swap spread significantly four days beforehand. We have 
seen that currently ECB has provided significant amounts of liquidity to markets but 
in spite of that the spreads are increasing. This will reflect in my sense the fact that 
markets see that as long as there is excess liquidity in markets and banks keep 
depositing those funds with National Central Banks because they refuse to lend each 
other or their customers, Euribor basis swap spreads will increase. Increase in credit 
default swap spreads indicated that as long as credit risk of Euribor panel banks and 
euro area sovereigns increase so does Euribor basis swap spread. Increase in CDS 
spreads reflect higher funding cost for banks and sovereigns. This in turn will affect 
to liquidity in my sense in a way that banks deposit excess liquidity with central bank. 
Thus, higher CDS spread will decrease liquidity (increase deposit facility), which will 
increase basis swap spreads. I found out when conducting additional estimation that 
Eurobond CDS spread and deposit facility were positively correlated, which supports 
my conclusion.  
 
The correlation coefficients of Eurobond yields with respect to Euribor basis swap 
spreads were negative in both OLS tests and co-integration tests. The result indicate 
that in spite of the positive correlation between Eurobond yields and Eurobond CDS 
spread, those does not necessarily move in similar fashion with respect to Euribor 
basis swap spreads. It should be noted that ECM indicates that in the short run 
Euribor basis swap spreads and Eurobond yield deviate but in the long-run they 
convergence. I see that one possible explanation for negative correlation between 
Eurobond yields and Euribor basis swap spreads in the short-run is a result of ECB’s 
supporting sovereign bond purchases. The negative correlation might stem if 
Eurobond yield is increasing and markets expect ECB to come help to push sovereign 
bond yields down, which will in turn increase liquidity, which should decrease 
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Euribor basis swap spreads as does the ECM implicate in the long-run. On the other 
hand, more robust conclusion in my sense is that increased Eurobond yields reflect 
steepening yield curve, which is usually profitable for banks. Banks have their 
funding in shorter tenor and lending in longer tenor. Thus steepened yield curve 
usually means higher profits and higher net interest income for banks as the long rate 
increase and short rate remains at relative low levels. Higher profits for banks 
together with more activity at markets, will lead to increased liquidity, which will 
decrease Euribor basis swap spreads. I found market evidence that increased 
Eurobond yield correlates positively with respect to outstanding amounts of euro 
denominated single currency plain vanilla swap contracts in billions of U.S. dollars 
(see Appendix 10). Swap data was gathered from Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) web page.            
  
According to OLS test result my initial hypotheses regarding liquidity and credit risk 
components as well as macroeconomic variable could all be accepted. Engle-Granger 
and Johansen co-integrating tests together with error correction models are 
supportive to accept at least liquidity risk. In the short- and long-run the relationship 
between only Eurobond yield and Euribor basis swap spreads were found out to be 
significant. In the last resort, I see that according to OLS results and conclusions I 
made, each significant factor can be regarded affecting to Euribor basis swap spreads 
through liquidity component. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Correlation matrix (levels) 
 
 bs3vs6y1 bs3vs6y2 bs3vs6y5 bs1vs3y1 bs1vs3y2 bs1vs3y5 bs3vs12y1 bs3vs12y2 bs3vs12y5 bs6vs12y1 bs6vs12y2 bs6vs12y5 Depo%daily
bs3vs6y1 1,00 0,84 0,29 0,34 0,15 -0,11 0,83 0,77 0,49 0,71 0,65 0,48 0,19
bs3vs6y2 0,84 1,00 0,75 -0,03 -0,02 0,21 0,58 0,69 0,69 0,45 0,49 0,48 -0,24
bs3vs6y5 0,29 0,75 1,00 -0,49 -0,29 0,46 0,11 0,36 0,70 0,04 0,18 0,36 -0,54
bs1vs3y1 0,34 -0,03 -0,49 1,00 0,89 0,10 0,40 0,23 -0,15 0,39 0,29 0,07 0,61
bs1vs3y2 0,15 -0,02 -0,29 0,89 1,00 0,50 0,11 0,02 -0,21 0,08 0,03 -0,11 0,38
bs1vs3y5 -0,11 0,21 0,46 0,10 0,50 1,00 -0,25 -0,11 0,11 -0,28 -0,20 -0,12 -0,17
bs3vs12y1 0,83 0,58 0,11 0,40 0,11 -0,25 1,00 0,95 0,65 0,98 0,94 0,79 0,55
bs3vs12y2 0,77 0,69 0,36 0,23 0,02 -0,11 0,95 1,00 0,85 0,93 0,97 0,92 0,37
bs3vs12y5 0,49 0,69 0,70 -0,15 -0,21 0,11 0,65 0,85 1,00 0,65 0,79 0,92 0,03
bs6vs12y1 0,71 0,45 0,04 0,39 0,08 -0,28 0,98 0,93 0,65 1,00 0,97 0,84 0,63
bs6vs12y2 0,65 0,49 0,18 0,29 0,03 -0,20 0,94 0,97 0,79 0,97 1,00 0,94 0,53
bs6vs12y5 0,48 0,48 0,36 0,07 -0,11 -0,12 0,79 0,92 0,92 0,84 0,94 1,00 0,34
Depo%daily 0,19 -0,24 -0,54 0,61 0,38 -0,17 0,55 0,37 0,03 0,63 0,53 0,34 1,00
MLF% 0,04 -0,37 -0,62 0,63 0,44 -0,12 0,42 0,26 -0,07 0,52 0,43 0,26 0,97
MRO% 0,11 -0,30 -0,59 0,63 0,41 -0,15 0,49 0,32 -0,02 0,58 0,49 0,30 0,99
Operations 0,36 0,22 -0,10 0,36 0,36 0,09 0,02 -0,14 -0,39 -0,10 -0,25 -0,46 -0,03
MLF 0,41 0,19 -0,09 0,11 -0,11 -0,31 0,52 0,42 0,20 0,51 0,44 0,31 0,38
Depo 0,60 0,62 0,34 0,24 0,23 0,15 0,37 0,36 0,23 0,27 0,22 0,12 -0,02
Liquidity_and_SMP -0,01 -0,22 -0,43 0,28 0,29 -0,01 -0,31 -0,53 -0,77 -0,38 -0,56 -0,77 -0,03
CA 0,02 -0,02 -0,06 0,07 0,05 -0,03 0,02 0,00 -0,04 0,02 0,01 -0,02 0,04
Reserves 0,04 -0,35 -0,70 0,58 0,40 -0,31 -0,01 -0,24 -0,60 -0,02 -0,17 -0,40 0,28
CBPP1 -0,11 0,15 0,67 -0,29 -0,27 0,15 0,40 0,54 0,76 0,51 0,61 0,70 0,36
EUR/USD -0,37 -0,43 -0,34 -0,23 -0,23 -0,21 -0,27 -0,30 -0,28 -0,21 -0,22 -0,17 0,14
Eurobond2y 0,08 -0,03 -0,09 0,21 0,07 -0,15 0,49 0,54 0,50 0,59 0,66 0,70 0,57
Eurobond5y -0,07 -0,25 -0,28 0,15 -0,04 -0,32 0,35 0,33 0,27 0,46 0,49 0,51 0,58
Eurobond10y -0,12 -0,27 -0,26 0,03 -0,14 -0,37 0,23 0,22 0,19 0,33 0,36 0,40 0,43
EurobondCDS5y 0,26 0,55 0,65 -0,21 -0,19 0,08 0,36 0,60 0,84 0,36 0,54 0,74 -0,27
EurobondCDS10y 0,28 0,56 0,64 -0,19 -0,18 0,08 0,37 0,62 0,84 0,37 0,55 0,75 -0,25
CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS 0,28 0,41 0,36 0,00 -0,08 -0,13 0,40 0,58 0,68 0,41 0,56 0,69 -0,16
CDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS 0,27 0,45 0,46 -0,07 -0,11 -0,04 0,41 0,61 0,76 0,42 0,58 0,74 -0,16
deficitzone -0,08 0,27 0,41 -0,44 -0,19 0,24 -0,56 -0,49 -0,26 -0,67 -0,67 -0,59 -0,85
debtzone -0,24 0,31 0,79 -0,83 -0,64 0,17 -0,33 -0,06 0,48 -0,34 -0,18 0,13 -0,76
Monetary dummy 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
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 Depo Liquidity_and_SMP CA Reserves CBPP1 EUR/USD Eurobond2y Eurobond5y Eurobond10y EurobondCDS5y EurobondCDS10yCDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSCDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSdeficitzone debtzone Monetary dummy
bs3vs6y1 0,60 -0,01 0,02 0,04 -0,11 -0,37 0,08 -0,07 -0,12 0,26 0,28 0,28 0,27 -0,08 -0,24 0,00
bs3vs6y2 0,62 -0,22 -0,02 -0,35 0,15 -0,43 -0,03 -0,25 -0,27 0,55 0,56 0,41 0,45 0,27 0,31 0,00
bs3vs6y5 0,34 -0,43 -0,06 -0,70 0,67 -0,34 -0,09 -0,28 -0,26 0,65 0,64 0,36 0,46 0,41 0,79 0,00
bs1vs3y1 0,24 0,28 0,07 0,58 -0,29 -0,23 0,21 0,15 0,03 -0,21 -0,19 0,00 -0,07 -0,44 -0,83 -0,01
bs1vs3y2 0,23 0,29 0,05 0,40 -0,27 -0,23 0,07 -0,04 -0,14 -0,19 -0,18 -0,08 -0,11 -0,19 -0,64 0,00
bs1vs3y5 0,15 -0,01 -0,03 -0,31 0,15 -0,21 -0,15 -0,32 -0,37 0,08 0,08 -0,13 -0,04 0,24 0,17 0,00
bs3vs12y1 0,37 -0,31 0,02 -0,01 0,40 -0,27 0,49 0,35 0,23 0,36 0,37 0,40 0,41 -0,56 -0,33 0,01
bs3vs12y2 0,36 -0,53 0,00 -0,24 0,54 -0,30 0,54 0,33 0,22 0,60 0,62 0,58 0,61 -0,49 -0,06 0,01
bs3vs12y5 0,23 -0,77 -0,04 -0,60 0,76 -0,28 0,50 0,27 0,19 0,84 0,84 0,68 0,76 -0,26 0,48 0,00
bs6vs12y1 0,27 -0,38 0,02 -0,02 0,51 -0,21 0,59 0,46 0,33 0,36 0,37 0,41 0,42 -0,67 -0,34 0,00
bs6vs12y2 0,22 -0,56 0,01 -0,17 0,61 -0,22 0,66 0,49 0,36 0,54 0,55 0,56 0,58 -0,67 -0,18 0,00
bs6vs12y5 0,12 -0,77 -0,02 -0,40 0,70 -0,17 0,70 0,51 0,40 0,74 0,75 0,69 0,74 -0,59 0,13 0,00
Depo%daily -0,02 -0,03 0,04 0,28 0,36 0,14 0,57 0,58 0,43 -0,27 -0,25 -0,16 -0,16 -0,85 -0,76 0,00
MLF% -0,12 -0,03 0,04 0,31 0,36 0,18 0,58 0,60 0,46 -0,29 -0,27 -0,14 -0,15 -0,81 -0,78 0,00
MRO% -0,07 -0,03 0,04 0,30 0,36 0,16 0,58 0,59 0,45 -0,28 -0,26 -0,15 -0,16 -0,84 -0,77 0,00
Operations 0,65 0,77 0,25 0,53 -0,60 -0,36 -0,58 -0,56 -0,55 -0,47 -0,47 -0,43 -0,49 0,24 -0,39 0,00
MLF 0,11 -0,06 -0,03 0,14 0,15 -0,16 0,21 0,23 0,20 -0,01 0,00 0,05 0,05 -0,27 -0,30 -0,01
Depo 1,00 0,12 -0,15 0,04 -0,19 -0,44 -0,11 -0,25 -0,28 0,15 0,16 0,08 0,09 0,08 -0,12 0,08
Liquidity_and_SMP 0,12 1,00 0,05 0,71 -0,67 -0,13 -0,74 -0,60 -0,54 -0,80 -0,82 -0,69 -0,78 0,35 -0,53 -0,01
CA -0,15 0,05 1,00 0,08 -0,04 -0,01 -0,02 0,01 0,01 -0,06 -0,06 -0,03 -0,05 -0,03 -0,09 -0,15
Reserves 0,04 0,71 0,08 1,00 -0,48 -0,25 -0,34 -0,23 -0,24 -0,61 -0,61 -0,36 -0,48 -0,10 -0,75 0,00
CBPP1 -0,19 -0,67 -0,04 -0,48 1,00 -0,48 0,46 0,34 0,27 0,64 0,63 0,49 0,54 -0,45 0,88 0,01
EUR/USD -0,44 -0,13 -0,01 -0,25 -0,48 1,00 0,29 0,39 0,38 -0,21 -0,21 -0,17 -0,15 -0,14 -0,03 0,00
Eurobond2y -0,11 -0,74 -0,02 -0,34 0,46 0,29 1,00 0,93 0,83 0,47 0,49 0,51 0,55 -0,84 -0,22 0,00
Eurobond5y -0,25 -0,60 0,01 -0,23 0,34 0,39 0,93 1,00 0,96 0,27 0,28 0,37 0,38 -0,77 -0,25 -0,01
Eurobond10y -0,28 -0,54 0,01 -0,24 0,27 0,38 0,83 0,96 1,00 0,25 0,26 0,37 0,37 -0,64 -0,14 -0,01
EurobondCDS5y 0,15 -0,80 -0,06 -0,61 0,64 -0,21 0,47 0,27 0,25 1,00 1,00 0,90 0,95 -0,04 0,70 0,01
EurobondCDS10y 0,16 -0,82 -0,06 -0,61 0,63 -0,21 0,49 0,28 0,26 1,00 1,00 0,89 0,94 -0,04 0,70 0,01
CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS 0,08 -0,69 -0,03 -0,36 0,49 -0,17 0,51 0,37 0,37 0,90 0,89 1,00 0,98 -0,16 0,39 0,01
CDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS 0,09 -0,78 -0,05 -0,48 0,54 -0,15 0,55 0,38 0,37 0,95 0,94 0,98 1,00 -0,16 0,50 0,01
deficitzone 0,08 0,35 -0,03 -0,10 -0,45 -0,14 -0,84 -0,77 -0,64 -0,04 -0,04 -0,16 -0,16 1,00 0,47 0,01
debtzone -0,12 -0,53 -0,09 -0,75 0,88 -0,03 -0,22 -0,25 -0,14 0,70 0,70 0,39 0,50 0,47 1,00 0,00
Monetary dummy 0,08 -0,01 -0,15 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 1,00  
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of European Central Bank’s actions over the 
sample period 
Depo%daily MLF% MRO% Operations MLF Depo
Mean 0,77 2,31 1,54 6105,56 15,35 1107,35
Median 0,25 1,75 1,00 6183,22 2,29 858,80
Standard Deviation 0,96 1,00 0,98 1459,95 34,10 906,95
Kurtosis 1,98 2,96 2,39 -1,21 17,58 -0,57
Skewness 1,89 2,03 1,95 0,06 3,92 0,67
Jarque-Bera 661,41 916,90 757,99 54,31 13429,90 77,55
Minimum 0,25 1,75 1,00 1804,33 0,00 0,40
Maximum 3,25 5,25 4,25 9104,50 287,07 3842,60
Count 879 879 879 879 879 879
 
Liquidity_
and_SMP CA Reserves CBPP Monetary dummy
Mean 2861,24 2152,32 2126,99 483,43 0,05
Median 3127,91 2158,12 2119,14 597,15 0,00
Standard Deviation 986,84 445,45 39,99 183,59 0,21
Kurtosis -0,04 1,38 -0,65 0,07 16,59
Skewness -0,84 -0,15 0,33 -1,24 4,31
Jarque-Bera 103,64 72,04 31,82 157,46 12655,10
Minimum 18,08 794,28 2060,96 0,66 0,00
Maximum 4172,17 3848,98 2210,56 611,44 1,00
Count 879 879 879 624 879
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Appendix 3. Euribor panel banks data on CDS spreads with 2 year and 5 year 
maturities  
 
Austria Erste Bank der Österreichischen Sparkassen Austria Erste Bank der Österreichischen Sparkassen
  RZB - Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG   RZB - Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG
Belgium Dexia Bank Belgium Dexia Bank
  KBC   KBC
France BNP - Paribas Finland Nordea
  Crédit Agricole s.a. France BNP - Paribas
  HSBC France   Crédit Agricole s.a.
  Natixis   HSBC France
  Société Générale   Natixis
Germany Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale   Société Générale
  Commerzbank Germany Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale
  Deutsche Bank   Commerzbank
  Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale   Deutsche Bank
  WestLB AG   DZ Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank
Ireland AIB Group   Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale
  Bank of Ireland   WestLB AG
Italy Intesa Sanpaolo Ireland AIB Group
  Unicredit   Bank of Ireland
Luxembourg Banque et Caisse d'Épargne de l'État Italy Intesa Sanpaolo
Netherlands ING Bank   Monte dei Paschi di Siena
  Rabobank   Unicredit
  RBS N.V. Luxembourg Banque et Caisse d'Épargne de l'État
Portugal Caixa Geral De Depósitos (CGD) Netherlands ING Bank
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   Rabobank
  Banco Santander Central Hispano   RBS N.V.
  Confederacion Española de Cajas de Ahorros Portugal Caixa Geral De Depósitos (CGD)
  La Caixa Barcelona Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
Other EU Banks Barclays Capital   Banco Santander Central Hispano
  Den Danske Bank   La Caixa Barcelona
  Svenska Handelsbanken Other EU Banks Barclays Capital
International Banks Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi   Den Danske Bank
  Citibank   Svenska Handelsbanken
  J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. International Banks Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi
  UBS (Luxembourg) S.A.   Citibank
  J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
  UBS (Luxembourg) S.A. 
Number of banks 34 Number of banks 36
Euribor panel banks' 2 year CDS spreads were available for Euribor panel banks' 5 year CDS spreads were available for
 
All inclusive list of panel banks: http://www.euribor-ebf.eu/euribor-ebf-eu/about-
us.html 
Data source: Bloomberg
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Appndix 4. Unit root test results (augmented Dickey-Fuller test) 
Neither 
constant
nor trend
Constant
no trend
Constant
trend
lags 
included
Neither 
constant
nor trend
Constant
no trend
Constant
trend lags included
Neither 
constant
nor trend
Constant
no trend
Constant
trend
lags 
included
bs3vs6y1 -0,272903 -3,06516 -3,0751 18 ∆bs3vs6y1 -6,15143 -6,18259 -6,17726 17 DLbs3vs6y1 -5,90615 -8,92175 -8,93338 18
bs3vs6y2 0,307273 -2,89749 -2,89749 18 ∆bs3vs6y2 -6,21372 -6,28832 -6,28556 17 DLbs3vs6y2 -7,46795 -7,62542 -7,6862 14
bs3vs6y5 0,763179 -2,06946 -2,51218 11 ∆bs3vs6y5 -9,20863 -9,32484 -9,3472 10 DLbs3vs6y5 -6,04801 -6,2727 -6,46232 17
bs1vs3y1 -0,851607 -2,52671 -2,98498 19 ∆bs1vs3y1 -6,20113 -6,19988 -6,24499 20 DLbs1vs3y1 -6,4782 -6,49652 -6,55126 20
bs1vs3y2 -0,775068 -3,59227 -4,48495 19 ∆bs1vs3y2 -6,69984 -6,69603 -6,71115 18 DLbs1vs3y2 -6,8836 -6,88708 -6,89466 18
bs1vs3y5 -0,661242 -3,35541 -3,39726 11 ∆bs1vs3y5 -7,58947 -7,584 -7,57904 10 DLbs1vs3y5 -6,57681 -6,58056 -6,57712 17
bs3vs12y1 -0,691049 -2,30321 -2,27722 18 ∆bs3vs12y1 -5,87363 -5,88925 -5,90484 17 DLbs3vs12y1 -10,2395 -10,4911 -10,4902 8
bs3vs12y2 0,00538029 -1,75292 -1,9536 18 ∆bs3vs12y2 -6,0323 -6,07311 -6,09677 17 DLbs3vs12y2 -10,3764 -10,5517 -10,5467 8
bs3vs12y5 0,797399 -0,866782 -1,79447 18 ∆bs3vs12y5 -6,43952 -6,54737 -6,5724 17 DLbs3vs12y5 -8,82392 -8,99813 -8,99594 11
bs6vs12y1 -0,986439 -2,04516 -2,01653 18 ∆bs6vs12y1 -5,7542 -5,76356 -5,79686 17 DLbs6vs12y1 -29,8846 -29,9677 -29,967 0
bs6vs12y2 -0,315248 -1,40594 -1,56114 18 ∆bs6vs12y2 -5,9758 -6,00043 -6,05926 17 DLbs6vs12y2 -4,74403 -5,07947 -5,11105 17
bs6vs12y5 0,797624 -0,540272 -0,9114 12 ∆bs6vs12y5 -9,07855 -9,14147 -9,24025 11 DLbs6vs12y5 -6,78057 -7,15993 -7,15447 19
Depo % -3,39538 -3,10177 -2,13376 20 ∆Depo% -5,19637 -5,41049 -5,98734 19 DLDepo % -5,66727 -5,68189 -6,0976 19
MLF % -3,04702 -3,97232 -2,91591 20 ∆MLF% -5,25701 -5,54877 -6,40914 20 DLMLF % -5,31566 -5,52734 -6,26111 19
MRO % -3,57672 -3,8722 -2,7073 20 ∆MRO% -4,92523 -5,23271 -6,17157 19 DLMRO % -5,35187 -5,52983 -6,28641 19
Operations excluding SMP -0,270541 -1,6278 -2,91131 20 ∆Operations excluding SMP -7,16546 -7,16168 -7,23071 20 DLOperations excluding SMP -4,88987 -5,82673 -5,97988 20
MLF -4,59961 -5,28466 -5,33033 3 ∆MLF -10,0337 -10,0323 -10,0296 13 DLMLF -5,94457 -11,7087 -11,7631 15
Deposit facility -0,669659 -2,2229 -2,19476 20 ∆Deposit facility -7,42276 -7,45648 -7,45794 19 DLDeposit facility -6,00258 -6,23137 -6,38075 20
Autonomous Factors and SMP -0,899752 1,72587 -1,60987 17 ∆Autonomous Factors and SMP -8,30707 -8,43318 -10,2701 16 DLAutonomous Factors and SMP-4,82697 -4,73663 -4,59367 20
Current accounts -0,403707 -7,86079 -8,57016 20 ∆Current accounts -12,6196 -12,6114 -12,6017 20 DLCurrent accounts -5,06387 -9,17896 -9,69942 20
Reserve requirements -0,703353 -0,822174 -2,49034 20 ∆Reserve requirements -7,31225 -7,34228 -7,37114 19 DLReserve requirements -7,25141 -7,27984 -7,30965 19
CBPP 0,115851 -2,44572 -2,12607 18 ∆CBPP -1,73593 -1,7971 -2,00962 17 DLCBPP -4,96979 -4,84588 -4,85388 20
Eurobond 2y 0,323255 -0,225116 -0,753034 18 ∆Eurobond 2y -5,52172 -5,53532 -6,83915 17 DLEurobond 2y -6,89545 -6,92382 -7,79583 15
Eurobond 5y -0,274262 -1,64563 -1,50853 16 ∆Eurobond 5y -6,27698 -6,27252 -6,8856 15 DLEurobond 5y -6,51655 -6,51925 -7,00826 19
Eurobond 10y -1,50853 -2,09775 -2,31813 14 ∆Eurobond 10y -7,08706 -7,0829 -7,30941 13 DLEurobond 10y -7,05777 -7,05555 -7,25122 13
EuroCDS 5y 2,01386 0,70269 -0,764236 19 ∆EuroCDS 5y -6,34414 -6,65308 -6,80138 18 DLEuroCDS 5y -5,37047 -5,70972 -5,72982 16
EuroCDS 10y 2,57674 1,25716 -0,269513 11 ∆EuroCDS 10y -7,19893 -10,7056 -9,71221 14 DLEuroCDS 10y -5,50293 -5,84287 -5,84505 16
CDS_2y_Euribor 1,02667 -0,358993 -1,10103 19 ∆CDS_2y_Euribor -5,54808 -5,58783 -5,66598 18 DLCDS_2y_Euribor -5,66611 -5,86572 -5,86106 20
CDS_5y_Euribor 1,07382 -0,282061 -1,33817 16 ∆CDS_5y_Euribor -5,73369 -5,88536 -5,97572 15 DLCDS_5y_Euribor -6,00057 -7,46804 -7,46633 15
Deficit -0,686519 -3,09404 -2,96235 1 ∆Deficit -3,33129 -3,33972 -3,45097 0 DLDeficit -0,407288 -0,185889 -1,10531 0
Debt 1,04823 -2,73927 -1,53769 1 ∆Debt -1,19995 -1,80662 -2,77371 0 DLDebt 0,155937 1,43956 0,602768 0
EUR/USD -0,831945 -3,27146 -3,27027 12 ∆EUR/USD -8,11695 -8,14138 -8,18107 11 DLEUR/USD -8,06607 -8,07862 -8,10851 11
*Critical values
(10% signifigance) -1,6156 -2,5671 -3,1279
*Critical values
(10% signifigance) -1,6156 -2,5671 -3,1279
*Critical values
(10% signifigance) -1,6156 -2,5671 -3,1279
*Critical values
(5 % signifigance) -1,9393 -2,8621 -3,4126
*Critical values
(5 % signifigance) -1,9393 -2,8621 -3,4126
*Critical values
(5 % signifigance) -1,9393 -2,8621 -3,4126
*Critical values
(1 % signifigance) -2,5658 -3,4336 -3,9638
*Critical values
(1 % signifigance) -2,5658 -3,4336 -3,9638
*Critical values
(1 % signifigance) -2,5658 -3,4336 -3,9638
*Mackinnon (2010)
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Appendix 5. Descriptive statistics of relative changes in variables 
*** bs3vs6y1 bs3vs6y2 bs3vs6y5 bs1vs3y1 bs1vs3y2 bs1vs3y5 bs3vs12y1 bs3vs12y2 bs3vs12y5 bs6vs12y1 bs6vs12y2 bs6vs12y5
Mean 0,004 0,003 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,006 0,003 0,002 0,236 0,030 0,006
Median 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Standard Deviation 0,059 0,040 0,030 0,045 0,035 0,031 0,108 0,060 0,042 4,108 0,329 0,104
Kurtosis 28,918 26,524 12,422 16,144 15,727 12,562 107,500 7,692 5,914 747,924 114,465 18,832
Skewness 2,514 2,357 1,227 1,172 1,096 0,338 6,052 0,702 0,489 26,548 9,008 2,241
Jarque-Bera 52,536 26242,800 5793,940 9618,930 9112,790 5717,670 423261,000 2207,910 1297,020 20334700,000 485662,000 13549,900
Minimum -0,388 -0,213 -0,123 -0,289 -0,171 -0,190 -0,672 -0,346 -0,212 -0,992 -0,909 -0,500
Maximum 0,681 0,471 0,259 0,464 0,362 0,280 1,892 0,429 0,254 117,000 5,000 0,889
Count 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878 878
*** Depo%daily MLF% MRO% Operations MLF Depo Liquidity_excl_SMP CA Reserves CBPP EUR/USD Eurobond2y
Mean -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,007 9,086 0,204 0,004 0,039 0,000 0,017 0,000 0,001
Median 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,037 -0,003 -0,022 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Standard Deviation 0,050 0,015 0,021 0,132 72,756 2,198 0,152 0,390 0,002 0,120 0,008 0,028
Kurtosis 227,062 119,131 100,734 45,109 398,330 349,684 449,522 24,518 43,113 160,777 2,603 23,080
Skewness 6,283 -7,520 -4,014 4,413 17,956 17,933 19,124 4,684 -1,299 12,219 -0,076 -1,606
Jarque-Bera 1870390,000 521503,000 369313,000 76413,700 5592290,000 1870390,000 7361690,000 24929,900 67452,000 676753,000 244,584 19630,900
Minimum -0,500 -0,222 -0,250 -0,612 -1,000 -0,996 -0,899 -0,564 -0,016 -0,003 -0,046 -0,331
Maximum 1,000 0,143 0,250 1,569 1751,500 47,528 3,747 3,087 0,015 1,870 0,041 0,119
Count 878 878 878 878 849 878 878 878 878 624 878 878
*** Eurobond5y Eurobond10yEurobondCDS5yEurobondCDS10y CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSCDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS deficitzone debtzone
Mean 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,004 0,003 0,002 0,001 -0,001
Median 0,000 0,000 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,000
Standard Deviation 0,017 0,012 0,043 0,038 0,032 0,031 0,036 0,035
Kurtosis 3,632 2,190 4,500 4,632 10,626 13,130 743,300 829,912
Skewness -0,271 -0,238 0,084 0,237 0,377 0,682 -26,516 -28,807
Jarque-Bera 486,019 180,584 731,117 782,002 4099,520 6296,610 18974500,000 23647800,000
Minimum -0,115 -0,066 -0,274 -0,251 -0,213 -0,190 -1,000 -1,000
Maximum 0,067 0,040 0,219 0,195 0,248 0,242 0,029 0,001
Count 878 878 878 878 878 878 830 830
***Variables are relative changes
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Appendix 6. OLS estimation results with six independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-878 
Dependent variable: bs3vs12y5 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,00216167 0,00123543 1,7497 0,08052 * 
Operations 0,0140948 0,00931937 1,5124 0,13079  
Depo 2,63688e-05 0,00056111 0,0470 0,96253  
EurobondCDS10y 0,0605531 0,0344723 1,7566 0,07934 * 
Reserves 0,125791 0,760615 0,1654 0,86868  
EUR_USD -0,617746 0,162493 -3,8017 0,00015 *** 
Eurobond5y -1,14535 0,0712427 -16,0767 <0,00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0,002450  S.D. dependent var  0,041553 
Sum squared resid  1,143174  S.E. of regression  0,036228 
R-squared  0,245063  Adjusted R-squared  0,239863 
F(6, 871)  47,12314  P-value(F)  3,93e-50 
Log-likelihood  1670,817  Akaike criterion -3327,634 
Schwarz criterion -3294,190  Hannan-Quinn -3314,843 
rho -0,025729  Durbin-Watson  2,048597 
 
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-878 
Dependent variable: bs3vs12y2 
 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
const 0,00283948 0,00172358 1,6474 0,09983 * 
Operations 0,0101758 0,0129947 0,7831 0,43380  
Depo 0,000236921 0,000782747 0,3027 0,76221  
EurobondCDS10y 0,260597 0,0486953 5,3516 <0,00001 *** 
Reserves 0,149206 1,06057 0,1407 0,88815  
EUR_USD -0,550589 0,226809 -2,4275 0,01540 ** 
Eurobond2y -1,13409 0,0617836 -18,3559 <0,00001 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0,003309  S.D. dependent var  0,059945 
Sum squared resid  2,224918  S.E. of regression  0,050541 
R-squared  0,294003  Adjusted R-squared  0,289140 
F(6, 871)  60,45280  P-value(F)  1,19e-62 
Log-likelihood  1378,482  Akaike criterion -2742,964 
Schwarz criterion -2709,520  Hannan-Quinn -2730,173 
rho -0,092663  Durbin-Watson  2,184779 
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Appendix 7. Correlation matrix (relative changes) 
 
bs3vs6y1 bs3vs6y2 bs3vs6y5 bs1vs3y1 bs1vs3y2 bs1vs3y5 bs3vs12y1bs3vs12y2bs3vs12y5bs6vs12y1bs6vs12y2bs6vs12y5Depo%daily MLF% MRO% Operations MLF
bs3vs6y1 1 0,951331 0,760447 0,231702 0,161845 0,106999 0,780935 0,844965 0,768172 0,283787 0,249697 0,456824 -0,00635 -0,01181 -0,0027 0,01236638 -0,01013
bs3vs6y2 0,951331 1 0,855772 0,223003 0,178698 0,13468 0,674232 0,816745 0,801442 0,158154 0,226372 0,445455 -0,0061 -0,00262 0,001863 0,01821855 -0,01256
bs3vs6y5 0,760447 0,855772 1 0,189206 0,181413 0,184524 0,509785 0,676862 0,782169 0,076675 0,18765 0,392753 0,007382 0,012681 0,026793 0,03505113 -0,01083
bs1vs3y1 0,231702 0,223003 0,189206 1 0,89184 0,591378 0,249306 0,227715 0,200887 0,155876 0,072029 0,09256 -0,0316 -0,12191 -0,10024 0,05443823 0,019704
bs1vs3y2 0,161845 0,178698 0,181413 0,89184 1 0,800249 0,158761 0,167626 0,176688 0,077418 0,035648 0,076793 -0,03308 -0,11328 -0,10945 0,05047989 0,012957
bs1vs3y5 0,106999 0,13468 0,184524 0,591378 0,800249 1 0,098787 0,125982 0,164744 0,015042 0,06367 0,08871 -0,01964 -0,05558 -0,06734 0,01872702 0,016012
bs3vs12y1 0,780935 0,674232 0,509785 0,249306 0,158761 0,098787 1 0,894224 0,740023 0,595943 0,431578 0,642422 0,012228 -0,00828 0,002134 0,014434 0,000189
bs3vs12y2 0,844965 0,816745 0,676862 0,227715 0,167626 0,125982 0,894224 1 0,923512 0,26512 0,457668 0,755077 0,002696 -0,00688 -0,00342 0,02843726 -0,00335
bs3vs12y5 0,768172 0,801442 0,782169 0,200887 0,176688 0,164744 0,740023 0,923512 1 0,128869 0,404322 0,75544 0,016554 0,01071 0,016864 0,0305962 -0,00764
bs6vs12y1 0,283787 0,158154 0,076675 0,155876 0,077418 0,015042 0,595943 0,26512 0,128869 1 0,113851 0,10726 0,001628 0,003108 0,003125 0,00243284 -0,002
bs6vs12y2 0,249697 0,226372 0,18765 0,072029 0,035648 0,06367 0,431578 0,457668 0,404322 0,113851 1 0,618248 0,003545 0,002174 0,002956 0,01340366 -0,00811
bs6vs12y5 0,456824 0,445455 0,392753 0,09256 0,076793 0,08871 0,642422 0,755077 0,75544 0,10726 0,618248 1 0,012705 0,005249 0,00896 0,02844189 -0,00671
Depo%daily -0,00635 -0,0061 0,007382 -0,0316 -0,03308 -0,01964 0,012228 0,002696 0,016554 0,001628 0,003545 0,012705 1 0,659338 0,86458 -0,08097314 0,002119
MLF% -0,01181 -0,00262 0,012681 -0,12191 -0,11328 -0,05558 -0,00828 -0,00688 0,01071 0,003108 0,002174 0,005249 0,659338 1 0,901342 -0,15903129 0,007903
MRO% -0,0027 0,001863 0,026793 -0,10024 -0,10945 -0,06734 0,002134 -0,00342 0,016864 0,003125 0,002956 0,00896 0,86458 0,901342 1 -0,14738677 0,007028
Operations 0,012366 0,018219 0,035051 0,054438 0,05048 0,018727 0,014434 0,028437 0,030596 0,002433 0,013404 0,028442 -0,08097 -0,15903 -0,14739 1 -0,00203
MLF (in secondary axis)-0,01013 -0,01256 -0,01083 0,019704 0,012957 0,016012 0,000189 -0,00335 -0,00764 -0,002 -0,00811 -0,00671 0,002119 0,007903 0,007028 -0,00202835 1
Depo 0,030066 0,029188 0,091948 0,034688 0,032996 -0,00598 0,021854 0,029383 0,022672 -0,00316 0,00232 0,002828 -0,00608 0,002827 0,00123 0,11954315 -0,00522
Liquidity_excl_SMP-0,02822 -0,02228 -0,00577 0,00221 -0,01722 -0,01401 -0,01925 -0,02081 -0,01601 -0,00283 -0,00787 -0,01233 0,009002 0,013996 0,014411 -0,02076518 -0,00626
CA 0,005176 0,013123 0,032719 0,059354 0,041182 0,016868 0,012119 0,025651 0,030071 0,001496 0,015238 0,027739 -0,05451 -0,14878 -0,14811 0,88070405 -0,01181
Reserves -0,00933 -0,01734 -0,02151 -0,0059 -0,00687 -0,04808 0,000536 -0,01325 -0,02033 0,000699 -0,00054 -0,00171 -0,21359 -0,16191 -0,18956 -0,01512421 -0,00376
CBPP -0,00539 0,005447 0,014981 0,007437 0,039715 0,062393 -0,0277 -0,0348 -0,03952 -0,00904 -0,01711 -0,0276 -0,00555 -0,00396 -0,00436 -0,00466982 -0,01654
EUR/USD -0,11946 -0,13761 -0,13612 -0,18585 -0,18386 -0,13137 -0,08333 -0,12049 -0,13472 0,027108 -0,0718 -0,08493 0,031018 0,033519 0,040861 0,01808766 -0,03993
Eurobond2y -0,37673 -0,3596 -0,30077 -0,01018 0,014248 0,003625 -0,42876 -0,50171 -0,46573 -0,01535 -0,26627 -0,44189 0,014573 0,038291 0,025699 -0,0029879 0,035935
Eurobond5y -0,36143 -0,35763 -0,31474 -0,08487 -0,05605 -0,0602 -0,41993 -0,49819 -0,46967 -0,02466 -0,26538 -0,41746 -0,00806 0,011871 -0,00229 0,02915423 0,007253
Eurobond10y -0,29606 -0,29684 -0,24982 -0,06881 -0,03739 -0,03223 -0,33268 -0,40396 -0,383 -0,02903 -0,21241 -0,32885 -0,01255 -0,008 -0,01242 0,03724015 -0,00984
EurobondCDS5y0,083315 0,087631 0,073007 0,13769 0,123033 0,079324 0,076713 0,08377 0,047722 0,005835 0,03652 0,032285 -0,00075 -0,04372 -0,03783 0,02895046 0,04305
EurobondCDS10y0,093935 0,102517 0,093498 0,144873 0,136168 0,089349 0,093475 0,110291 0,085666 -0,00158 0,053316 0,059527 0,015174 -0,0439 -0,0265 0,02849538 0,053004
CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS0,083685 0,115285 0,145355 0,165649 0,171368 0,147011 0,045996 0,082667 0,105485 -0,01839 0,016129 0,044729 -0,00446 0,00485 -0,01287 -0,00475656 0,061897
CDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS0,146935 0,176904 0,192453 0,155914 0,163903 0,149165 0,08044 0,135135 0,150812 -0,01746 0,029955 0,070003 -0,00807 -0,00819 -0,02312 -0,01282316 0,0617
deficitzone 0,015641 0,009831 -0,00554 -0,00922 -0,00253 0,00584 0,003476 0,001472 -0,00406 5,45E-05 -0,00418 0,002743 -0,01338 -0,0028 -0,01093 -0,00553448 0,000817
debtzone 0,005454 0,002053 -0,00398 -0,00794 -0,00405 0,000622 -0,00126 -0,00296 -0,00419 0,001674 0,001904 -0,00067 -0,00114 -0,00291 -0,00271 0,00174753 0,003317
Monetary dummy0,017162 -0,00611 -0,0189 0,050795 0,040958 0,051601 0,018504 0,003879 -0,01312 -0,00914 -0,00579 -0,00421 0,003819 0,013902 0,012231 -0,01738165 0,042526
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DepoLiquidity_excl_SMPCA Reserves CBPP EUR/USDEurobond2yEurobond5yEurobond10yEurobondCDS5yEurobondCDS10yCDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSCDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSdeficitzone debtzoneMonetary dummy
bs3vs6y1 0,030066 -0,02822 0,005176 -0,00933 -0,00539 -0,11946 -0,37673 -0,36143 -0,29606 0,083315 0,093935 0,083685 0,146935 0,015641 0,005454 0,017
bs3vs6y2 0,029188 -0,02228 0,013123 -0,01734 0,005447 -0,13761 -0,3596 -0,35763 -0,29684 0,087631 0,102517 0,115285 0,176904 0,009831 0,002053 -0,006
bs3vs6y5 0,091948 -0,00577 0,032719 -0,02151 0,014981 -0,13612 -0,30077 -0,31474 -0,24982 0,073007 0,093498 0,145355 0,192453 -0,00554 -0,00398 -0,019
bs1vs3y1 0,034688 0,00221 0,059354 -0,0059 0,007437 -0,18585 -0,01018 -0,08487 -0,06881 0,13769 0,144873 0,165649 0,155914 -0,00922 -0,00794 0,051
bs1vs3y2 0,032996 -0,01722 0,041182 -0,00687 0,039715 -0,18386 0,014248 -0,05605 -0,03739 0,123033 0,136168 0,171368 0,163903 -0,00253 -0,00405 0,041
bs1vs3y5 -0,00598 -0,01401 0,016868 -0,04808 0,062393 -0,13137 0,003625 -0,0602 -0,03223 0,079324 0,089349 0,147011 0,149165 0,00584 0,000622 0,052
bs3vs12y1 0,021854 -0,01925 0,012119 0,000536 -0,0277 -0,08333 -0,42876 -0,41993 -0,33268 0,076713 0,093475 0,045996 0,08044 0,003476 -0,00126 0,019
bs3vs12y2 0,029383 -0,02081 0,025651 -0,01325 -0,0348 -0,12049 -0,50171 -0,49819 -0,40396 0,08377 0,110291 0,082667 0,135135 0,001472 -0,00296 0,004
bs3vs12y5 0,022672 -0,01601 0,030071 -0,02033 -0,03952 -0,13472 -0,46573 -0,46967 -0,383 0,047722 0,085666 0,105485 0,150812 -0,00406 -0,00419 -0,013
bs6vs12y1 -0,00316 -0,00283 0,001496 0,000699 -0,00904 0,027108 -0,01535 -0,02466 -0,02903 0,005835 -0,00158 -0,01839 -0,01746 5,45E-05 0,001674 -0,009
bs6vs12y2 0,00232 -0,00787 0,015238 -0,00054 -0,01711 -0,0718 -0,26627 -0,26538 -0,21241 0,03652 0,053316 0,016129 0,029955 -0,00418 0,001904 -0,006
bs6vs12y5 0,002828 -0,01233 0,027739 -0,00171 -0,0276 -0,08493 -0,44189 -0,41746 -0,32885 0,032285 0,059527 0,044729 0,070003 0,002743 -0,00067 -0,004
Depo%daily -0,00608 0,009002 -0,05451 -0,21359 -0,00555 0,031018 0,014573 -0,00806 -0,01255 -0,00075 0,015174 -0,00446 -0,00807 -0,01338 -0,00114 0,004
MLF% 0,002827 0,013996 -0,14878 -0,16191 -0,00396 0,033519 0,038291 0,011871 -0,008 -0,04372 -0,0439 0,00485 -0,00819 -0,0028 -0,00291 0,014
MRO% 0,00123 0,014411 -0,14811 -0,18956 -0,00436 0,040861 0,025699 -0,00229 -0,01242 -0,03783 -0,0265 -0,01287 -0,02312 -0,01093 -0,00271 0,012
Operations 0,119543 -0,02077 0,880704 -0,01512 -0,00467 0,018088 -0,00299 0,029154 0,03724 0,02895 0,028495 -0,00476 -0,01282 -0,00553 0,001748 -0,017
MLF (in secondary axis)-0,00522 -0,00626 -0,01181 -0,00376 -0,01654 -0,03993 0,035935 0,007253 -0,00984 0,04305 0,053004 0,061897 0,0617 0,000817 0,003317 0,043
Depo 1 -0,00777 0,083284 0,002402 0,010091 -0,0245 -0,02866 -0,02659 -0,02959 -0,01116 0,005956 0,028717 0,032052 0,023426 0,002113 -0,011
Liquidity_excl_SMP-0,00777 1 -0,04472 -0,00274 -0,00118 -0,00864 0,006073 0,002254 -0,02878 -0,01331 -0,02086 -0,0351 -0,04767 0,046147 0,050334 -0,005
CA 0,083284 -0,04472 1 -0,06912 -0,02051 0,011566 0,004524 0,026199 0,044663 0,033719 0,023843 -0,01242 -0,0153 -0,00107 0,006249 -0,033
Reserves 0,002402 -0,00274 -0,06912 1 0,000748 0,04277 0,002109 0,031949 0,042769 -0,07732 -0,07599 -0,07543 -0,05379 0,002664 -0,00077 0,004
CBPP 0,010091 -0,00118 -0,02051 0,000748 1 0,02649 0,010291 0,002917 0,000474 -0,0509 -0,05043 -0,04978 -0,04904 0,020908 0,006496 -0,025
EUR/USD -0,0245 -0,00864 0,011566 0,04277 0,02649 1 -0,02797 -0,01119 -0,00702 -0,36064 -0,36789 -0,30806 -0,327 0,047532 0,05513 0,005
Eurobond2y -0,02866 0,006073 0,004524 0,002109 0,010291 -0,02797 1 0,829387 0,657583 0,188687 0,15842 0,146234 0,111964 -0,00487 0,013736 0,016
Eurobond5y -0,02659 0,002254 0,026199 0,031949 0,002917 -0,01119 0,829387 1 0,899369 0,058461 0,032419 -0,01883 -0,05595 0,009184 0,01975 0,008
Eurobond10y -0,02959 -0,02878 0,044663 0,042769 0,000474 -0,00702 0,657583 0,899369 1 0,025976 -0,00767 -0,06779 -0,09906 0,020876 0,028156 0,032
EurobondCDS5y-0,01116 -0,01331 0,033719 -0,07732 -0,0509 -0,36064 0,188687 0,058461 0,025976 1 0,880942 0,556102 0,557735 -0,01093 -0,00391 0,045
EurobondCDS10y0,005956 -0,02086 0,023843 -0,07599 -0,05043 -0,36789 0,15842 0,032419 -0,00767 0,880942 1 0,570063 0,575446 -0,01414 -0,00849 0,028
CDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS0,028717 -0,0351 -0,01242 -0,07543 -0,04978 -0,30806 0,146234 -0,01883 -0,06779 0,556102 0,570063 1 0,871508 -0,00978 -0,009 0,011
CDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKS0,032052 -0,04767 -0,0153 -0,05379 -0,04904 -0,327 0,111964 -0,05595 -0,09906 0,557735 0,575446 0,871508 1 -0,01342 -0,01734 0,011
deficitzone 0,023426 0,046147 -0,00107 0,002664 0,020908 0,047532 -0,00487 0,009184 0,020876 -0,01093 -0,01414 -0,00978 -0,01342 1 0,972926 0,007
debtzone 0,002113 0,050334 0,006249 -0,00077 0,006496 0,05513 0,013736 0,01975 0,028156 -0,00391 -0,00849 -0,009 -0,01734 0,972926 1 0,008
Monetary dummy-0,01119 -0,00503 -0,03308 0,004499 -0,02469 0,004516 0,015731 0,00817 0,032239 0,045103 0,027565 0,011336 0,010609 0,006881 0,007664 1
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Appendix 8. Correlation between 3M vs. 12M Euribor basis swap spreads with 2 year and 5 year maturities including one to five 
leads and lags of explanatory variables 
Basis lead/lag Depo%daily MLF% MRO% OperationsMLF (in secondary axis) Depo Liquidity_and_SMP CA Reserves CBPP EUR/USD Eurobond2y Eurobond5y Eurobond10yEurobondCDS5yEurobondCDS10yCDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSCDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSdeficitzone debtzone Monetary dummy
-5 0,003 -0,064 -0,029 -0,003 0,015 -0,011 0,001 -0,004 -0,010 -0,030 -0,038 0,018 0,005 -0,007 0,042 0,048 -0,020 -0,015 0,006 0,007 0,033
-4 0,079 0,011 0,069 0,017 0,031 0,071 0,016 -0,004 -0,080 -0,027 -0,051 0,010 -0,019 -0,037 0,038 0,018 -0,003 -0,055 0,026 0,029 -0,017
-3 0,017 0,024 0,017 -0,016 0,021 0,090 0,023 -0,014 -0,046 -0,029 0,047 -0,041 -0,074 -0,088 -0,056 -0,045 -0,035 -0,056 0,025 0,026 0,063
-2 0,055 0,052 0,072 0,036 -0,046 -0,034 0,003 0,039 -0,043 -0,012 -0,006 0,017 0,009 0,015 0,020 0,007 -0,006 0,009 0,002 0,001 -0,029
-1 0,065 0,057 0,071 -0,006 0,033 0,082 -0,003 -0,018 -0,001 -0,031 -0,102 -0,053 -0,017 0,009 0,107 0,120 0,111 0,076 -0,015 -0,020 0,004
0 0,003 -0,007 -0,003 0,028 -0,003 0,029 -0,021 0,026 -0,013 -0,035 -0,120 -0,502 -0,498 -0,404 0,084 0,110 0,083 0,135 0,001 -0,003 0,004
1 0,004 0,014 0,013 -0,015 -0,025 0,035 0,005 -0,018 -0,001 0,030 -0,002 0,025 0,027 0,031 0,042 0,020 -0,031 -0,034 -0,003 -0,010 -0,012
2 0,007 -0,012 0,009 -0,012 -0,031 0,001 0,006 -0,023 -0,011 -0,061 -0,012 0,028 0,047 0,063 0,017 0,004 0,002 0,027 0,007 0,004 -0,011
3 0,069 0,001 0,054 0,026 0,018 -0,048 0,003 0,020 0,025 -0,007 -0,019 0,015 0,020 0,013 0,015 0,019 -0,049 -0,033 0,044 0,042 0,022
4 -0,041 -0,013 -0,035 -0,012 0,021 0,106 -0,006 -0,005 0,030 0,036 -0,012 0,057 0,035 0,038 -0,007 0,037 0,006 0,040 -0,002 -0,007 0,053
5 -0,022 -0,009 -0,023 0,000 0,005 0,024 0,047 -0,007 0,072 -0,057 0,005 0,067 0,060 0,062 0,010 -0,015 -0,108 -0,103 0,019 0,015 0,015
Basis lead/lag Depo%daily MLF% MRO% OperationsMLF (in secondary axis) Depo Liquidity_and_SMP CA Reserves CBPP EUR/USD Eurobond2y Eurobond5y Eurobond10yEurobondCDS5yEurobondCDS10yCDS 2y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSCDS 5y EURIBOR PANEL BANKSdeficitzone debtzone Monetary dummy
-5 0,002 -0,078 -0,037 0,004 0,011 -0,007 0,004 0,000 -0,013 -0,028 -0,023 0,034 0,021 0,006 0,008 0,015 -0,048 -0,043 0,002 0,007 0,038
-4 0,082 0,018 0,080 -0,002 0,025 0,071 0,003 -0,024 -0,076 -0,023 -0,052 0,002 -0,015 -0,037 0,033 0,015 -0,015 -0,067 0,017 0,024 -0,017
-3 0,022 0,032 0,028 -0,006 0,021 0,107 0,005 -0,022 -0,035 -0,039 0,038 -0,029 -0,060 -0,078 -0,064 -0,051 -0,031 -0,067 0,017 0,023 0,049
-2 0,032 0,030 0,050 0,039 -0,032 -0,031 -0,016 0,038 -0,035 -0,009 0,011 0,018 0,018 0,030 0,030 0,020 -0,007 0,010 -0,004 0,000 -0,041
-1 0,072 0,061 0,081 -0,005 0,027 0,076 -0,003 -0,015 -0,026 -0,041 -0,088 -0,066 -0,035 -0,012 0,102 0,113 0,120 0,078 -0,015 -0,016 -0,013
0 0,017 0,011 0,017 0,031 -0,008 0,023 -0,016 0,030 -0,020 -0,040 -0,135 -0,466 -0,470 -0,383 0,048 0,086 0,105 0,151 -0,004 -0,004 -0,013
1 0,006 0,028 0,025 -0,016 -0,013 0,036 0,011 -0,018 -0,012 0,047 -0,018 0,004 -0,012 -0,003 0,037 0,013 -0,020 -0,015 -0,005 -0,006 -0,006
2 0,000 -0,016 0,003 -0,010 -0,015 -0,024 0,009 -0,017 -0,012 -0,072 0,006 0,032 0,041 0,050 0,043 0,019 -0,001 0,012 0,003 0,003 -0,019
3 0,071 0,001 0,062 0,018 0,005 -0,028 0,006 0,011 0,033 0,003 -0,022 0,006 0,002 0,005 0,027 0,040 -0,035 -0,010 0,036 0,039 0,031
4 -0,038 -0,009 -0,037 -0,002 0,028 0,130 -0,007 0,006 0,020 0,049 -0,003 0,045 0,016 0,020 -0,013 0,022 -0,007 0,030 -0,005 -0,005 0,057
5 -0,051 -0,021 -0,049 -0,007 0,007 0,028 0,035 -0,011 0,094 -0,072 0,023 0,077 0,066 0,058 0,018 -0,015 -0,112 -0,114 0,011 0,009 -0,003
3vs12 2y
3vs12 5y
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Appendix 9. Lag length selection for Johansen’s test 
VAR system, maximum lag order 20 
 
The asterisks below indicate the best (that is, minimized) values 
of the respective information criteria, AIC = Akaike criterion, 
BIC = Schwarz Bayesian criterion and HQC = Hannan-Quinn criterion. 
 
lags        loglik    p(LR)       AIC          BIC          HQC 
 
   1  -15221,96370            35,571510    35,881549    35,690212  
   2  -14942,56342  0,00000   35,035072    35,616394*   35,257637* 
   3  -14863,97458  0,00000   34,966181*   35,818786    35,292609  
   4  -14825,32501  0,00610   34,990279    36,114169    35,420572  
   5  -14791,61952  0,04155   35,025889    36,421063    35,560045  
   6  -14759,60553  0,07330   35,065438    36,731895    35,703457  
   7  -14729,58062  0,13391   35,109617    37,047358    35,851501  
   8  -14681,11382  0,00005   35,110859    37,319883    35,956606  
   9  -14647,54150  0,04352   35,146779    37,627087    36,096389  
  10  -14599,55521  0,00007   35,149139    37,900731    36,202613  
  11  -14564,68741  0,02736   35,182043    38,204918    36,339381  
  12  -14532,26055  0,06410   35,220630    38,514789    36,481832  
  13  -14504,65664  0,25171   35,270446    38,835889    36,635511  
  14  -14474,03047  0,11248   35,313226    39,149952    36,782155  
  15  -14444,17402  0,14045   35,357797    39,465807    36,930590  
  16  -14413,46137  0,10963   35,400376    39,779669    37,077032  
  17  -14391,65369  0,69047   35,463687    40,114265    37,244207  
  18  -14343,50796  0,00006   35,465676    40,387537    37,350060  
  19  -14304,04374  0,00430   35,487878    40,681023    37,476126  
  20  -14232,81854  0,00000   35,436132    40,900560    37,528243  
 
VAR system, maximum lag order 20 
 
The asterisks below indicate the best (that is, minimized) values 
of the respective information criteria, AIC = Akaike criterion, 
BIC = Schwarz Bayesian criterion and HQC = Hannan-Quinn criterion. 
 
lags        loglik    p(LR)       AIC          BIC          HQC 
 
   1  -14401,12270            33,660356    33,970394    33,779057  
   2  -14141,74197  0,00000   33,170528    33,751851*   33,393093* 
   3  -14058,09844  0,00000   33,089868*   33,942474    33,416297  
   4  -14025,14091  0,05372   33,127220    34,251109    33,557512  
   5  -13996,30287  0,18515   33,174163    34,569336    33,708319  
   6  -13960,65684  0,02044   33,205255    34,871711    33,843274  
   7  -13934,83272  0,37072   33,259215    35,196955    34,001098  
   8  -13889,33533  0,00025   33,267370    35,476394    34,113117  
   9  -13859,02018  0,12320   33,310874    35,791181    34,260484  
  10  -13812,81378  0,00018   33,317378    36,068969    34,370852  
  11  -13780,17398  0,05975   33,355469    36,378344    34,512807  
  12  -13753,27684  0,29590   33,406931    36,701090    34,668133  
  13  -13727,38118  0,36547   33,460725    37,026167    34,825790  
  14  -13704,03616  0,56727   33,520457    37,357183    34,989386  
  15  -13676,85215  0,27745   33,571251    37,679261    35,144043  
  16  -13650,11200  0,30629   33,623078    38,002372    35,299734  
  17  -13630,81914  0,85740   33,692245    38,342822    35,472765  
  18  -13584,13193  0,00014   33,697630    38,619491    35,582013  
  19  -13545,21284  0,00544   33,721101    38,914246    35,709348  
  20  -13473,86355  0,00000   33,669065    39,133494    35,761176  
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Appendix 10. Total outstanding amounts of over the counter euro denominated plain vanilla swaps in billions of USD (in right axis) 
with respect to Eurobond yields (in left axis)  
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